APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In November 2005 the petitioner, Ronnell Leberry, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In November 2007, following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves allegations of intentional misrepresentation and associated causes of action all related to the sale of a spring for commercial development. Appellant contends that the output of the spring was misrepresented. The trial court granted summary judgment as to a number of causes of action, and the appellant then non-suited his remaining claims and appealed. For the reasons stated herein we affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Keith Collins, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Laquenton Monger, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Michael J. Floyd, appeals as of right the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The petitioner alleges that his conviction and resulting sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal and void due to an involuntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Buford C. Throneberry, appeals his conviction of disorderly conduct that followed a bench trial in the Rutherford County Circuit Court. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Because we conclude that the State failed to prove that the defendant’s words or actions prevented anyone from carrying on lawful activities, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

Appellant purchased a commercial truck from a merchant who dealt in goods of that kind. Before obtaining good title, Appellant entrusted the merchant with the truck to allow the merchant to make agreed upon repairs. While the merchant had possession of the truck, he sold it to the Appellee. Appellant filed suit to recover the truck. The trial court found that Appellee was a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary course of business and that under Tenn. Code Ann. §47-2-403, Appellant’s entrustment of the truck to the merchant provided the merchant the authority to transfer title to the Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Mustapha Boutchiche, was convicted of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim was untruthful in a prior proceeding, admitting the victim’s 9-1-1 phone call, not requiring the State to make an election of offenses, and ordering that he undergo a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing. He also argues that his sentence was excessive because the trial court enhanced his sentence based on enhancement factors not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and denied probation because he refused to undergo the psychosexual evaluation. We affirm the defendant’s conviction and the trial court’s denial of probation but modify his sentence to one year.

The petitioner, Arthur W. Stamey, III, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that due process principles require the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and that newly discovered, exculpatory evidence warrants coram nobis relief. Because the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the judgment of that court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a determination of whether due process principles require the tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations.

The petitioner was found guilty of five counts of rape, all Class B felonies; twelve counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, all Class C felonies; and seven counts of statutory rape, all Class E felonies. He was sentenced to nine years for each Class B felony, three years for each Class C felony, and one year for each Class E felony. His sentences for the Class B felonies were ordered to be served consecutively. His sentences for the Class C felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the Class B felonies. His sentences for the E felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the B felonies, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective and that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting the challenge to his sentence because it was previously determined on appeal. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

On appeal, the crux of Appellant’s argument is that his local zoning board erred in determining that he could not use two structures on his property for human occupation. In support of this contention, Appellant argues that when reviewing the zoning board’s decision, the trial court applied the wrong standard of review, misconstrued the zoning ordinances, excluded admissible evidence, and should have applied the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel. On appeal, Appellee also asserted that Appellant’s argument was moot. Because we do not agree that Appellee’s case is moot, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim. Finding no error, however, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant urges this court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery based upon his argument that the proof is insufficient to support the element that the robbery was either accomplished with a deadly weapon or by the display of something the victim might have reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon. After analyzing the defendant’s actions in isolation before and after disarming the victim, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support this element of aggravated robbery and modifies the conviction to robbery. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from this conclusion.

The petitioner, Christopher Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Ben Thomas Dowlen, Jr., pled guilty to attempted possession of a schedule I substance, a Class C felony, and agreed to a sentence of ten years as a Range II offender. The trial court imposed the agreed upon sentence, denied alternative sentencing, and ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant an alternative sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mark Anthony Foulk, was convicted by a jury of: one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of vandalism in the amount of $500 or less and one count of driving under the influence, both Class A misdemeanors; one count of speeding and one count of failure to obey a traffic control device, both Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to an effective term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the vandalism, aggravated burglary, or aggravated robbery, and was otherwise insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary; (3) he was effectively denied his right to a jury trial; (4) the court improperly instructed the jury that a certain State’s witness, Detective Dale Quillen, was an expert on gunshot wounds and stippling; (5) the court improperly enhanced his sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery; and (6) the court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We agree with the Defendant that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery, and accordingly modify this conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery. We also conclude that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences and failed to make the required findings to impose consecutive sentences.  We conclude that the Defendant’s other points of error lack merit. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The petitioner was originally indicted on multiple sex offenses and felony failure to appear. A Morgan County jury found the petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., guilty of felony failure to appear but deadlocked as to his eight other sex offense charges. Before a retrial on the sex offenses and before a judgment of conviction was entered on the felony failure to appear conviction, the petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts, and the parties agreed that the judgment of conviction arising from the jury trial would reflect that the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor failure to appear rather than felony failure to appear. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his convictions were void because he had been convicted by a jury of a felony but the trial court agreed to allow that conviction to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Further, he asserted that the reduction of this charge from a felony to a misdemeanor was a material element of the plea agreement, and he sought habeas corpus relief from all of his judgments. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault, and one count of leaving the scene of the accident. In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received sentences of three years, two years, and one year, respectively. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day, followed by ten years of probation. Appellant seeks review of the sentence on appeal. We determine that the trial court erroneously deprived Appellant of good conduct credits by ordering him to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. The remainder of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Mickey Jeffries, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to adequately communicate a plea agreement to him. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, R. L. Williams, appeals from the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2003 rape convictions. He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the DNA evidence, which he posits was the only convicting evidence because the testimony of the victim was unreliable. Holding that he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Eddrick Devon Pewitte,1 was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of certain statements he made to police; (3) the State violated a discovery order; and (4) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors in sentencing him. We conclude that the Defendant’s first three points of error lack merit. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in the application of certain enhancement factors. We remand for resentencing.

Petitioner, David Cantrell, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner failed to comply with the procedure defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Randall A. Myers, appeals the sentence imposed by the Blount County Circuit Court following his open guilty plea to two counts of filing a false report, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. After hearing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years, three years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The court further ordered the sentences to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the two felony sentences are excessive; (2) the court erred in denying an alternative sentence; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

The Defendant, Darrell Franklin, was convicted of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony over his hearsay objection and in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction; (3) he received an excessive sentence; and (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing him. We also conclude, however, that the trial committed plain error by admitting certain testimony in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. We accordingly vacate his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

The employee sought workers' compensation for a knee injury suffered in a fall. While acknowledging compensability for the claim, the employer sought to cap the award at 1.5 times the disability rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008). The trial court held that the employee was terminated due to her injury rather than her misconduct but applied the 1.5 cap on the award. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's factual findings, but its application of the cap was in error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and the cause is remanded.

Plaintiff alleged that she was robbed at knife-point on Wal-Mart’s parking lot, and Wal-Mart was negligent in failing to provide security to protect her from the robbery. Wal-Mart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Judge ruled due to the paucity of crimes in the parking lot, Wal-Mart owed no duty to the plaintiff to provide security where the crime allegedly occurred. Plaintiff has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.