APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case addresses the allocation of funds received by a county from the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Tennessee Valley Authority is exempted from state taxation, but makes payments to the county in lieu of taxes. Historically, the county has earmarked these funds for education and has allocated a portion of them to the special school districts within the county. In 2003, however, the county decided to phase out the allocation of funds to the special school districts. Subsequently, the plaintiffs in this action, parents of children in a special school district located in the county, sued the county, arguing that the county’s decision to stop sending funds to the special school district violated several statutory provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the case is controlled by the decision in Oak Ridge City Schools v. Anderson County, 677 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), and that the county is entitled to summary judgment.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial judge erred by failing to exercise his role as thirteenth juror in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. In support of her argument, Appellant urges this Court to consider comments the trial judge made in ruling on Appellees’ motions for a directed verdict; the Statement of the Evidence, Response, Reply, and Surreply; and Appellees’ proposed order, in which the trial judge struck certain language. Appellees, however, contend that this material is either not properly reviewable by this Court or does not bear on the issue of whether the thirteenth juror standard was met. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The Court in this case has reversed the holding of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel that Mr. Trosper failed to prove that his preexisting osteoarthritis was permanently worsened by work he performed in the winter of 1997-1998. Based on a selective review of the evidence, the Court has concluded that Mr. Trosper is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because his work “advanced the severity” of his osteoarthritis. I respectfully disagree that Mr. Trosper has carried his burden of proof in this case.

This is a premises liability case against the county. The plaintiff attended a football game at a county high school. She fell on the steps leading to the bleachers in the football stadium and suffered back injuries. She claimed that the step on which she fell was dented prior to her fall, and that this caused her fall. The plaintiff filed this action against the school district, alleging that it was negligent in failing to correct a dangerous condition or in failing to warn her about the dangerous condition on the school district’s property. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the school district’s actual or constructive notice of the defective condition. Alternatively, it claimed that the school district was immune from suit under the GTLA. The trial court agreed with the school district and granted summary judgment based on both grounds. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, concluding that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the school district had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition, and that the school district is not immune from suit under the GTLA.

Following surgeries on both of his hands, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits on the theory that the repetitive nature of his work in the employer’s flooring business exacerbated a pre-existing, but dormant, arthritic condition. The trial court found that the employee’s work duties had worsened his osteoarthritis and awarded 40% permanent partial disability to each hand. The trial court also awarded temporary total disability benefits for the time during which the employee was recuperating from the surgeries and unable to work. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court, holding that the employee’s condition was neither caused nor aggravated by the work he performed for the employer. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of causation and the award of benefits, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Panel and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the administration of an intestate estate. The respondent was appointed administratrix of her mother’s estate. She administered the estate with the help of an attorney. At the time of the decedent’s death, the decedent and the respondent owned a joint banking account with the right of survivorship. The respondent determined that the proceeds in the account passed directly to her upon the decedent’s death, and so she did not include it in the decedent’s estate. The respondent made a final distribution to the heirs of the estate, and the estate was closed. Subsequently, the petitioner, one of the decedent’s heirs and the respondent’s brother, filed a motion to reopen the estate. He alleged that the respondent and her attorney mismanaged the estate and violated his claimed right to a portion of the decedent’s joint checking account. The trial court reopened the estate and appointed a successor administrator. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioner’s claim to some additional distribution, but determined that the petitioner was not entitled to a portion of his mother’s joint checking account. The petitioner now appeals. Because all of the petitioner’s claims were not adjudicated by the trial court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, we initially made a referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). We then granted direct review. The employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that he suffered a work-related injury to his wrist, which caused an aggravation of the underlying dormant arthritic condition in his right wrist. In response, the employer asserted that the employee’s arthritis was not causally related to his employment and argued that the severity of the pre-existing condition was not advanced by his work activities. The trial court awarded benefits, concluding that the employee had sustained a 36% permanent partial impairment to his right extremity and was entitled to future medical treatment and discretionary costs. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee had sustained an injury that was causally related to his work activities and by ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cloyd’s scapholunate dissociation with radiolunate osteoarthritis is a compensable workers’ compensation injury. Mr. Cloyd had the burden of  proving that his work-related activities caused his disabling condition. This required him to  present expert evidence of causation. Glisson v. Mohom Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that except for the most obvious cases, employees must present expert medical evidence to establish that their injury was caused by their work-related activities). This evidence was provided by Dr. William Kennedy.

This case is before this court upon the petitioner’s, Timothy E. Higgs, motion to late-file his notice of appeal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a construction case. The plaintiff filed an action in general sessions court to collect money that he alleged that the defendants owed him under a construction contract. The general sessions court entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and the defendants appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court also entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. After the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial, the defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings.

This is a breach of contract case in which the plaintiff, reflected as “Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC” (“Realty Center”), a real estate broker, sued Dowlen Construction, LLC (“Dowlen”), a builder and developer, for unpaid commissions on sales of real estate. Realty Center signed the contracts at issue in a name slightly different from the name on its real estate broker’s license. The trial court held that Realty Center is entitled to commissions, prejudgment interest, and discretionary costs. Dowlen appeals. We hold, in accord with the general rule, that the misnomer in the contracts did not render those documents invalid or inoperative where there was evidence that Dowlen knew the identity of the real party and, in this circumstance, Dowlen was estopped to deny the existence of the entity with which it contracted. We further hold that the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-13-101 et seq. (“the Act”) does not expressly require a real estate broker to sign contracts in its licensed name, and we decline Dowlen’s invitation to construe the Act to find this requirement. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case terminating a 40 year marriage. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s division of marital property, award of alimony in futuro, and award of attorney’s fees to Wife/Appellee. In addition, Husband/Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting Wife/Appellee’s motions to re-open proof, and in denying Husband/Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm as modified herein.

This is a will contest. The decedent had three children, two daughters who survived her and a son who predeceased her. Two months before the decedent’s death, she executed a will that left all of her property to her daughters and some of their family members, but left nothing to any of the six children of the predeceased son. After the decedent’s death, one of the daughters sought to probate the will. The deceased son’s children filed this petition to contest the will, arguing that it was procured through undue influence. After a jury trial, the jury found that the will had not been procured through undue influence and was, therefore, valid. The son’s children now appeal the jury verdict. We affirm, concluding that the evidence in the record supports the jury verdict.

The defendant, Britt Alan Ferguson, was convicted by an Obion County jury of facilitation of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony; two counts of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; unlawful drug paraphernalia use and activities, a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a Class E felony;1 and was sentenced by the trial court as a multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction. Following the denial of his untimely motion for new trial, he filed an untimely notice of appeal to this court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia convictions and arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The State responded with a motion to dismiss on the basis that both the motion for new trial and notice of appeal were untimely. This court granted the motion in part, ruling that the defendant had waived the suppression issue by his untimely motion for new trial but that we would waive the untimely notice of appeal in order to consider the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred in failing to allow Appellant to proceed with discovery after the State of Tennessee filed its Motion to Dismiss, in dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and Amended Complaint based solely on argument, without any proof by testimony or documentation, and in dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and Amended Complaint in regards to BellSouth which did not file a motion to dismiss or present evidence or documentation prior to the court’s dismissal. On appeal, Appellant contends that it was entitled to proceed with discovery before the court ruled on the State’s motions. Likewise, Appellant argues that the State should have been required to prove ownership of an easement right of way over Appellant’s property. Finally, Appellant contends that because BellSouth filed only a Notice of Appearance, Appellant’s claim against BellSouth should not have been dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Von Arlen McKinney, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; and violation of the implied consent law. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for his DUI offense; eleven months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license, to run concurrent to the DUI; eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to run concurrent to the other sentences; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for violation of the implied consent law, with five days to run consecutive to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of eleven months and thirty-four days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that the sentence imposed was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether Express Disposal had a legal, vested right to conduct its garbage collection business for residences in Berryhill prior to its annexation by the city of Memphis, such that Memphis’ exercise of its exclusive right to provide municipal services in Berryhill constituted a taking of Express Disposal’s property rights without just compensation in violation of Article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. We find that Memphis’ takeover of residential garbage collection in Berryhill did not amount to a constitutional taking, such that Express Disposal was entitled to compensation. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Express Disposal’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of theft of less than $500, and two counts of failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to six years on each count of forgery to be served concurrently with each other and six years on each count of failure to appear to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for the forgery convictions. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft under $500 to be served concurrently to the other sentences. These sentences were then run consecutively to the nine year sentence Defendant was already serving. On appeal, Defendant argues that the sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce proceeding, Wife appeals the trial court’s decision not to enforce the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement, the trial court’s distribution of the marital assets, and the trial court’s failure to sanction Husband for failure to comply with the discovery rules. After Wife filed for divorce, the parties executed a Martial Dissolution Agreement. The trial court, however, refused to enforce the Marital Dissolution Agreement because some of Husband’s property was damaged while within Wife’s exclusive control. The trial court admitted as evidence Wife’s attorney’s statement that he would not permit Wife to damage husband’s property. We affirm that attorney’s statement was properly admissible parol evidence and the trial court properly denied Wife’s motion to enforce the Martial Dissolution Agreement.

Wife also argues that the trial court failed to equitably distribute the marital assets and that the court erred by failing to sanction Husband for discovery violations. This Court affirms the trial court’s division of marital assets, as modified, and its order denying Wife’s request for sanctions.

Memorandum Opinion - This is an appeal from an order of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Lasalle Bank National Association (Lasalle Bank).  The appeal is dismissed. 

This appeal concerns the value of property taken by the City of Memphis under its eminent domain power. The condemned land was subject to a leasehold interest held by the Appellant. The Appellant used the land as a site for a billboard, which it rented to advertisers. After taking possession of the land, the City compensated the owner, but not the Appellant. Appellant sought compensation for its property interest, and designated an expert witness to offer proof on its value. The City objected to the expert’s methodology, and asked the trial court to exclude his testimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the expert’s methodology was prohibited by this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Comm’r v. Teasley, 913 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Without the expert’s testimony, Appellant could not present proof on the value of its property interest and accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment for the City. Finding that the trial court erred when excluding Appellant’s expert, we reverse.

Following her guilty plea to facilitation of robbery and a sentencing hearing in the Sullivan County Criminal Court, the defendant, Katrina M. Everhart, appeals that court’s decision to order her three year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. She claims on appeal that the criminal court erroneously denied her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between an employee and employer over life insurance coverage under a group insurance policy. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward; the procedural history, however, is surprisingly complicated. Ultimately, we dismiss for lack of a final judgment and remand to the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the petitioner, Michael S. Powell, of count one, first degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being aggravated child abuse, and of count two, aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life in prison for the murder conviction and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals that dismissal, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that a mental evaluation be conducted on the petitioner. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Walker, Jr., appeals his conviction for second offense DUI. The defendant claims there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury to sustain a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After complete review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.