APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the petitioner, Robert S. Barnes, was convicted of reckless endangerment, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault. For his convictions, the petitioner was sentenced as a career offender to an effective sentence of forty-five years for the felony convictions, plus consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Robert Sanford Barnes, No. W2003-02967-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 331376 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 11, 2005). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the postconviction court subsequently denied after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner now appeals. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff brought suit to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate contending that one of the selling heirs was the authorized agent of the remaining heirs to enter into the agreement. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits and the Plaintiff countered with his affidavit. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court granted the motion and we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole to the employee. The employer asserts that the trial court erred by finding that the employee sustained a compensable aggravation of his pre-existing congenital condition. In the alternative, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work and by awarding more than two and one-half times the medical impairment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a). We affirm the finding of compensability, reverse the finding that the employee did not have a meaningful partial disability to the body as a whole.

The plaintiff in this case suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a tort claim against the third-party defendant. We granted review to determine whether the third-party defendant is entitled to argue the comparative fault of a principal contractor who is an employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law. We conclude that the third-party defendant may not argue the comparative  fault of a principal contractor even if the principal contractor does not have a subrogation interest in the plaintiff’s recovery. The third-party defendant may, however, argue that the principal contractor was the sole cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. We also conclude that the jury instruction provided by the trial court accurately and adequately explained the jury’s ability to consider whether the actions of the principal contractor were the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues pretermitted by its opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 65% to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court used an incorrect method to calculate the average weekly wage. The employer also argues that the amount of the award is excessive and that it is entitled to a credit for an overpayment of temporary disability benefits. We hold that the method used to calculate the average weekly wage was, in fact, erroneous and modify the judgment accordingly. We also hold that the Employer is entitled to credit for the overpayment of temporary disability benefits. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Allen Oliver, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to assert a ground that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The Petitioner, Sherman Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Neil Lincoln Miller, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that his sentence is illegal. Because the record and law establish that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Nathaniel Starr, appeals as of right his bench trial conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred in finding him to be a persistent offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s decision except that I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s holding “that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the [Plaintiff’s] amended motion and limiting the trial to the issue of damages only.” I believe the Trial Court acted well within its discretion in ordering this sanction. As discussed by the majority, Rule 37.04 clearly is authority for a trial court’s “rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” because that party failed to serve answers or objections to interrogatories. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(C). That is exactly what the Trial Court did here.

This is a legal malpractice case. Raymond Clayton Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) sued his former attorney, Jes Beard (“the Attorney”), in connection with the Attorney’s representation of the Client in the latter’s action to modify child support. In the present case, after the Attorney failed to answer interrogatories regarding his experts, the Client filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 seeking to prevent the Attorney from offering any expert testimony. The court entered an order granting the Client’s motion and barring the Attorney from introducing expert testimony at trial. The Client subsequently filed a second motion for Rule 37 sanctions, this time seeking a default judgment against the Attorney. The motion sought this further sanction as punishment for the Attorney’s alleged failure to cooperate in the discovery process. The court granted this motion and announced its decision in a fax to counsel on the day before trial. An order was never entered memorializing this ruling. The Attorney filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. After a hearing solely on the issue of damages, the trial court entered a judgment against the Attorney for $16,697.38. He appeals. After review, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a default judgment against the Attorney as a Rule 37 sanction. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial, but solely on the issue of liability.

The Appellant, Terrance Burke, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Burke argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff sought to recover payment of workers compensation benefits via subrogation against the defendant. The Trial Court entered Judgment for defendant. We affirm.

The defendant, Jack N. Taylor, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to three years in the community corrections program. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) brought this action alleging that Alfred O. Hibler, II, had failed to report earned income as required in order to avoid a reduction in the amount of his Metro disability pension, resulting in significant pension overpayments to Mr. Hibler. The income in dispute consisted of distributions of excess earnings of an S corporation owned by Mr. Hibler. The issue is whether this income is properly characterized as “earned income,” defined by the Metro Code as including “wage or salary – not rent, interest, dividends or capital gains.” After a trial, the trial court ruled that the distributions, labeled “draws” by the S corporation, were not earned income required to be reported to Metro for purposes of calculating Mr. Hibler’s disability pension, and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found Defendant/Petitioner to be in contempt; denied his petition to modify alimonyupon finding no change in material circumstance; ordered him to pay back alimony, plus 10%interest; awarded Plaintiff/Respondent’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, Defendant/Petitioner asserts thetrial court erred in failing to find a material change in circumstance. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I am, respectfully, unable to join in the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment of conviction due to the insufficiency of the evidence, although I concur in the majority opinion regarding all other issues. The majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the Defendant, knowingly, by other than accidental means, inflicted serious injury on this victim. Specifically, the majority concludes that there is a failure of evidence with regard to the Defendant’s mens rea.

The defendant, Marty Michelle Clark, was convicted of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to six years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to sustain his nconviction. Upon review of the full record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of  the trial court.

The defendant, David Harold Hanson, was convicted of aggravated child abuse a Class A felony, and received a sentence of eighteen years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the definition of “accidental means” as submitted by the defendant; (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the “knowing” element of aggravated child abuse; and (4) whether the trial court erred by giving sequential jury instructions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for aggravated child abuse; and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated assault, one count of theft, Class D felony theft, and misdemeanor vandalism, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault and theft; (2) the trial court improperly allowed testimony that the Defendant had kidnapped the victim the night before this incident; and (3) the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. Finding that there exists no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Scott Christopher Magness, appeals as of right from the sentence of confinement imposed by the Hardin County Circuit Court for his conviction of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. As a Range I, standard offender, the defendant received a sentence of six  years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff sustained a compensable work-related injury to his right shoulder, in awarding plaintiff temporary total disability benefits for work missed due to surgery, in awarding him a 12% disability to the body as a whole as to each shoulder, and in commuting the entire award into a lump sum payment. Plaintiff asks this court to find the Defendant's appeal in this case to be frivolous. We find the chancellor's rulings as to all these issues to be correct and affirm the trial court's decision. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the award is insufficient and that the trial court also erred in allowing Defendant to set-off benefits paid under the Defendant company's sickness and accident policy. Because we are unable to determine from the record the nature of the benefits paid by Defendant, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The majority in this case concludes that defendant is not entitled to relief based on the trial court’s rulings regarding the defendant’s proposed expert, Dr. Stephen Adams. As the majority states, the trial court ruled that Dr. Adams was qualified to give expert testimony regarding the defendant’s brain injuries; however, in ruling that Dr. Adams was not qualified as a psychiatric expert, the trial court stated that “[t]he court does not prefer to hear testimony regarding capacity on a non-specific intent crime.” In my view, this ruling prevented the Dr. Adams from presenting any testimony that the defendant lacked the capacity to form the requisite mental state for the offense with which he was charged. As a result, the defendant was prevented from presenting the key element of his defense, and the ruling clearly prejudiced the defendant. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

The defendant, Jarvis Harris, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder and sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and eighteen years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude references to gang affiliation and the State made improper comments about gang membership during opening and closing statements; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements; and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for appropriate resentencing for the attempted first degree murder conviction.

The defendant, Bradley Ferrell, was convicted by a Van Buren County jury of escape, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended after service of sixty days in the county jail. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial, in not permitting his expert witness to testify about his incapacity to form the requisite intent for the crime, in refusing his request for a special jury instruction on diminished capacity, and in overruling his motion for a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.