APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the attempt of a long-term employee of an air conditioner manufacturer to obtain benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an injury to her foot. She filed a claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for White County. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits resulting from a fifty-five percent permanent partial disability to her foot. On this appeal, the employer asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the injury arose out of the course of the employment and that the disability award was excessive. We have determined that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s award.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves an employee who returned to work after sustaining a compensable injury but who was unable to continue working after his injury worsened.  He filed a petition in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) (2005) in the Chancery Court for Putnam County seeking reconsideration of his permanent disability. Following a bench trial, the trial court made an award based on a seventy-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, subject to a credit for the amount of the earlier settlement. The employer asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by exceeding the cap of six times the impairment in the absence of expert proof regarding whether the employee has reasonably transferable job skills.  Because we have determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 (2005) requires expert proof on this issue, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Tommy Lee Clark, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; and possession of a deadly weapon other than a firearm with the intent to employ it during the commission of a dangerous offense, a Class E felony.  The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, twelve years, and six years, respectively, and ordered that each sentence run consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated burglary and attempted aggravated burglary because the State presented no proof regarding his intent to commit a theft; (2) the indictment for attempted aggravated burglary was defective because it did not state an essential element of the offense; (3) the trial court erred in holding that a box cutter is a deadly weapon; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. After his probation was revoked, the defendant, Brandon Dailey, entered a plea of guilty to the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. Thereafter, the court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment and ordered that his sentence run concurrently with his prior sentences. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentence without considering enhancement and mitigating factors and for failing to state on the record its reasons for the sentence in contravention of procedure established by the Sentencing Reform Act. Upon a full review of the record, arguments of counsel and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Keary Lee Chearis, was convicted of five counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years on each count. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses, ruling that the State properly authenticated video recordings offered as evidence, overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument, enhancing his sentences beyond the statutory minimum, and imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that it was error to deny the defendant’s motion to sever the offenses, but such error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST Commission”) decertified an officer previously given preliminary certification pending a background check based upon a plea of guilty and nolo contendere to felonies that were entered and set aside in California decades ago. In decertifying the officer, the POST Commission relied upon the position that it had no discretion under its own rules, and that decertification was required. The Chancery Court reversed the POST Commission for failing to give full faith and credit to the California judgment. We hold that the POST Commission failed to adopt criteria for exceptions and waivers as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-106. For reasons other than those used by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of  the trial court, but modify the judgment to vacate the POST Commission’s decision to decertify and remand the matter to the POST Commission to reconsider the officer’s decertification in  accordance with statutory directives.

The Defendant, Glen Andrew Adams, was charged with Class C felony manufacture of marijuana. The Defendant applied for pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied his request. The trial court reversed, concluding that the district attorney abused his discretion and ordering that the Defendant be placed on pretrial diversion. The State appeals. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Cocke County Circuit Court ordering the district attorney general to grant the Defendant diversion is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

After sixteen years of marriage, Linda Kay Edwards (“Wife”) sued Ronald Dell Edwards (“Husband”) for divorce. After the trial, the Trial Court entered an order, inter alia, granting the parties a divorce, distributing the marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife transitional alimony in the amount of $2,600 per month for twelve months. Wife appeals raising issues regarding the distribution of marital property and alimony. We modify the Trial Court’s Final Decree to order that Husband is to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,000 per month after the transitional alimony ends, and we affirm as modified.

The petitioner, Raymond Belcher, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

In this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State challenges the trial court’s suppression of the defendant’s June 23, 2003 statement to police. Because we agree that the defendant’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights, as well as certain statutory rights, were violated in the procuring of the statement, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves modification of a parent’s status as primary residential parent. The mother and the father never married, and the mother was the children’s primary residential parent. The father filed a petition to modify, requesting to be named the primary residential parent. As a material change in circumstances, he alleged that the children had been living primarily with him for the past several months. After a hearing, the juvenile court established the father as the primary residential parent, gave the mother alternate parenting time, and set child support payments for the mother. The mother appeals, arguing that she never received proper notice of the father’s petition to modify, that there had been no material change in circumstances, and that the evidence did not support a finding that designating the father as the primary residential parent was in the children’s best interest. We affirm, finding that the mother waived her challenge to the sufficiency of service of process, and that the evidence supports the designation of the father as the primary residential parent.

This appeal concerns a contempt proceeding arising from the alleged failure of the appellant to pay child support and other expenses as required by a prior court order. Neither the appellant nor counsel for the appellant appeared at the hearing below held on the issue of his contempt. The trial court found the appellant to be in contempt for nonpayment of his court-ordered obligations; the appellant was also taxed with attorney’s fees for the appellee. Because the trial court failed to find that the appellant possessed the present ability to pay and also failed to find that he was in willful noncompliance with the court’s prior order, we reverse that part of the decision below finding the appellant to be in contempt as well as awarding attorney’s fees, and we remand for further proceedings. We leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that the appellant was in arrears on his obligations to the appellee.

The Defendant, Benjamin A. McAlister, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia subject to reservation of a certified question on appeal. The Defendant then applied for and was granted judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. On appeal, the Defendant presents the following certified question for our review: whether he voluntarily consented to the search of his residence. As provided by our diversion statute, no judgment of conviction was entered and, as such, we conclude that the Defendant has no appeal as of right. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the appeal, the appeal is dismissed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  After working an evening shift at his job, the employee awoke the next morning with severe back pain. He sought medical treatment through his family physician who referred him to a neurosurgeon.  Within a few days, he had surgery to repair bone spurring and degenerative changes in his cervical spine. After the surgery, he informed his supervisor that he believed his job caused his condition.  He made a workers’ compensation claim, which his employer denied. The trial court found that his injury was work-related and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to comply with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law, and that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, George A. Johnson, was convicted by a Sevier County Jury of rape and statutory rape. As a result, he received an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court. See State v. George A. Johnson, No. E2003-02881-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 225025, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 31, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 2, 2005). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction review on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, determining that Petitioner failed to carry the burden required for post-conviction relief. We agree and, therefore, affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order to produce two witnesses for deposition within forty-five days, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion where there was no evidence of willful or dilatory conduct by Plaintiff. We vacate and remand.

The defendant, Gerald Sanford, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction on one count of first degree murder. In this appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sarah Michelle Vinson, appeals her Lincoln County Circuit Court convictions of two counts of forgery. In this appeal, she contends that she was improperly denied alternative sentencing and that her sentences are excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Lewis Jeffrey Cox, was arrested for public intoxication. Appellant was a registered violent sex offender at the time of his arrest. He failed to inform the arresting officers or the facility where he was held that he was a registered violent sex offender. Subsequently, Appellant was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for failure to inform the incarcerating facility that he was a registered violent sex offender under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204(e). Appellant pled guilty to the charge. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years as a career offender. Appellant appeals his sentence to this Court. On appeal, he argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204 carries no penal provision, and the penal provisions included in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-208 do not apply to his failure to inform the facility of his status as a registered violent sex offender. After a thorough review of the applicable laws, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Nikia Grasty, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The appellant urges this court to reverse the post-conviction court’s decision denying him post-conviction relief based upon his allegation that trial counsel’s failure to explain to him, prior to his plea of guilty, the extent of his obligations under the community supervision provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to undermine the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, he complains that had counsel informed him adequately regarding the requirements of lifetime community supervision, including the possible associated monthly cost of forty-five dollars, he would not have entered his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and automobile burglary. The appellant claims and counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this omission rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent and unknowing.

The Petitioner, Chad Alan Parker, pled nolo contendre to one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of burglary of an automobile. The trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and community supervision for life for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, and to two years for the burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the issues and applicable authorities, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for the Petitioner to withdraw his best interest plea.

This appeal involves the trial court’s classification and division of marital assets upon the parties’ divorce. The wife contends that the trial court incorrectly classified improvements made to the husband’s home with monies taken from the parties’ joint account as the husband’s separate property. Only the wife filed a brief, and we do not have a transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

We reverse the trial court’s finding that the immunity granted in the second sentence of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-53-110 applied only where there was proof that actual malice was absent. With regard to the statute of limitations governing claims related to diminution in value to a business, where the gravamen of the complaint is for breach of contract, the six-year period of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109 governs, but where the gravamen of the complaint is for injury to property, the three-year period of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 governs.

Plaintiff’s employment contract as a probationary teacher was not renewed. He filed a grievance under the agreement existing between the local board of education and the local professional employees’ association. As the last step in the grievance procedure, the teacher sought binding arbitration. The board filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to arbitrate the former employee’s grievance. The trial court dismissed that action, and on appeal this court reversed and remanded for further consideration by the trial court. The trial court then ruled that the issues raised by the teacher were subject to arbitration, and the board again appealed to this court. We hold that a locally negotiated agreement cannot be interpreted to delegate to an arbitrator the decision of whether to renew a probationary teacher’s contract because state statutes clearly give that decision to local school officials. Consequently, we reverse the trial court.