APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendants Jason Malone and Harold Robinson, along with co-Defendant Johnny Miller, were indicted and tried jointly for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Defendant Miller’s case is not part of this appeal. Following the jury trial, Defendant Malone was found guilty of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in count one of the indictment, and the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor, in count two. Defendant Robinson was found guilty of aggravated robbery in count one, and not guilty of aggravated burglary in count two. The trial court sentenced Defendant Malone as a Range II, multiple offender, to nineteen years for his aggravated robbery conviction, and to a concurrent sentence of thirty days for his criminal trespass conviction. The trial court sentenced Defendant Robinson to sixteen years for his aggravated robbery conviction. In their appeal, Defendant Malone and Defendant Robinson challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the question of whether a passenger in a car may be subjected to a pat-down search following a traffic stop if officers suspect the presence of a weapon. The appellee, Thomas Dewayne Moffatt, was indicted by an Obion County grand jury for possession of more than .5 grams of Schedule II cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a park (a Class B felony) and tampering with evidence (a Class C felony). He was the passenger in a car which was stopped for a traffic violation, and officers testified that, based upon their belief that a weapon was present, both the driver and the passenger were asked to exit the vehicle with the intent to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. The appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, the drugs, asserting that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search him. After hearing testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, the Obion County Circuit Court, relying upon Johnson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980), concluded that “there was nothing amiss” and that the officers were not entitled to conduct the pat-down search. Because the State was unable to  prosecute the case without the suppressed evidence, the charges against the appellee were dismissed. The State now appeals the denial of the motion to suppress. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion as the evidence presented preponderates against the court’s findings. As such, we reverse the court’s decision granting the motion, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Brandon McCaslin, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed (1) to challenge certain prospective jurors during voir dire; (2) to object to the State’s admission of evidence that Petitioner had a prior conviction for the unauthorized use of a vehicle; (3) to request the trial court to instruct the jury on the use of impeachment evidence; and (4) to preserve and raise issues on appeal other than the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Dennis Wayne Merriweather, filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his fifteen year sentence for selling controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a school renders the judgment imposed as a result of his guilty plea void because the judgment provides the sentence is to be served at 100%. Because we find the judgment is not void, we hold the habeas court properly dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courtis affirmed.

Plaintiff filed suit against two defendants, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this Court. However, we find that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order appealed from is not a final judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After sustaining injuries to his head and leg in a work-related motor vehicle accident, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee a 14% permanent partial disability to the leg and an additional 2% to the body as a whole due to chronic headaches. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for the headaches. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to second degree murder and received an agreed-upon sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, violent offender. On appeal, he contends that: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily; the post-conviction court erred by failing to enter specific factual findings or legal conclusions; and Supreme Court Rule 28 was violated by both the State and the post-conviction court. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

This breach of contract action arises from the parties’ employment agreement. Employer agreed to pay Employee $10,000.00 to relocate to the city where Employer’s plant was located. Employee moved to the local area without his family and Employer paid him $10,000.00. After Employee terminated his employment, Employer sued to recover the $10,000.00 because it claims that Employee failed to satisfy the relocation requirement because he did not move his family with him to the local area. The trial court held that Employee satisfied the relocation requirement. We affirm.

The Appellant, Jasper D. Lewis, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioners challenge a mosquito spraying plan adopted by a local board of health alleging that it violates an ordinance on the same subject. Dismissal by the trial court is affirmed since there is no conflict between the plan and ordinance and petitioners fail to allege a legally cognizable ground to challenge the plan since dissatisfaction with the plan is not sufficient.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employee contends that the trial court erred in two ways: first, in finding that Employee’s permanent partial disability award should be capped at one and one-half times her medical impairment rating; and second, in finding that Employee is not entitled to reconsideration of a prior injury to her left shoulder. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

he defendant, Dwight Woodlee, appeals as of right his guilty plea convictions for vandalism and civil rights intimidation, both Class D felonies, for which the trial court imposed concurrent four-year sentences to be served on probation. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff and the defendant had several business dealings, including loans, a marketing consultant agreement, and a lease agreement. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in general sessions court to recover monies allegedly owed under the marketing consultant agreement. The defendant failed to answer or appear. The general sessions court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit against the same defendant in circuit court.

Defendant, Phyllis Ann Amos, entered pleas of guilty to possession of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are kept or sold, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and felony possession of dihydrocodone, a Class D felony. In accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, Defendant accepted concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for her misdemeanor conviction, one year for her Class E felony conviction, two years for each Class D felony conviction, and ten years for her Class B felony conviction. The felony sentences are as a Range I, standard offender. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed upon sentences and ordered Defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I respectfully dissent. I concur with the analysis in the majority opinion, as far as it goes.  I am concerned, though, with the trial court’s ruling that the Petitioner’s claims against trial counsel had been previously determined. I conclude that the record reflects that the Petitioner did not receive a full and fair hearing regarding trial counsel’s representation. I believe the case should be remanded to allow such a hearing on that issue.

The petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing or making adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State has responded with a motion that we affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner filed his petition well outside the statute of limitations and has not shown any reason why the limitations period should be tolled, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Ronald Fielding, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for three counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape for which he received an effective fifty-year sentence to be served in the custody of the Department of Correction. On appeal, he alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary and that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case originated with a mechanic’s and materialman’s lien asserted by Plaintiff Metro Construction against commercial real property owned by Defendant/Cross Plaintiff Peabody Place Center in Memphis. It arises from improvements made by Metro Construction to a leasehold held by Defendant Sim Attractions. Sim Attractions abandoned the leasehold without compensating Metro Construction for the improvements, which included the installation of a several-ton race car simulator that remained in the abandoned leasehold. Defendant Fitraco claimed the simulator was its property under the terms of a lease agreement between Fitraco and Sim Attractions. It alternatively asserted a superior security interest. The trial court found that the simulator was personal property and determined that that the agreement between Sim Attractions and Fitraco was not a lease but an unperfected, disguised security agreement. The trial court attached the simulator to secure judgment in favor of Metro Construction. It also awarded Metro Construction discovery sanctions against Fitraco. The trial court awarded Peabody Place damages for lost rent. Fitraco appeals, asserting it had leased the simulator to Sim Attractions or, in the alternative, that it had properly perfected its security interest prior to judicial attachment by the trial court. It further asserts the damages claimed by Peabody Place were speculative. We reverse the judgment in favor of Metro Construction and affirm the judgment in favor of Peabody Place.

The defendant, Joseph May, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed a premeditated and intentional murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Jamerson, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully investigate police techniques used in obtaining the petitioner’s confession, and (2) the trial court and counsel failed to ensure proper jury instruction. The petitioner also asserts in brief that he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

This appeal arises from the removal of a state court action to federal court. Once the federal court granted the defendants summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s federal claims, it dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice. Approximately one year later, the plaintiff sought to present its state law claims in state court by filing a motion titled to be a “Motion to Reassume Jurisdiction” and refiling its entire cause of action in state court. The trial court dismissed both cases with prejudice because the statute of limitations had run. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The trial court sustained the petition to adjudicate dependency and neglect filed by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Junior Aldridge, guilty of one count each of first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder counts and imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and forty years as a Range II, multiple offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court’s exclusion of testimony regarding statements made by the victim denied the defendant his right to present a defense. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the testimony and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a family dispute over real property. The plaintiffs filed suit to enforce a document which purported to convey to them a co-ownership interest in certain property and to estop and enjoin the defendants from selling the property at issue. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiffs were “equitably entitled to ownership of the five acre tract they have improved.” We affirm.