APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Derrick Sorrell, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the indictment was improper, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, and that the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Wolfe, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that: 1) the trial court was prejudiced against defense counsel during the course of the trial; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by conducting trial during the evening; 3) the assistant district attorney general intentionally distracted trial counsel during the course of the trial; 4) the jury did not see all the exhibits presented during trial; 5) the assistant district attorney general manipulated the slide projector during trial; 6) the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to remove his clothing and show his scars from injuries sustained in a 1997 shooting; and 7) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for the jury to visit the crime scene. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

In February 2006, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Larry Carnell Pittman, on one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all three counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-eight years as a Range II, violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, nineteen years as a Range II, multiple offender for the aggravated robbery conviction, and nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for the conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered that all sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a  continuance; (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court imposed excessive sentences. After reviewing the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her three children based upon four separate grounds. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations on the grounds of mental incompetence and persistence of conditions, we affirm.

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner filed a Petition styled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. We affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition, but on the basis that the petition was not supported by oath or affirmation nor does it state that it is the first application for a writ.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). An employee who sustained a workplace injury in 1997 but who did not miss any work filed suit in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2006 seeking a reconsideration of the 2003 settlement of her workers' compensation claim arising out of that injury. In response to the employer's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was time-barred under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(a)(2) (2008) because it was not filed within four hundred weeks following her return to work, the employee insisted that the time for seeking reconsideration should begin to run from the date in 2003 that she reached maximum medical improvement, rather than from the date she returned to work in 1997. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court based on the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6- 241(a)(2).

The defendant, Thomas Lamont Coleman, was found guilty following a bench trial of violating the implied consent law. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding him guilty absent a showing by the State that the breathalyzer test was administered in accordance with the standards set forth in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnny Justin Postles, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated criminal trespass and assault in case assignment 04-720, and aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft under $500 in case assignment 04-721. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, David Mark McDade, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Anthony Buntley, was convicted by a jury of bribing a witness, a Class C felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

The defendant, Toneka Y. Reid, appeals as of right from her jury conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of theft of property valued at five hundred dollars or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in jail. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and in denying probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that proof of prior drug sales by the defendant was properly admitted. I conclude that this proof was prejudicial and essentially irrelevant to the issues in the trial. I would reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial.

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, brought this action to enforce an employment contract for benefits allegedly due under the contract. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that a provision in the employment contract to which the parties originally agreed to, was an unenforceable contract, as the provision amounted to an agreement to agree and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm.

Defendant-Appellant, Byron Lebron Roshell, appeals his conviction by a Davidson County jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2006). He argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting a former co-defendant’s testimony that he had bought drugs from Roshell in the past and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Corey Moten, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the suppression of his statement on the grounds that it was involuntarily given. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Kassy Janikowski, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court order dismissing her petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute between a decedent’s ex-wife and the decedent’s heirs. When the decedent and the ex-wife divorced, their marital dissolution agreement provided that the decedent would receive certain real property. When the decedent died four years later, the ex-wife had not executed a quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the property to the decedent. Therefore, the heirs filed this action to quiet title. The ex-wife claimed that the decedent wanted her to retain her interest in the property, and she claimed that the heirs were barred from seeking relief under the doctrines of laches and waiver. The trial court found in favor of the heirs, and the ex-wife appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Anthony Bufford, pled guilty in October 2005 to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor. For the Class E felony, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in community corrections with sixty days to be served in jail. For the Class A misdemeanor, he received eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation in the community corrections program. For the Class C misdemeanor, the defendant received thirty days’ incarceration at seventy-five percent. All sentences were to be served concurrently. The trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in April 2008 after finding that the defendant failed to remain drug-free. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in removing him from community corrections and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Damien Clark, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County for second degree murder, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years’ confinement as a violent offender. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction as character evidence, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction when the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and notice of impeachment was “inadequate and inaccurate,” and (4) the jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit the defendant of second degree murder before examining voluntary manslaughter as a conviction offense deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and to trial by jury. Although the required procedure was not used to admit the defendant’s prior conviction, we conclude the errors were harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the granting of a summary judgment to Gtech Corporation and Specialized Communications Companies, Inc., relating to the installation of a satellite antenna on the roof of A&S Market located in Davidson County, Tennessee. The market burned and the owners brought suit alleging that the negligent installation of the satellite antenna caused the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground the negligence alleged by the market owners was not the legal cause of the fire. We reverse.

The eleven Plaintiffs, investors in a real estate development in Tunica, Mississippi, suffered losses when the financing for hotels on the tracts of land they had leased failed to materialize. Five of the Plaintiffs first learned of the investment opportunity in 1993 while attending a presentation by real estate agents Lloyd and Betty Link in Gatlinburg. After suit was filed against several Defendants based upon breach of oral and written contracts, the trial court entered an order of dismissal as to the Links and other of the Defendants and, later, granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of D.C. Parker and Richard Flowers, the owners of the land. When judgments had been entered as to all of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs appealed, but only as to Parker and Flowers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that whether an agency relationship existed between Parker and Flowers, as principals, and the Links, and whether the Links had been guilty of misrepresentation were disputed questions of fact. Upon remand, a jury found that the Links were the agents of Parker and Flowers, who were vicariously liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made by the Links. Damages were awarded to the Plaintiffs. In a second appeal, this time by Parker and Flowers, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to those five Plaintiffs who had attended the presentation in Gatlinburg, but remanded for a new trial as to those who did not. We granted an application for permission to appeal to consider whether the order of dismissal in favor of the agents precluded any adjudication of vicarious liability as to the principals.

The Appellant, Carlos Bonding, LLC, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $20,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $6,000 of the bond. On appeal, Carlos Bonding argues that the trial court, by referencing the concept of treble damages, abused its discretion in its method of calculating the amount to be forfeited. Because the trial court must be afforded broad discretion in a bail forfeiture proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this divorce case the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce and divided the marital estate. The husband appealed on the grounds that a house awarded to the wife was not a marital asset, and otherwise questioned the property and division of the indebtedness of the marital estate. On appeal we affirm, as modified, the modification being that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Judge finding that the father had awarded his son a collection of firearms.

The defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, which were merged into two counts, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to ten years for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with all sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the record supported that the sentences be served consecutively. However, the matter was remanded to the trial court for the defendant to be sentenced under the pre-2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. Subsequently, the defendant was resentenced to eight years for each of the aggravated robberyconvictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping, with all sentences to be served consecutively. He again appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. The State asks that this matter be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and, following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20.