APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, MaryAnn McNeilly, of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be suspended after serving ten days in confinement; imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine; ordered that she perform one hundred hours of public service; and suspended her driver’s license for one year. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the trial court should have suppressed her statement to a police officer; (2) that the trial court improperly allowed the State to replay a videotape of the appellant’s stop for the jury; (3) that the trial court improperly admitted the appellant’s blood test results into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense witnesses to testify about the appellant’s character; (5) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (6) that her sentence is excessive; and (7) that these cumulative errors denied the appellant her right to a fair trial.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction but modify her sentence to reflect that she is to serve five days in confinement and remand the case for entry of an amended judgment.

The Appellant, Louis Tyrone Robinson, proceeding pro se, presents a Rule 3 appeal from the  Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition.” Robinson seeks post-conviction relief in five separate cases arising from crimes which occurred during a period between August 1989 and October 1992. The post-conviction court denied Robinson’s motion on the following grounds: (1) that the motion failed to present a new claim of constitutional error under the limited circumstances set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117; (2) that no postconviction petition had ever been filed in four of the five cases; (3) that the statute of limitations had expired for post-conviction relief; and (4) that Robinson’s claims had been previously addressed.  Because the Appellant failed to comply with the statutory requirements for appealing the denial of a motion to reopen, this court is without jurisdiction to review the issue. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

I join with my colleagues in all respects, save one, I would affirm the sentence as imposed.

The Appellant, Audra Lynn Johnson, entered a best interest plea and reserved for appeal a certified question of law: whether the trial court possessed territorial jurisdiction to try the out-of-state defendant. We conclude that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction.

The Appellant, Michael Evans, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Evans’ petition was summarily dismissed by the post-conviction court upon grounds that it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Evans contends that application of the statute of limitations in this case serves to deny him his right to due process.  Following review of the record before us, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and because Evans has failed to establish any ground which would support a tolling of the statute.

The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody of the parties’ child upon finding no material change of circumstances had occurred.  We affirm in part and remand.

The Appellant, Carlos Burris, was convicted by a Madison County jury of misdemeanor possession of cocaine. On appeal, Burris argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.  After review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant appeals from his jury convictions of criminal trespass (Class C misdemeanor), assault (Class A misdemeanor), aggravated burglary (Class C felony), aggravated assault (Class C felony), and theft (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant received an effective sentence of five and one-half years incarceration plus two jail terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Issues presented on appeal are the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the consolidation of offenses from two indictments involving separate dates with a single victim. After review, we have concluded that the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that the defendant waived the severance of the offenses issue. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Antonio George, was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror who had a pending criminal case; (3) the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of the lead investigating officer; (4) the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offenses of theft and robbery; and (5) the trial court erred by not giving a curative jury instruction regarding a comment made by the prosecutor. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the defendant.

The petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to have him undergo a mental evaluation prior to trial. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden that: (1) his counsel was deficient in her performance, and (2) he was prejudiced in his claim of ineffective assistance. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Proceeding pro se, the petitioner, Miko T. Burl, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding. On appeal, the petitioner contends the court erred by dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and claims he is entitled to relief based upon the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following our review, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant, Tyree Robinson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Brown, Morris, and Courtney Perry were accomplices as a matter of law; the trial court abused its discretion in allowing hearsay statements; and the trial court erred in responding to a jury question. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Harvey S. Burns, ¹ pled guilty to selling less than one-half gram of cocaine. At the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner accepted a sentence of thirteen years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and after being appointed counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marco Hughlett, was indicted under alternative theories, charging Defendant in count one with committing aggravated robbery by violence, and in count two, with committing aggravated robbery by placing the victim in fear. The jury convicted Defendant under both counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven years for each conviction. The trial court merged Defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery in count two with his conviction of aggravated robbery in count one. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tara L. Beffrey, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, for which she received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence; violation of the implied consent law, a Class A misdemeanor, for which she received a five-day consecutive sentence; and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, for which she received a six-month concurrent sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the convicting evidence was insufficient to prove DUI and (2) the vehicle stop that led to her arrest was unconstitutional. We conclude no error exists, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, TDY Industries Inc., asserts that the trial court erred in awarding the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and 40% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity for injuries he incurred during the course of his employment. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Larry Dickerson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting life sentence. The trial court dismissed his petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Small, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge ordered the Defendant to proceed pro se because he allegedly physically attacked his appointed trial counsel. The trial court merged the two counts of aggravated robbery and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) his failure to file a motion for new trial should not constitute waiver of trial errors on appeal because he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the appointed counsel to represent him during trial because the attorney-client relationship became “adversarial,” (3) the trial court violated his right to counsel by requiring him to proceed pro se post-trial, and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated robbery.  We conclude that the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to permit our review of whether the Defendant was properly required to proceed pro se. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further factual determinations regarding the alleged attack on the Defendant’s trial counsel and any other pertinent information on the issue of whether the Defendant implicitly waived or forfeited his right to counsel.

The defendant, Charles A. Walker, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, based on acts he committed against his stepdaughter, who was less than thirteen years old when the offenses occurred. He was sentenced by the trial court to twenty years for each of the rape convictions and to eight years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, with the rape sentences to be served concurrently to each other and the aggravated sexual battery sentence to be served consecutively to the rape sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the State sufficiently proved the date of two of the offenses as set out in the bill of particulars and the verdict forms submitted to the jury; (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error by not issuing unanimity and election of offenses jury instructions; and (4) whether the totality of alleged evidentiary ruling errors warrants a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the rape convictions but reverse and remand for a new trial on the aggravated sexual battery offense. Additionally, we remand for entry of corrected judgments on the rape convictions to reflect that the defendant was sentenced to twenty years, rather than twenty-two, in each count.

The petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Louis Steele, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. Steele pled guilty to misdemeanor vandalism, harassment, and three counts of driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Steele contends that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in: (1) failing to inform him of the consequences of his pleas, specifically that three DUI convictions automatically qualified him as a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender; (2) failing to seek court-ordered medical treatment while he was in jail or to pursue his release on bail; and (3) failing to properly conduct a pretrial investigation.  Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves allegations of employer discrimination by an African-American male employee.  He claimed that he experienced race and gender discrimination because he was treated differently than his co-workers who were African-American females and a white male.  He also claimed to have been retaliated against after he filed various grievances and complaints against his employer, and he alleged outrageous conduct on the part of his employer and his supervisor, individually.  The trial court dismissed the case, and for the following reasons, we affirm.

In this action for damages to personal property caused by an allegedly defective storage container, the Trial Court granted Judgment for plaintiffs. We affirm.

We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to consider the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreed sentence exceeds the maximum available term in the offender Range but does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the offense. For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that the plea-bargained sentence is legal. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.