APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed the employee’s back injury claim based on her failure to comply with the notice provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201. Although dismissing the employee’s claim, the trial court made an alternative finding that the back injury was work-related and resulted in a 20% vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The employer appeals this alternative ruling contending that the trial court erred in finding the injury work-related. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the employee’s claim based on the notice provisions and affirm the trial court’s finding that the back injury is work-related and results in a 20% impairment to the body as a whole. We conclude that the alternative finding is supported by the record. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part, remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Eric Michael Goldman, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of misdemeanor reckless endangerment and public intoxication and received sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and thirty days, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. After review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, George Robert Waggoner, was convicted by a DeKalb County jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of murder committed during the perpetration of a theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, and one count of theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, involving the deaths of his grandparents. The premeditated murder and felony murder counts merged, and the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions concurrent with a three year sentence, as a Range I, standard offender, for the theft conviction. The defendant now appeals, claiming the trial court erred in admitting prior bad acts committed by the defendant, in admitting photographs of the deceased victims taken at the crime scene, and in imposing consecutive life sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A judgment lienholder appeals from a trial court’s determination that a purchase money mortgage lien on real property has priority over a previously recorded judgment lien. Based upon this court’s holding in Guffey v. Creutzinger, 948 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), we affirm the trial court.

In this action for legal malpractice against defendant attorney, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff, as a condition precedent to maintaining the malpractice action, had to obtain post-judgment relief from his criminal conviction, which plaintiff had failed to do after bringing his post-judgment action. On appeal, we affirm.

This appeal involves petitions for contempt and to modify a custody order. Both the mother and the father filed petitions seeking to have the initial custody order modified, and both asked that the other parent be held in contempt for failing to comply with the parenting plan. They presented various arguments about why custody should be changed in their favor, but neither alleged that any circumstances had changed since the initial order was entered. The trial court dismissed both petitions after finding that both parties had failed to prove a material change in circumstances to justify a modification of the custody order. The court also dismissed both petitions for contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm.

This case arises from a default judgment entered against Appellant for failure to comply with an Order to Compel. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand for determination of damages for frivolous appeal.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bobby Chris Couch was injured within the course and scope of his employment when he fell while unloading a truck. During the fall he caught his right leg between the truck and the loading dock. This resulted in a crushing injury to the right leg and a back sprain. Mr. Couch filed a complaint seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for permanent partial disability to his leg and back. The trial court awarded 5% partial disability to the lower extremity. However, the court found no permanent impairment to the back. The court’s final order required the employer to be responsible for future medical benefits for the leg and back injury. The employer has appealed only the award of future medical benefits for the back injury claiming that the trial court erred in making such an award when there was no expert medical proof of either permanent impairment or work limitations for the back injury. After review we affirm the trial’s court findings.

After receiving a routine hormone injection, the plaintiff patient experienced pain, facial swelling, numbness, and blindness. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the clinic, its employee physician, and the employer of the nurse who had administered the injection, alleging medical malpractice. The defendant clinic and physician filed a motion for summary judgment, and attached the expert affidavit of the defendant physician in which he stated that all of the defendants had treated the plaintiff in accordance with the relevant standard of care and according to their best medical judgment. After the physician’s deposition was taken, the plaintiff filed a motion for a determination by the trial court that his previously filed affidavit had been filed in bad faith, citing alleged inconsistencies with his deposition testimony and discovery admissions. The nurse’s employer filed a motion for summary judgment that relied upon the physician’s deposition testimony that the nurse had acted in accordance with the relevant standard of care and that the actions of the nurse had not caused the plaintiff’s injuries. A hearing was held at which the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to find that the physician’s affidavit had been made in bad faith, and the trial court allowed the plaintiff additional time in which to produce expert proof of causation. After the plaintiff was unable to obtain expert proof, the trial court ultimately granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At the time the parties were divorced, they essentially agreed to a joint custodial arrangement for their two children. Subsequently, the father filed a Petition alleging change of circumstances and for primary custody of the children. The wife filed a Counter-petition for primary custody. The Trial Court heard evidence and awarded primary custody to the father. The mother has appealed. We affirm.

In this divorce proceeding, the appellant contends the trial court erred by granting the divorce to his wife and designating her as the primary residential parent of their minor child. Finding no error, we affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the employee's injury, caused by a fall in the workplace, arose from her employment. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (2) affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed JON KERRY BLACKWOOD, SR. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and J. S. (STEVE) DANIEL, Sr. J.,joined. Daniel T. Swanson, Knoxville, TN, for the Appellant, Patsy Diane Ownby. John P. Dreiser, Knoxville, TN, for the Appellee, Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., d/b/a Marriott Business Services. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Patsy D. Ownby [hereinafter "the employee"] was employed as a billing specialist for Marriot Hotel Services [hereinafter "the employer"]. She began her employment with the employer in 2. -1- She had an associate's degree in accounting and was 53 years old at the time of trial. On August 15, 23, the employee was attending a daily "stand-up meeting" within her department. As the meeting was concluding, she testified that she walked down an aisle and "her feet caught on the carpet" causing her to fall. She described the fall as "being shot out of a rocket." She further testified that she was wearing non-skid office type shoes, that she had previously stumbled on the carpet, and that she was aware that other employees had stumbled. As a result of the fall, the employee suffered carpet burns on both hands and knees, broke her glasses and watch, and sustained injuries to her right arm, cervical spine and left knee. After the accident, the employee saw Dr. Basile, who was a physician offered to her as a part of a panel of physicians provided by the employer. Dr. Basile referred the employee to several physicians to treat her for her injuries. She was treated by Dr. Finelli with therapy and medication for her cervical spine injury. Dr. Finelli referred her to Dr. Bellner, a physiatrist. Dr. Koenig performed surgery on employee's left knee. She was also seen by Dr. Killeffer for a cervical spine evaluation and Dr. Burns for an arm evaluation. Dr. William E. Kennedy saw the employee for an independent medical evaluation and agreed with Dr. Finelli's assessment that the employee had suffered a 7% impairment of the cervical spine. In addition, Dr. Kennedy, who testified by deposition, further opined that the employee's left knee had a 2% whole body impairment rating, for a combined rating of 9%. II. RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT The trial court found the injury to be compensable, and awarded 22.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tenn. 1989). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be afforded those circumstances on review since the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Industries, Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). IV. ANALYSIS The only issue raised by the employer is whether the trial court erred in finding that the injury arose out of employee's employment. The employer contends that the employee's injuries were caused by an idiopathic fall, and thus not compensable. -2- ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 o 4 o 5 o 6 o 7 o 8

The Petitioner, Johnny Parker, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to assert a ground that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The Petitioner, Cornelius D. Pierce, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

Appellant, who was the defendant in a previous criminal proceeding, filed a Writ of Mandamus seeking to obtain a refund of the bond he posted in the criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm.

Knox County- The defendant, Jeffrey A. Sundahl, was charged with four counts of unlawfully and knowingly depriving the state of the realization of its lawful revenue by failing to remit sales tax revenue, a Class E felony; one count of unlawfully and knowingly delaying, hampering, impeding, obstructing, and thwarting the state in its collection of its lawful revenue by failing to register with the state under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-601, a Class E felony; and one count of theft over $60,000, a Class B felony. The trial court dismissed all six charges on statute of limitations grounds. The state appeals the dismissals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as to counts 1 through 5. We conclude, however, that the trial court wrongly applied a three-year statute of limitations to the theft count, count 6, and we reverse the judgment as to that count.

The Appellant, Shad Tankersly, was found guilty of violating his probation and ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s decision to revoke probation, asking this Court to determine whether a warrant is required to initiate a probation revocation proceeding and toll the time limitation within which to revoke probation. We hold that T.C.A. § 40- 35-311 plainly requires the issuance of a warrant to initiate a probation revocation proceeding, and, that in the absence of the issuance of a warrant during the probationary period, as is the case here, there is no tolling of the period. Therefore, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

This is a property case involving a restrictive covenant. The homeowners in a subdivision entered into a restrictive covenant agreement with the original developer of a tract of land directly across the highway from the residential subdivision. The restrictive covenant prohibits the use of the developer’s property for “billboards . . . not in place on December 1, 1995.” On December 1, 1995, three billboard structures existed on the burdened property. Years later, the defendant billboard company purchased easements in the three billboard sites and the existing billboard structures were removed. The defendant billboard company then erected three new billboard structures.  Subsequently, the plaintiff homeowner in the subdivision filed the instant lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendant billboard company’s placement of new billboard structures on the burdened property constituted a violation of the restrictive covenant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant billboard company, and the plaintiff homeowner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the language of the restrictive covenant is unambiguous, and that it restricts only the use of the burdened property, limiting the use to the number of billboards on the property as of December 1, 1995.

The defendant was indicted for three counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, committed while he was in prison for a previous, unrelated conviction. The defendant pled guilty to the three counts. As part of his plea agreement, he received three sentences of ten years each to be served concurrently. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the three concurrent sentences should be served consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time the crimes were committed. The defendant appeals, arguing that he should have received concurrent sentences and that he was entitled to pre-trial jail credits for time served between the continuation of a parole hearing and his sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The matters at issue pertain to the fee awarded a Co-Executor of an estate.  The Co-Executor appeals contending he was entitled to a contractual fee equal to five percent of the gross estate based on an oral agreement with the ninety-four year old widow of the testator who served as his co-executor. The Special Master and Chancellor made concurrent findings that the appellant had failed to properly administer the estate. They also found that his claimed excuse, that he was acting according to the wishes of his ninety-four year old Co-Executrix, did not relieve him of his affirmative fiduciary duties as a personal representative. The Chancellor awarded him a fee of $25,000 for his services as Co-Executor.  We have concluded he is entitled to no fee for his services.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a work-related back injury and awarded the employee permanent partial disability benefits of 57.5% to the body as a whole. The employer appeals, contending that the employee’s back problems did not arise out of his employment. We affirm the trial court.

Grandparents filed petition for contempt against Father for willfully denying Grandparents their court-ordered summer visitation and weekend visitation with grandchildren. Grandparents also requested a mental evaluation and counseling for both Father and the minor children. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt and ordered that the eldest child, B.H., undergo counseling. Father appeals arguing that the trial court erred in (1) holding him in criminal contempt of court and entering sanctions against him; and (2) ordering B.H. to undergo counseling. The judgment of the trial court is vacated in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

The defendant, Raymond Lee Gibson, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of one count of manufacturing methamphetamine. On appeal, he raises several evidentiary issues for our review and argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record, we are not persuaded that the evidentiary issues merit relief, and we hold that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the manufacturing conviction. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, affirmed.

This is a retaliatory discharge case.  The plaintiff was an at-will employee of the defendant store.  While at work, the plaintiff witnessed a woman across the street from the store being physically assaulted by an unidentified man. The plaintiff employee took a baseball bat from under the work counter, left the work premises, and yelled and gestured at the assailant with the bat, causing him to leave the scene. The plaintiff then brought the woman back to the store, where the police were called.  Two days later, the defendant store terminated the plaintiff’s employment because he had left the work premises to aid the assault victim.  The plaintiff employee then sued the defendant, asserting that his termination violated Tennessee public policy. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on its face, arguing that the termination did not violate a clearly established public policy of the State of Tennessee. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, determining that the complaint stated a valid claim for retaliatory discharge. The defendant was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal by the trial court and by this Court.  We affirm, finding that the complaint states a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of a clear public policy of the State of Tennessee.

This case concerns a motor vehicle accident in which serious injuries were sustained. The insured believed that his insurance policy provided excess coverage if he were to be involved in an accident with an uninsured or underinsured motorist. In forming this belief, he relied upon statements by the insurance agent and the summary pages of his policy. Following the accident, the insurance company denied that the insured maintained excess protection under his uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, citing an exclusionary endorsement in the policy. The insured alleged that the policy was ambiguous. The trial court granted the insurance company’s Motion For Summary Judgment, ruling that the policy was not ambiguous and that the insured’s affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the representations made by the insurance agent. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.