APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, following a jury trial, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for Count 1, second degree murder, twelve years for Count 2, attempted second degree murder, and eight years for Count 3, attempted second degree murder. Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to Count 3 for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in its remarks to the jury venire; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Sergeant Berryman that Defendant had two gold teeth at the time he was interviewed; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the convictions. We reduce the sentence in Count 2 from twelve years to eight years. Further, we reverse the judgments only insofar as they order consecutive sentencing, and remand for a new sentencing hearing solely to determine whether consecutive sentencing should be imposed.

I respectfully depart from the majority’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(a)(3)’s mandate for release of a defendant operates upon the aggregate sentencing from two or more counties.

The defendant, Demetry Fitzgerald Conley, pled guilty in four separate cases to multiple counts of forgery and theft. In Lincoln County case number S0700004, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of forgery between $500 and $1000 (Class E felony). In Lincoln County case number S0700062, the defendant pled guilty to one count of forgery between $500 and $1000. For these three convictions, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent two-year sentences, with 365 days to serve in the county jail. In Marshall County case number 17437, the defendant pled guilty to thirty-two counts of forgery up to $1000 (Class E felony). In Marshall County case number 17438, the defendant pled guilty to thirty-four counts of forgery up to $1000 (Class E felony), fifteen counts of theft under $500 (Class A misdemeanor), and two counts of theft of property between $500 and $1000 (Class E felony). The court subsequently imposed a sentence of one-year and six-months for each forgery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine-day sentences for each theft. Based upon the imposition of partial consecutive sentencing, the effective sentence in the two Marshall County cases was six years, with 365 days to serve. The court further ordered that the Marshall and Lincoln County cases be served consecutively to each other for a total effective sentence of eight years, with two terms of 365 days to be served in the local county jail. The balance of the sentence was to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of split confinement rather than a full community corrections sentence and whether the sentence of confinement, as imposed, violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(a)(3); and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range in the Lincoln County cases based upon the application of enhancement factors in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Following review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with the following exceptions: 1) remand for entry of corrected judgments as identified supra; and 2) remand for resentencing with regard to the two Class E felony thefts in Marshall County case number 17438 as discussed infra.

This is the second appeal in a legal malpractice case filed by Raymond Clay Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) against Jes Beard (“the Attorney”). In the first appeal, we affirmed the Trial Court’s sanction against the Attorney for discovery abuse which prohibited the Attorney from introducing any expert testimony at trial. However, a majority of this Court reversed the Trial Court’s issuance of a default judgment as a further sanction against the Attorney. We also affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that the amount of the Client’s damages totaled $16,697.38. We remanded the case on the sole issue of liability. On remand, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the Client’s motion for summary judgment and found the Attorney 100% at fault for the Client’s damages. The Trial Court then denied the Attorney’s motion for summary judgment, found that motion was filed in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11, and awarded an additional $1,374.94 in damages. The Attorney appeals raising several issues. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects.

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff college professor was asked by his employer college to teach a summer class. The class was cancelled after the professor had taught only two class sessions. The college said that the class was cancelled due to low enrollment; this reason was disputed by the professor. The professor filed a lawsuit against the college for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in law, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant college on all of the professor’s claims. The professor appeals, arguing that he was denied discovery and that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. We affirm the challenged discovery rulings and the grant of summary judgment as to the claims for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contractual relations, and as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the second class taught by the plaintiff. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the first class taught by the plaintiff.

In this divorce action the Trial Court awarded primary custody of the children to the mother, refused to allow overnight visitation with the father until the children were one year old, and ordered standard visitation with the father. The father appealed, insisting that the Trial Court erred in applying the “tender years doctrine” and also erred in awarding standard visitation of the children. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Derrann William Estill, of aggravated kidnapping, and the appellant pled guilty to domestic assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seventeen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to define “possession” adequately when the jury requested a definition during deliberations, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (3) his sentence for aggravated kidnapping is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tommy Dale Taylor, Sr., was convicted by a Tipton County jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for the rape of his granddaughter, who was seven years old when the abuse was discovered. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to eighteen years for each count with the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective eighteen-year sentence at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged prior sexual abuse, admitting a photograph of the victim’s vaginal and anal areas, allowing the trial to continue too long in one day and the jury to deliberate into the late evening hours, and not properly instructing the jury on the election of offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dependency and neglect proceeding finding the minor child, B.C., dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(12), and specifically on the ground of severe child abuse on the part of the Appellant/Mother. The trial court sustained the petition to adjudicate dependency and neglect filed by the Appellee Department of Children's Services. We affirm.

A woman enrolled in a nursing program at Tennessee State University received a grade of D in one of her courses and was dropped from the program. She appealed to the provost of the university, who led her to believe that she had been, or would be, reinstated. She learned that this was not so when she returned to class and the instructor physically escorted her from the classroom. She brought suit against the university and four of its employees, including the provost, asserting claims of battery, conspiracy to commit battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed her suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We affirm.

The Petitioner, Donald Lynn Miller, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Knox County from his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life and twenty-three years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Darrin Bonner (“Bonner”), was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony, and was later sentenced to six years in confinement. On appeal, Bonner argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The certified question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennesse
that we address in this case is: what amount may each member of a married couple with custody of a minor child claim as a homestead exemption, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2- 301(f), in a joint petition for bankruptcy? We hold that the statute allows each individual debtor spouse with custody of a minor child to claim a $25,000 exemption for a combined exemption of $50,000, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23 Certified Question of Law
 

The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action brought by Lee Hayes, the Gibson County juvenile court clerk, is whether he should be compensated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended in 2001, which sets the Gibson County juvenile court clerk’s salary at a minimum of $50,805 per year, or pursuant to a 2000 private act that sets the salary at $32,000 per year. Gibson County argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the private act of 2000 creating the office of Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk and establishing his salary at $32,000 per year, controls. Mr. Hayes argues that the General Assembly’s 2001 amendment to TennesseeCode Annotated section 8-24-102, establishing statewide salaries for county officers, including juvenile court clerks, supersedes the 2000 private act and that his annual salary should be $50,805 in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended. We hold that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 2000 private act and the 2001 public act, and that the 2001 public act, a general statutory scheme of statewide application, supersedes and repeals by implication the earlier private act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights. The trial court found that the father had committed severe child abuse, that the father failed to comply with the obligations and responsibilities outlined in the permanency plans, and that conditions which led to the removal of the children still persisted. We affirm.

Eric Kerney and wife, Cassandra Kerney, brought this suit to enjoin the operation of a beauty salon by defendant Susan Endres in the home owned by her and her husband, Gary Endres. The Kerneys and the Endreses are adjoining homeowners in the Plantation Manor Subdivision in Kingsport. The properties are subject to a restrictive covenant limiting their use to residential and forbidding commercial use. Following a bench trial, the court found the salon was merely incidental to the residential use and, as a consequence, did not violate the restriction. The court did, however, enjoin any expansion of the business. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se petitioner, Ricky Johnson, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, for this court to affirm the judgment of the circuit court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the court.

The Defendant, William Edwin Harris, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, with an agreed sentence of three years on each count, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of six years. The manner of service of the sentences was to be determined by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the first three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), with the last three-year sentence to be served on probation. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted several victim impact statements during his sentencing hearing; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied him full probation. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the victim impact statements were properly admitted, and the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The defendant, Terence Alan Carder, pled guilty to theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000 and received a sentence of two years to be served on probation after service of 60 days in jail. The defendant was also ordered to provide restitution to the victim in the amount of $80,000 to be paid back at $1,000 per month. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering confinement and setting restitution. Following our review, we affirm the sentence as imposed but conclude that the trial court made inadequate findings in assessing restitution pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304. Therefore, we remand for reconsideration of the restitution award based upon the required findings.

Millennium Taxi Service, L.L.C., filed suit against the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority (“CMAA”) seeking a declaration that CMAA regulations prohibiting unregistered taxicabs from picking up passengers curbside at the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport were unconstitutional. Millennium further sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the challenged regulations. In its counterclaim, CMAA asserted that Millennium had repeatedly and flagrantly violated its regulations and requested that Millennium be permanently enjoined from engaging in any further violations. The court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment to CMAA upon finding that the challenged regulations had a rational basis and did not discriminate unreasonably against unregistered taxis. Millennium appeals. We affirm.

Appellants, a flooring company hired to install hardwood flooring at a home being built by Appellee, appeal the judgment of the trial court finding them liable for breach of contract and breach of warranty and awarding damages to Appellee. Appellants were hired to install hardwood flooring at a home being built by Appellee. After installation of the floors, problems developed; Appellants tried to correct the problems on numerous occasions to no avail. Appellee hired another subcontractor to refinish the hardwood flooring and to resolve the problems associated therewith. Appellee subsequently brought action against Appellant to recover amounts paid to subcontractor and the trial court awarded Appellee full measure of damages sought. We modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before us on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court for consideration of  issues we pretermitted in our earlier opinion, which decision the High Court reversed. In our earlier judgment, Ellis v. Sprouse, E2006-01771-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3121666 (Tenn. Ct. App, E.S., filed October 26, 20007), we held that plaintiff Mike Ellis (“the Farmer”) did not exercise his lease option on farmland owned by Kerry M. Sprouse 1 (“the Landlord”) by actions taken after the lease expired. As a result of that holding, we ruled that the portion of the judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding lost farming profits of $82,000 could not stand. We further held that the punitive damage award of $30,000 had to be retried since – at the time of our decision – it was based solely upon a compensatory damages award of $534 for the Landlord’s trespass – a trespass that was not contested on appeal. In Ellis v. Sprouse, 280 S.W.3d. 806 (2009), the High Court held that the Farmer had indeed exercised his option to renew the lease by continuing to hold over and making his lease payments after the initial term had expired. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this Court with “directions to consider and decide the issues that were pretermitted in [our] earlier opinion in this case.” We now have considered those issues, and, with respect to them, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion and our opinion on remand, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in toto.

The appellant, a former police officer, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court alleging that her due process rights were violated when the City of Bartlett terminated her employment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the appellant was an employee-at-will, and therefore, she had no protected property interest in her job.

The defendant, Dalton Lister, appeals from his jury convictions in the Bradley County Criminal Court for first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. He received a life sentence, with concurrent sentences of six years as a Range I, standard offender for each Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charged offenses; (2) that the trial court erred in not permitting cross-examination regarding a severed defendant’s outstanding arrest warrant, pending charges, status as a fugitive, and possible bias to fabricate testimony to obtain a favorable disposition of the pending charges; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a recorded statement of the defendant when the original recording was intentionally destroyed and lost by the detective who had possession of it; and (4) that the trial court erred in not ordering disclosure of the detective’s statement to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation concerning the lost and destroyed original recording of the defendant’s statement taken the night of the homicide. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the charges and that the defendant waived his remaining issues by not filing a timely motion for new trial, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.