APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Richard D. Baker, appeals the revocation of his six-year probationary sentence. He contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation before the commencement of the probationary term and by ordering incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ontrell James, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction because the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the property of another. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child support case. The child’s mother is married to a man who is not the child’s biological father. The biological father petitioned the trial court to order genetic testing to establish paternity and to set child support. The mother sought the dismissal of the biological father’s petition, asking that her husband be designated as the child’s legal father. The husband also intervened, seeking dismissal of the petition and asking to be designated as the legal father. The trial court ordered genetic testing, which showed that the petitioner was the child’s biological father. The trial court declared the petitioner to be the child’s legal father and he began to pay the mother child support. An agreed permanent parenting plan was eventually entered, but the issue of child support was reserved. The mother sought retroactive child support for the five month period between the child’s birth and the date on which the biological father began to pay child support. The trial court denied the mother’s request, without including written findings to explain the reason for deviating from the presumption under the child support guidelines that retroactive support should be awarded. The mother now appeals. We remand for the trial court to either comply with the child support guidelines or make specific findings to support deviation from the guidelines.

The defendant, Jairie Pierce, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County of theft of property valued over $1000, a Class D felony, and theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony. He received respective sentences of four years and two years to be served concurrently in the Shelby County Correctional Center. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of theft of property valued over $1000 and that it was only sufficient to convict him of unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lamario Hill, of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison for the defendant’s murder conviction, nine years for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction, and four years for his aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Darrell Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

John P. Konvalinka (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for access to public records seeking access to certain records in the possession of the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority (“the Hospital” or “Erlanger”). These documents were created pursuant to the provisions of a Corporate Integrity Agreement entered into between the Hospital and the federal Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services following an investigation into allegations of illegal conduct by the Hospital. The Hospital filed a motion for protective order claiming the requested documents were confidential and protected from disclosure pursuant to: (1) the Tennessee Public Records Act; (2) the federal Freedom of Information Act; and/or (3) federal regulations implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services. The Trial Court found that the documents were protected from disclosure by the Tennessee Public Records Act; specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(2)(A). This finding rendered moot whether the documents were protected from disclosure pursuant to either or both the Freedom of Information Act or the regulations developed by the Department of Health and Human Services. Petitioner appeals. We hold that the documents at issue are not protected from disclosure by the Tennessee Public Records Act, and the judgment of the Trial Court holding otherwise is vacated. We remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether the documents at issue are protected from disclosure pursuant to applicable federal law.

Insurance company filed suit for a declaration that the policy exclusion for intentional acts applied to an injury arising from a paintball game. The trial court ruled for the insured. We affirm.

Appellees, employees of Appellant City of Columbia, filed a class action suit against the City, seeking step raise promotions based upon merit. Appellees brought their suit under breach of contract theories, claiming that the City was contractually obligated to pay the raises based upon contract(s) arising from a 1984 employee handbook and certain pay ordinances passed by the City. The trial court held that the1984 Handbook was a contract, which the City had breached, and that the ordinances gave rise to an implied contract entitling the Appellees to damages on grounds of detrimental reliance. The City appeals. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Appellant, a candidate for the Memphis City Council, filed suit against his opponent and the members of the Shelby County Election Commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that his opponent was not a qualified candidate and to enjoin the Commission from including his opponent’s name on the election ballot. Following the election, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint as being moot. We affirm.

Petitioner, Ronald Eugene Hall, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of two counts of second degree murder. The convictions were merged into a single count of second degree murder, for which Petitioner received a twenty-year sentence to be served at one-hundred percent incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See State v. Ronald Eugene Hall, M2003-02326-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 292432, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 8, 2005). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals the judgment of the post-conviction court. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he was incompetent to stand trial.

This appeal involves a dispute arising out of a contract for the sale of Appellant’s house. After the contract was executed, Appellees conducted a home inspection which revealed mold in the home’s air ducts. Appellants refused to repair the air ducts, and Appellees terminated the agreement. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees finding that termination was an available remedy under the terms of the agreement. Finding no error in this conclusion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant challenges the dismissal of his malicious prosecution action and the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Finding that an essential element of Appellant’s cause of action had been negated, the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed. Finding there to be no abuse of discretion, the trial court’s imposition of sanctions is affirmed. Finding this appeal to be frivolous as to one of the Appellees, we remand the case for the trial court to determine the damages to be awarded.

In 2005, the employee, a truck driver, sustained a compensable injury to his right leg that also aggravated a pre-existing low back condition. As a result of childhood polio, the employee’s left leg and foot were substantially smaller and weaker than his right leg and foot. The employee reported this pre-existing condition to the employer when hired in 2003. Medical proof established the employee’s combined anatomical impairment at 14% to the body as a whole. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court assigned 84% of the award to the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Cherokee Insurance Company, and 16% to the Second Injury Fund. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding the
employee to be permanently and totally disabled. The Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing that it is without liability because the employee performed his truck-driving duties without restrictions or accommodations, thus, the employer did not have “actual knowledge” of the employee’s prior disability. Alternatively, the Second Injury Fund contends that the trial court’s award of permanent and total disability is not supported by the evidence. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.1

The Petitioner, Matthew M. Jackson, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This appeal arises out of a tractor lease. After lessee failed to make the required monthly payments, lessor filed this action alleging that lessee breached several different contract provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded lessor the unpaid rentals. Lessee appeals arguing that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on grounds which lessor failed to allege in its motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought benefits for a right shoulder injury, which occurred after he had ceased working for Employer. He contended that his employment had caused a weakening of the structures of his shoulder, which contributed to his eventual injury. The trial court ruled that he did not sustain his burden of proof and entered judgment for Employer. On appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred in its ruling. We affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Chaurice Bagley, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Chittum, was charged with one count of reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony. His application for pretrial diversion was denied by the district attorney general and that denial was upheld by the Criminal Court of Trousdale County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in upholding his denial of pretrial diversion because the district attorney general considered an irrelevant factor in his denial memorandum. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney general impermissibly considered an irrelevant factor and asks us to remand this case to the district attorney general for reconsideration. The Defendant, in response, asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order granting him pretrial diversion. After our review, we reverse, remand, and direct the entry of an order granting the Defendant pretrial diversion.

Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an airplane which had been purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Department, but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer appealed and the Chancery Court reversed, finding that, because (1) taxpayer provided the seller with a certificate of resale, (2) taxpayer immediately leased the airplane such that it transferred possession and control of the plane to the user, and (3) taxpayer was a validly organized business which observed all corporate formalities, the sale-for-resale exemption pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(34)(A) applied to the transaction. Finding no error, we affirm.

Appellant William Griffin, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to vacate or amend its order dismissing Mr. Griffin’s case against the Appellee Kentucky National Insurance Co. for bad faith denial of an insurance claim. We affirm

This is the second appeal in this divorce case. The husband is a lawyer and the wife was a homemaker during most of the marriage. After the divorce trial, the trial court divided the marital estate, awarded the wife transitional alimony, and ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed. In the first appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s valuation of two marital assets, stock and a corporation, and remanded for the trial court to re-value those assets. In addition, the trial court’s decision regarding the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets was reversed, and that issue was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration as well. The issues raised on alimony and attorney’s fees were not addressed in the first appeal. On remand, the trial court found a debt owed by the corporation to the husband was uncollectible and determined that the value of the corporation was zero. The trial court adjusted the valuation of the wife’s interest in the stock and engaged in a detailed analysis of the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets, finding no dissipation. On remand, the wife sought an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court declined to award alimony in futuro but awarded the wife an additional year of transitional alimony. Finally, the trial court declined the wife’s request for her attorney’s fees. Both parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the husband did not engage in dissipation, affirm the trial court’s increased property award to the wife, reflecting her interest in the stock, reverse the trial court’s finding that the value of the corporation is zero, and remand to the trial court for valuation of the corporation and division of that asset, modify the trial court’s award of alimony by awarding the wife alimony in futuro when the transitional alimony ends, affirm the trial court’s refusal to award the wife her attorney’s fees, and order the award of postjudgment interest on the wife’s increased property award from the stock, dating from the date of the judgment on remand.

A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. The trial court agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim, but reverse its dismissal of the trespass claim because the evidence shows that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After sustaining a workrelated injury to his back, the employee filed a complaint seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Marion County. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the employee to be totally and permanently disabled. The employer appealed, contending that the employee’s continuing employment as a pastor precluded a finding of total and permanent disability. An Appeals Panel reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was totally and permanently disabled and modified the award to seventy-two percent (72%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Conaway v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., No. M2006-01177-WCR3-WC, 2007 WL 2141537 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 26, 2007). The employee, who had resigned as a pastor before the Appeals Panel decision was issued, filed a motion for modification pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231(2) (2008). Following a second evidentiary hearing, the trial court again found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled. The employer appeals contending that the employee failed to present sufficient proof that he sustained an increase of incapacity solely as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.