APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The November 7, 2006 Hendersonville election for alderman in Ward 3 is the subject of this litigation. The margin of victory was a mere 18 votes. The losing candidate, Mr. Skidmore, challenged the election results. The chancellor held against him. Mr. Skidmore appeals, maintaining that a sufficient number of illegal votes were cast to require that the election be voided. We affirm the chancellor.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, M-Tek, Inc. ("Employer") contends that the trial court erred in finding that Ida Cummings ("Employee") sustained a compensable permanent partial right shoulder disability. In the alternative, Employer contends that the trial court erred in relying on the evaluating physician's impairment rating instead of the rating given by the treating physician, and in awarding Employee a 27.5% impairment to the body as a whole. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Troy Sepulveda ("Employee") sustained an injury to his lower back while sleeping in the cab of his truck while waiting to make a delivery. The trial court found that he was a "traveling employee," found the injury to be compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. Western Express, Inc. ("Employer") has appealed, contending that the injury did not arise from the employment. We affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Paul Dykas, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-four years. This Court affirmed those judgments on direct appeal. ¹ He filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to properly strike a juror, failed to prepare him for trial, and failed to prepare a witness for examination. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed that decision. ² The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, again claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly strike a juror and for failing to object to a jury instruction. The habeas court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment where Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants’ motion prior to the hearing. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that they had received notice of the hearing but did not receive a copy of Defendants’ motion itself. The trial court found the motion had been mailed with the notice of hearing, and that Plaintiffs failed to respond timely. Plaintiffs appeal; we affirm.

In this legal malpractice action, the trial court denied the former client’s motion to stay proceedings and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney. The former client asserts on appeal that summary judgment was not proper because the underlying case in which the malpractice allegedly occurred is still pending, and therefore, damages cannot be established. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher James Dodson, pled guilty to facilitation of robbery, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range I offender, to four years to be served at thirty percent. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that the parties and the trial court agreed at sentencing that the Petitioner should receive thirteen months of jail credit, which he was not given by the Tennessee Department of Correction. Because he was not given this jail credit, the Petitioner alleged he was entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered, and he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals that dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff and defendants entered into a verbal agreement wherein plaintiff would purchase two lots from the defendants at an agreed price. Plaintiff made payments as agreed over a period of time, but before the lots were completely paid for defendants sold one of the lots to a third party. Plaintiff brought this action for specific performance and the Trial Court ruled that the verbal agreement violated the Statute of Frauds. However, the Trial Court invoked the theory of equitable estoppel against defendants, ordered specific performance, and awarded damages for the lot sold, which was part of the purchase agreement. On appeal, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Claudell Watkins Carpenter, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Additionally, the defendant pled guilty to evading arrest. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court subsequently granted as to certain of the convictions, reducing the second degree murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter and dismissing the first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions. The defendant then was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, twelve years for the especially aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Thereafter, the State appealed the trial court’s ruling on the motion for judgment ofacquittal. Rule 29, pursuant to which the defendant filed the motion for judgment of acquittal, requires that, before a judgment is entered following the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court first should rule on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for disposition of the motion for new trial so that a single appeal will result from the defendant’s trial. Since judgments were entered prematurely following the court’s granting the motion, they are set aside, and the jury verdicts for second degree murder (Count 1), first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 4) are reinstated. Because the State’s appeal is premature, it is dismissed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendants, Martha Ann Freeman and Rafael DeJesus Rocha-Perez, of the first-degree murder of Martha Freeman’s husband. On appeal, Freeman alleges that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting a nude photograph of Rocha-Perez; (2) refusing to allow Freeman to play a recording of a 911 call; and (3) refusing to grant her motion to sever. Rocha-Perez alleges the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify concerning a statement Freeman made in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Both Defendants allege there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher Cooper, pleaded guilty to a charge of theft of property worth $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was sentenced in the Blount County Circuit Court to a sentence of four years, with 30 days to be served incarcerated on consecutive weekends and the balance to be served through supervised probation. On April 16, 2007, the court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve six months in confinement and extended his subsequent probation period by one year. From that order, the defendant appeals and claims a lack of evidence to support revocation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below.

The plaintiff physician sued the defendant hospital for breach of contract after the hospital declined to promote him to a permanent position on its medical staff. He claimed that the hospital’s bylaws were part of his employment contract, and that the manner in which the hospital reached its decision violated those bylaws. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. We agree that the bylaws formed part of his contract, but since the record clearly shows that the hospital substantially complied with its bylaws we affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Glen Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was sentenced improperly. Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to interview witnesses, never discussed trial strategy with the petitioner, and failed to file proper motions. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the defendant, Gary Lynn Sykes, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court required restitution of $4,421.00 and imposed a Range I, three-year sentence in the Dyer County jail; all but sixty days were suspended. In his appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The appellant, Devito Polk, pled guilty to second degree murder¹ and was sentenced to 35 years as a Multiple Range II offender. His sentence was to be served concurrently with seven pending aggravated robbery charges. He, thereafter, filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary plea. He appeals the denial of the petition. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of guilty; and (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition. The appellant, Michael South, was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and sentenced to serve 60 years and 30 years, respectively.  The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.  In his petition seeking post-conviction relief, the sole issue was whether South had been denied effective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge filed an excellent, detailed opinion. The trial judge found that counsel’s performance was not deficient and denied relief. We have reviewed the briefs, transcript of the hearing, opinion and order denying relief and the entire appellate record. The evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings and conclusions of the trial court.  The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal appeals.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 23, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in November 1988, and was convicted of the same in August 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 22, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in October 1988, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in January 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Bryan Matthew Willis appeals his convictions in the Circuit Court of Henry County. He was convicted by a jury of three (3) counts of aggravated burglary and three (3) counts of theft of property. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient for the convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Turks, a/k/a Asad E. Mujihadeen, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court which denied him post-conviction, habeas corpus and coram nobis relief from his 1979 first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's case because the postconviction and coram nobis actions were barred by statutes of limitations and the habeas corpus action failed to state a ground for relief. The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for post-conviction relief under Tennessee law?

(2) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for habeas corpus relief?

(3) Does the one-year statute of limitations for bringing evidence of actual innocence under Tennessee's coram nobis statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves a child support obligation. The mother and father had three minor children. When the parties divorced, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a permanent parenting plan, which were approved by the divorce decree. Relevant to this appeal, the parties owned a newer residence, which was their marital home, and also an older residence, which had been listed for sale. The permanent parenting plan provided that it would not become effective until the older residence was sold. The parties agreed that the mother and the three children would be allowed to continue living with the father in the newer residence after the divorce until the older residence was sold. The father would be paying several marital debts until the older home sold, including the mortgage on the older home. However, the parenting plan provided that the father’s obligation to pay child support would not begin until the older home was sold. The mother and children soon moved out of the marital home and into the older residence. Pursuant to the agreement, the father had no obligation to pay child support because the older residence had not been sold. Six weeks after the final divorce decree was entered, the mother filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree and parenting plan, claiming that the parties were not abiding by the decree and the father was not paying any child support. The mother began receiving public assistance benefits, and the State of Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a petition on her behalf seeking to modify the father’s child support obligation, claiming that the agreement relieving him of his duty to pay child support was void and that a significant variance existed between his current obligation and the Child Support Guidelines. The trial court entered a default order requiring the father to pay child support directly to the mother, but later set it aside, leaving the father with only his obligation, pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement, to pay the marital debts until the older residence sold. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff has operated a funeral home on its property since 1997. In this zoning dispute, the City of Mt. Juliet Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”) refused to allow plaintiff to establish a crematory as an expansion of plaintiff’s funeral home services. The funeral home had been a legal nonconforming use of plaintiff’s property since the City’s zoning ordinance was amended in 1998. The Board refused to allow plaintiff to operate a crematory on the same property because crematories are not permitted in the zoning district for plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Trial Court for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Trial Court granted the writ and found that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, illegal, and capricious. The Trial Court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered defendants to allow plaintiff to build and operate the proposed crematory on its funeral home property. The Trial Court also granted plaintiff $10,000 in attorney fees and costs. Defendants appeal. We affirm. We also hold that BMC is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during this appeal, not to exceed $10,000, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-37-101, et seq. Therefore, we remand to the Trial Court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded to BMC and for collection of costs below.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no evidentiary hearing. While the petitioner submits an extensive brief outlining a number of issues, we have summarized his claims as follows:

(1) whether the trial court erred when it determined that sentence reform legislation adopted in 1979 and 1989 did not apply to petitioner's sentence;

(2) whether the subsequent sentence reform acts deny petitioner equal protection under the law and due process of the law;

(3) whether the petitioner's sentence is cruel and unusual punishment;

(4) whether the trial court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the petitioner during this habeas corpus proceeding;

(5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this petition; and

(6) whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction to alter the petitioner's sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Obion County, granting Appellant’s motion to modify her sentence, but denying her full probation. See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property in excess of $60,000, a Class B felony.  Her original sentence, imposed April 17, 1995, was to a term of eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended except for one year which Appellant was ordered to serve in the Obion County Jail. A probationary period was imposed for the balance of the term and restitution ordered as a condition thereof.