APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the second appeal by a mother and a father of the termination of their parental rights. We have concluded that the juvenile court correctly determined that a ground for termination existed as to the father. Regarding Mother, we find that the court erred in its analysis finding a ground for termination. We also conclude that the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the ground for termination and vacate this portion of the order and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact in its best interests analysis regarding Father. Therefore, we also vacate this part of the order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an order that makes sufficient findings.

Father appeals the trial court’s order changing his children’s surnames from his surname to another family name. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not address four of his stated issues. As to his final issue, because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we have no evidence to review. Accordingly, we must presume that the evidence presented at the final hearing supports the trial court’s conclusion that the name change was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

I fully join the majority’s opinion upholding seizure of the handgun under the plain view doctrine. I write separately to further address the plain view doctrine’s “immediately apparent” requirement that has caused confusion and consternation among both federal and state courts.

This is an appeal from an order suspending a mother’s parenting time until she completes a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 mental health evaluation. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Rodney Miller, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated statutory rape, and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner initially argues that the order of the post-conviction court is insufficient for appellate review. He further claims that each of his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the State’s improper voir dire, in failing to effectively cross-examine the victim at trial, and in failing to adequately advise the Petitioner of his right to testify. Finally, the Petitioner asserts that the cumulative effect of trial counsels’ deficiencies deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this conservatorship action, the trial court’s appointment of the ward’s stepdaughter as conservator has been appealed by the ward’s nephew and ostensibly the ward herself. Because the record leaves us unable to discern the basis of the trial court’s decisions, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for the entry of an appropriate order.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. 

Ambreia Washington (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of, among other offenses, unlawful possession of a firearm. Before trial, the Defendant moved to suppress the firearm a law enforcement officer seized from the vehicle the Defendant was driving. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments, including the trial court’s ruling on the suppression issue. We granted permission to appeal to determine the legality of the officer’s warrantless seizure of the firearm. We hold that the seizure was constitutionally permissible under the plain view doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the trial court’s February 14, 2025 order denying his motion to dismiss a presentment charging him with aggravated stalking. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (2023). The Defendant asserts that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable injury to the Defendant; to prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation; and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application. Following our review, the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s finding that her minor children are dependent and neglected. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Nicholas S. Collins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of the following offenses: domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 2); assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 3); and aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony (count 5). He received an effective sentence of seven and one-half years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s findings that her minor child is dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Before the court is the pro se Defendant’s “Application for Extraordinary Relief.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 10. The Defendant raises two issues for this court’s review:
1. Whether Unicoi County Court(s) are moving [in] clear absen[ce] of jurisdiction?
2. Whether Unicoi County Court err[ed] in denying Petitioner access to Court by vehicle of habeas corpus?
The Defendant alleges that he was arrested illegally, that the trial court denied him counsel in violation of his constitutional rights, and that the trial court refused to hear a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He seeks dismissal of his charges.
The pleading contains no documentation in support of the Defendant’s allegations.1 As such, the pleading is wholly insufficient for this court to engage in any review of the trial court’s actions. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(c).

The Defendant, Marcus Anthony Pearson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court did not sufficiently set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each argument raised in his Rule 36.1 motion. Additionally, the Defendant contends that his consecutive sentences are illegal because he was not resentenced in accordance with this court’s prior order, and as such, adequate Wilkerson findings were never made to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Lastly, he claims the amended judgment forms were not entered in a timely fashion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case originates in a dispute over the administration of two trusts created for Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Meersman”). Meersman has filed multiple lawsuits against former trustees Michael Castellarin (“Castellarin”) and Regions Bank (“Regions”) (“Defendants,” collectively) alleging that they mismanaged the trusts. The trusts were terminated by court order in 2015. Laila Rumsey (“Rumsey”), Meersman’s partner, sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that she too was damaged by Defendants’ actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted based on the statute of limitations. Rumsey filed a motion to alter or amend within thirty days of entry of judgment but, contrary to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, did not serve Defendants within thirty days. The Trial Court denied Rumsey’s motion as untimely. Rumsey appeals. Rule 59.04 requires such a motion be both “filed and served” within thirty days of entry of judgment. Rumsey failed to serve Defendants timely. Therefore, Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time in which to file a notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns a disciplinary action taken against a prisoner. Rodger Broadway (“Petitioner”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex, was found guilty of Class B Defiance by the prison’s disciplinary board (“the Board”) for cursing at another inmate while in the gym. Petitioner, pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and multiple officials (“Respondents,” collectively). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, which the Trial Court denied as untimely even though Petitioner delivered the motion to the appropriate individual at his correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the Trial Court to consider Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend on its merits.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Defendant was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of disrupting a lawful
meeting, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence
to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence
is insufficient to support her conviction and that the statute prohibiting disruption of a
lawful meeting is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. Based on our review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jessie Rose Hodge, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s decision to deny judicial diversion for her guilty-pleaded conviction of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212. Following our review, we affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Decory Sanchez Smith, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life plus ten years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by imposing a ten-year sentence for his robbery conviction and ordering consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellee filed a petition in juvenile court seeking to terminate a father’s parental rights.  After a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility, and (4) failure by a putative father to timely file a petition to establish paternity.  The trial court also determined termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  We affirm the grounds for termination.  However, we conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding its best interest analysis.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Devan Shepherd, Defendant, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree felony murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to prohibit any discussion of Defendant’s age at the time of the offenses; and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on defense of a third person. Following our review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this healthcare liability case, appellant/patient appeals the trial court’s grant of appellee/doctor’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss and its grant of appellee/doctor’s employer’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court held that appellant failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. As such, the statute of limitations barred appellant’s claims against the doctor. Having granted the doctor’s motion to dismiss, the trial court applied the common-law, operation-of-law exception to dismiss appellant’s vicarious liability claims against the doctor’s employer. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Mitchell, appeals from his Giles County Circuit Court conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, for which he received a sentence of two years, suspended to two years’ supervised probation. Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior incident in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the evidence of his reckless mental state was insufficient. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision in this post-divorce modification action. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to change the residential parenting schedule and to make the father the primary residential parent. We further find no error in the trial court’s ruling making the father the sole decision-maker on non-emergency medical care and educational matters. However, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that neither parent could obtain a passport for the children or take them out of the country. Further, we vacate and remand the trial court’s decision on the residential parenting schedule for failure to make a specific provision for holiday parenting time.