APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of a sheriff’s department employee. The employee was terminated and appealed the termination to the county civil service commission. The termination was upheld by the commission, based solely on expert testimony. The employee then sought judicial review. The motion for summary judgment filed by the employer sheriff’s department was granted, and the employee’s petition was dismissed. The employee now appeals. We find that the expert testimony on which the commission relied is incongruent with the undisputed facts in the record. Therefore, we conclude that the commission’s decision is not supported by substantial and material evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the employee.

Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc., initiated this litigation against F&M Marketing
Services, Inc., with a complaint seeking a declaration that Christenberry had not contracted
to pay F&M a commission on loads Christenberry hauled for UPS/Dell Computer (“the
UPS/Dell account”). F&M filed an answer and counterclaim asking for a determination that
there was a contract with respect to the UPS/Dell account under which Christenberry was
obligated to pay F&M a commission of 6%. F&M’s counterclaim also asked for an
accounting and attorney’s fees. The case was tried without a jury, after which Christenberry
was allowed to amend its pleadings to allege that if there was a contract it was illegal and
unenforceable because F&M is not licensed as a broker by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“the ICC”). The trial court found that there was a contract between
Christenberry and F&M, but that the contract was rendered illegal and unenforceable because
of F&M’s lack of a broker’s license. F&M hired new counsel who filed a notice of appeal
that did not contain the signature of its trial counsel. Christenberry filed a motion with the
trial court to strike the notice of appeal. Six days later, F&M filed an amended notice of
appeal which bore, in addition to the signature of its new appellate counsel, the signature of
its counsel of record in the trial court. F&M argues on appeal that it was not required to be
licensed and, alternatively, that the contract should not be nullified for its lack of a license,
even if one was required. Christenberry argues that the notice of appeal is ineffective. We
vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Johnny L. Sapp, was found guilty of one count of possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number has been removed in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-111 and two counts of altering the serial number on a motor vehicle in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-112. He received a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that his convictions for possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number had been removed and altering the serial number on a motor vehicle violate double jeopardy; and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Keith Dotson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction of aggravated burglary on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and prepare adequately for the fingerprint evidence presented at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff filed this action seeking to review the business records of the defendant, asserting under oath that she is a 25 percent shareholder of the defendant corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §48-26-104(a) – the corporate records statute – and ordered the defendant to comply with the request to inspect and/or copy corporate records. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. We reverse.

The pro se Petitioner, Dock Walker, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment in a
medical malpractice case. The trial court denied Appellants/Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann.§29-26-116(a)(3), was
tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment on the part of Appellants/Defendants. Finding
that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellants’ motions for summary judgment. We, however, vacate any decision that the
statute of limitations was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment.

The Defendant, Teddy Ray Mitchell, appeals from his jury conviction in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of thirty days in jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that his conviction violates his First Amendment right to free speech, and (3) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an altercation with another police officer that was contemporaneous to the offense. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

This is a construction case. Appellants/Builders appeal the trial court’s award of damages
to Appellees/Homeowners pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and arising
from Appellants/Builders’ breach of warranty and contract. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Roy Rowe, Jr., pled guilty to seventeen counts of sale of a controlled substance, and, after merging several of the counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court imposed a split sentence, ordering that the Defendant serve 365 days in the county jail, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence to the maximum within the range. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract. The issues were referred to a Special Master, and the plaintiff on the hearing date, acting pro se, asked for a continuance which the Master denied. The defendant moved to confirm the Master's report and a hearing was set on the Motion. The plaintiff, again acting pro se, asked for a continuance, which was again denied. The plaintiff, acting pro se, moved to set aside the Judgment because he did not get a full ten days to file objections, and the court set aside the Judgment and set another hearing date. After hearing plaintiff's objections, the Court affirmed the Special Master's report and entered Judgment. Plaintiff, on appeal, raises the issues of whether the Trial Court erred in not sustaining objections to the Master's report, whereby the Master allowed defendant to interview witnesses and exhibits at the hearing without compliance with local rules that require the parties to exchange names of witnesses in advance of trial, and whether the Trial Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for continuance. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Stanley Harvill, appeals the circuit c 1 ourt’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the court’s order.

The defendant, Arealie Boyd, pled guilty to forgery over $1,000, a Class D felony, on March 30, 2009. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced her to a two-year sentence in the Shelby County Correctional Center, suspended all but thirty days of the sentence, and placed her on probation for six years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and manner of her sentence. Specifically, she contends that the trial court should have sentenced her as an especially mitigated offender to either full probation or judicial diversion. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, Monterrio Watson and D’Angelo Barnes, were both convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. Appellants were both juveniles at the time of the offenses but were transferred to criminal court for trial as adults. Appellant Barnes was sentenced by the trial court to serve ten years for each conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Appellant Watson was ordered to serve eight years and six months for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Both Appellants filed timely motions for new trial. The trial court denied both motions and these appeals ensued. The appeals were consolidated by this Court. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court properly denied Appellant Watson’s request for an acceptance hearing in criminal court after the transfer from juvenile court. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant Watson waived the issue related to the transfer from juvenile court for failing to provide an adequate record on appeal. Moreover, Appellant Watson failed to file a motion for an acceptance hearing within ten days of the transfer order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(d). Further, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for aggravated robbery. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Oscar Joe Garcia, was convicted of four counts of facilitation of attempted second degree murder, four counts of facilitation of aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of possession of a weapon with intent to employ during the commission of an offense. The trial court merged the facilitation of aggravated assault convictions into the facilitation of attempted second degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each of the facilitation convictions, two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the weapon conviction. The court ordered the six-year sentences to be served consecutively and the remaining sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and in denying his motion to correct and/or reduce his sentence. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Preston Rucker, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced, respectively, to concurrent sentences of twenty-four years and twenty years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred in concluding that a police report was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellee filed a Petition for Contempt against respondent for failing to pay child support. The Trial Court found respondent in contempt, entered Judgment for back child support, but later purged the Judgment for incarceration. The respondent has appealed, arguing that the Trial Court erred in finding him in civil contempt, and it was not appropriate to incarcerate him to enforce the Court's orders. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Rain Thomas Chesher, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the circuit court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment

This is a will construction case. The decedent died testate in July 2008. The personal
representative of the decedent’s estate filed this action to construe provisions of the
decedent’s will concerning the control of specifically devised farm property. The chancery
court determined that the decedent intended for the property to remain subject to the control
of her estate pending administration. Because the unambiguous language of the will
pointedly excludes specifically devised real property from the control of the personal
representative, we reverse and remand.

A jury convicted the defendant, Jaroz Dantae Thomas, of underage driving while impaired, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 11 months, 29 days of probation, supervised by Community Corrections; a $250 fine; suspension of his driver’s license for one year; and twenty-four hours of community service. On appeal, the defendant challenges his sentence. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the defendant’s sentence to strike the 11 months, 29 days of probation. The case is remanded for entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

This appeal concerns the discretion of the Memphis Police Department to fill vacant civil
service positions with temporary, “acting” personnel prior to the expiration of an active
promotion roster. The trial court concluded the Memphis City Charter does not mandate
permanent promotion of the next eligible employee from an active promotion roster simply
because a vacancy exists. The court further concluded that no charter provision or city
ordinance prohibits the use of acting appointments; rather, the proof showed that the use of
officers in an acting capacity is a longstanding policy within the police department and every
other division of city government. As a result, the court held that the department did not
violate civil service laws when it declined to permanently promote the plaintiffs. Finding no
error in the decision below, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification and
division of property, the award of alimony in futuro to Wife, and the award to Wife of a
portion of her attorney’s fees. We affirm.