APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial with co-defendant Maurice Nash, Defendant, Spencer Louis Lark, Jr., was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and two years for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant does not appeal the length or manner of service of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alisha J. Glisson, was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant presents a single issue for our review: whether the proof is sufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She argues that the State failed to show that she was criminally responsible for the death of the victim and, alternatively, failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the accomplices. After a review of the evidence in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs/Appellees bring this case pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and a negligent bailment theory. They allege that auto service center made poor cosmetic repairs to interior of their car and that exterior of the car was damaged while at the service center. Finding no violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and that Defendant/Appellant failed to overcome presumption of negligent bailment, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Byron Smallen, alleged that he had sustained a gradual hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise in the workplace. Ownership of his employer had changed approximately one year prior to his last day worked. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears, and assigned liability to the new owner of the business, International Muffler. That party has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly applied the last injurious exposure rule. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Edward Leon Davis, was convicted by a jury of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) weighing more than .5 grams, a Class B felony. For his conviction, the defendant received a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation or alternative sentencing.

The Defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor evading arrest. He was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Warren County Jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on resisting arrest as a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor evading arrest. We conclude that this contention lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm.

The Defendant, Archie Ray Moore, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court erred in denying him community corrections and in setting the length of his sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a factual dispute about whether defendant signed a lease as a tenant and is liable under the terms of the lease. The Trial Court held defendant liable for damages under the lease. We affirm.

Following the entry of a final decree in a divorce action, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., asserting that the parties made a clerical error in the marital dissolution agreement, as a result of which Wife received a higher percentage of marital assets than intended. The trial court denied relief. We affirm the action of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael S. Morani, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Virga, was convicted of aggravated arson for burning down a trailer home where he resided. He was also convicted of first degree felony murder for the death of Rochelle Hinrich, who died in the fire. He challenges his convictions, arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his confession to law enforcement officers because the statements were not given freely, voluntarily, and intelligently. He also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother and Father appeal the order of the Juvenile Court for Dickson County, Tennessee terminating their parental rights. Mother’s termination was based on: noncompliance with the permanency plan; failure to visit; failure to establish a suitable home; and the persistence of conditions that prevent return of the children; and the children’s best interests. Father’s termination was based on noncompliance with the permanency plan and the children’s best interests. Finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the children’s best interests, as modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant-appellant, Tony Lee Crowe (hereinafter “Crowe”), was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) whether the trial court properly exercised its role as the thirteenth juror, and (3) the denial of his amended motion for new trial based on new evidence. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm Crowe’s convictions but remand the case for the sole purpose of considering the third amended motion for new trial.

The defendant, Tommy Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He raised a number of issues in his original direct appeal, including whether the trial court erred in finding that he had forfeited his right to trial counsel. We found no merit in the other claims, but remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the forfeiture of counsel issue. See State v. Tommy L. Holmes, No. W2006-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1651876 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2007), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007). After holding that hearing, the trial court entered an order finding that the defendant had forfeited the right to counsel by physically assaulting his trial counsel. The defendant now appeals from that order, arguing that his behavior was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order finding that the defendant waived his right to counsel. Having previously found no merit to the defendant’s other issues raised on direct appeal, we also affirm his judgment of conviction.

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority affirming the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s conduct in this case warranted the forfeiture of counsel. I acknowledge that the majority opinion correctly recites the applicable case law concerning defendant misconduct and forfeiture of counsel. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s application of the law to the facts presented in this case. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination that the defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial.¹

I respectfully dissent. In my view, our legislature has granted trial courts with broad statutory authority to transfer claims filed in the wrong jurisdiction under the remedial provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008). Moreover, this Court has traditionally encouraged the disposition of colorable claims on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. In consequence, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a transfer of the claim to the court having jurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

In 2004, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Defendants had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in the State of Tennessee. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss citing two defenses: lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion for failure to state a claim but explicitly declined to rule on the jurisdictional question. Defendants have not
waived their personal jurisdiction defense. On appeal, Defendants ask that we consider the jurisdictional question only if we first find for Plaintiff on the substantive issue. Because we find that jurisdiction is a prerequisite of an adjudication on the merits, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal, and remand to the trial court for consideration of Defendants’ personal jurisdiction
defense.

This appeal involves the application of the transfer provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (Supp. 2008) to habeas corpus petitions challenging a criminal conviction. The petitioner, who was incarcerated in Davidson County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. The trial court promptly denied the petition on its merits. Rather than filing a petition seeking post-conviction relief, the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. For the first time on appeal, the petitioner, invoking Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116, requested the Court of Criminal Appeals to transfer his habeas corpus petition to Maury County, where he had been convicted, for consideration as a post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to transfer the habeas corpus petition to Maury County and affirmed the denial of the petition. Carter v. Bell, No. M2006-01363- CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2744998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2007). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor finding that, based upon the discovery rule, the one year statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim had expired prior to the filing of the Appellants’ complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

Charles Fenn and Dott Fenn owned property in Sevier County. In August 1996, they entered into a contract to sell the property to Benjamin F. Darnell, Sr. The Fenns agreed to finance the sale over a ten-year period. According to the contract, Mr. Darnell was to make monthly payments of $999.11 for ten years, with one final balloon payment of $113,058.43. Mr. Darnell died in February 2004 and his wife, Mary Darnell, continued making the monthly payments. Unbeknownst to Ms. Darnell, on October 14, 2005, the Fenns sold the property to Teddy Jones. Four days later, Ms. Fenn, through her attorney, sent Ms. Darnell a letter terminating the contract based on various alleged breaches. Ms. Darnell filed suit seeking specific performance of the contract. Following a bench trial, the court found that the contract was enforceable; it ordered specific performance. The trial court rejected the claim of the defendant Teddy Jones that he was a bona fide purchaser without knowledge. The Fenns and Mr. Jones appeal. We affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant Claiborne Builders to recover the rental fees from a contract between plaintiff and Claiborne Builders for earth-moving equipment which Claiborne Builders used to remove soil from Wilder's property. The Trial Judge entered Judgment against Claiborne Builders on its contract and Wilder Construction under an implied contract. Wilder has appealed. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Robert Edward Boling, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006). He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the admission of testimony that he alleges was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Because the defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely, we hold that he has waived our consideration of any issue except for sufficiency of the evidence. Holding that the jury was within its province in convicting the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Tipton County jury convicted the defendant, James Roosevelt Fleming, of one count of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of attempted possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his felony conviction, and he also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing opinion testimony in violation of Rule 701 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Johnson (hereinafter “Johnson”), of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. As a Range I, standard offender, Johnson received concurrent sentences of eight years, nine months for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years, three months for the aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed solely for the aggravated robbery conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for specific performance of a land sale contract. Plaintiff made partial payments towards the purchase price for several months after the agreement was reached. In 2005, however, the relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant deteriorated, and the Plaintiff stopped making payments. Defendant then informed the Plaintiff that the agreement was cancelled and began looking for another buyer. After the presentation of Plaintiff’s proof, the trial court found that Plaintiff was unable to perform under the agreement within a reasonable time. The trial court also found that the agreement expressly permitted the Defendant to cancel the agreement in the event of Plaintiff’s non-performance. Finding no error, we affirm.