APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Opal Hughes sustained injuries while in the care of defendant Hillcrest Healthcare - West, and her administrator brought this action for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was a complaint for malpractice against defendant. Plaintiff argued that the complaint was for simple negligence, and the Trial Court held the complaint was for medical malpractice and since statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice complaint had not been met, dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the distribution of marital property. After a bench trial, the court entered the Final Decree of Divorce and distributed the marital property. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and for attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion in part and awarded approximately $2,087.50 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Wife. Wife appeals. We affirm.

In this action charging retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted defendant a dismissal of action based on its Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 Motion. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The Defendant, Conrad Earl Edwards, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, incest, a Class C felony, and sexual battery, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to serve eight years as a Violent Offender for rape, three years as a Range I offender for incest, and one year as a Range I offender for sexual battery. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's failure to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender and the denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Former foster mother and her new husband filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption of three children by the current foster parents. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Ray Clark, appeals as of right the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea convictions for five counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and four counts of theft of property, Class D felonies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel's ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

The Petitioner, Marco Linsey, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea conviction for one count of child rape, a Class A felony. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee developed a latex allergy as a result of her employment at a hospital, and the hospital made certain accommodations that enabled the employee to continue working. However, the employee’s sensitivity to latex increased over the years, and she eventually left her job. The employee filed a petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On this appeal, the employer contends that the treating physician’s impairment rating should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not in accordance with the AMA Guides. The employer also argues that a lower impairment should have been used by the trial court and that the award should have been capped. We affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court approved a settlement of this workers’ compensation claim. The settlement was presented to the court by means of an affidavit executed by the employee and a telephone conference between the court and the employee. Approximately six weeks later, the employee petitioned to set aside the settlement under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-206(a) and alternatively, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court dismissed the petition for relief from Judgment. The employee has appealed. We affirm the order dismissing the petition to set the settlement aside.

Bobby R. Hopkins ("Hopkins") sued Doyle K. Riggs and Ruth Riggs ("the Riggs") alleging, in part, that the Riggs had contracted to construct a road on the Riggs' property for Hopkins' use and had failed to construct an adequate road. The Riggs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Trial Court granted them summary judgment. The Riggs then sought attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract. The parties then reached an agreement with regard to attorney's fees, an agreement which the Riggs subsequently alleged was breached by Hopkins. The Riggs then filed a motion and the Trial Court entered an order granting the Riggs additional attorney's fees. Hopkins appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, hold that the Riggs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract, vacate the Trial Court's November 25, 2008 Order granting additional attorney's fees, and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order that complies with the parties' August 6, 2008 agreement.

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine ("Plaintiff") was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton ("Walton"). The vehicle was owned by James Rice ("Father"), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice ("Son"), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day. Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, John Tyler Beason, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, for which he received a twenty-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement and that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. An employee sustained a work-related repetitive exposure hearing loss injury. After he retired for reasons unrelated to the injury, he filed suit in the Criminal Court for Wilson County seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded 65% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears and set the date of injury as the date that the employee first learned of his hearing loss. The employer appealed arguing that the award was excessive and that the trial court erred in setting the date of injury. We find that the award was excessive and modify it to 15% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to its determination of the date of the injury.

The Petitioner, Leslie Paul Hatfield, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's partial denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he contended (1) that his conviction for incest, a Class C felony, was void because he was illegally sentenced to community supervision for life, (2) that his convictions for two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count each of solicitation of a minor and casual exchange of a Schedule IV controlled substance, both Class E felonies, were void because he was not awarded all his pre-trial jail credits, and (3) that his convictions for statutory rape, solicitation of a minor, and casual exchange were void because he was not awarded pre-trial jail credits against the sentences that he was ordered to serve concurrently. The trial court granted the writ of habeas corpus for the Petitioner's sentence for incest, but it denied habeas corpus relief on the Petitioner's remaining grounds. Because the judgment for statutory rape reflects an illegal sentence and because the Petitioner's pre-trial credits were not applied to the sentences that he was ordered to serve concurrently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for transfer to the Criminal Court for Scott County for the entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, Quincy Bryan Banks, appeals the consecutive-sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court, which was imposed following remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals for resentencing. See State v. Quincy Bryan Banks, No. M2007-00545-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 11, 2008). Upon our de novo review of the order of consecutive sentencing without a presumption of correctness, we vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand for further sentencing proceedings.

I concur in the results reached by the majority opinion; yet, I choose to write
separately because my opinion differs from the majority in how we arrive at that same result.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Elgy Smith, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, both Class B felonies; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, both Class E felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged each pair of convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five persistent offender for the cocaine offense and five years as a Range III, persistent offender for the marijuana offense. Finding the Defendant to be a professional criminal, the trial court also ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bykeem Bret Jenkins, pleaded guilty in 2007 in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and received a two-year suspended sentence. In response to a timely petition for violation of the defendant's probation, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals from the order of confinement. We affirm the trial court's order.

In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Justin Rashard Forrest, appeals the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery in case number 07-337; aggravated burglary and theft in case number 07-285; and possession of marijuana and especially aggravated robbery in 07-286. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Latoya Danielle Patton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received a sentence of forty years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in advising the petitioner. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Stevie Leonard Kelly, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and two counts of evading arrest. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years for the drug conviction and five years for each evading arrest. The trial court further ordered that the effective ten-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction consecutive to sentences for which the defendant was found to be in violation of probation. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentences, specifically contending that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors in determining the sentence lengths; (2) the court erred in ordering that the sentences be served in confinement; and (3) consecutive sentencing was improperly imposed. Following review of the record, we conclude that: (1) a challenge based upon the weighing of enhancement or mitigating factors is no longer a ground for appeal; (2) no abuse of discretion resulted from the court's decision that confinement was necessary because measures less restrictive than confinement had recently been applied; and (3) no abuse of discretion resulted from the court's decision to impose consecutive sentencing based upon the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time the offenses were committed. Accordingly, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

Petitioner, Charles Owens, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received a sentence of twenty-four years. State v. Charles Owens, No. M2005-02571-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1094136, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007). Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,the post-conviction court denied the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied the petition for relief. We agree with the post-conviction court that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to various things at trial, in part because this Court had already determined on direct appeal that the alleged "prosecutorial misconduct" at trial did not affect the outcome of trial. Accordingly, because we determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.