APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The current round in this on-going child support dispute arises from Mother’s petition for contempt for failure to pay child support filed in April 2004, and Father’s cross-petition to modify child custody. The eldest of the parties’ four children had reached the age of majority when the 2004 petitions were filed, and the parties agreed that Father would assume custody of their son, Darius. Father does not dispute that he does not spend any time with the parties remaining two minor children. Mother requested visitation time with Darius after the change of custody. Thus, the proceedings required a resetting of child support. The issues raised by Mother for our review are
whether the trial court erred by determining Father is capable of earning only $30,000 per year for
the purposes of setting Father’s child support obligation and by ordering Father to pay stipulated
child support arrears of $20,578, plus 12% interest, at the rate of $150.00 per month.

In April 2003, the plaintiff’s employer terminated his employment. The employer, citing the company’s respectful workplace policy, fired the employee for allegedly cursing a fellow employee.  The employee subsequently filed suit against the employer for retaliatory discharge. The employee alleged that his prior workers’ compensation claims were the real reason that his employer terminated his employment. In his complaint, the employee sought compensatory and punitive damages, but did not set forth the amount requested. After the jury trial got underway, the trial court allowed the employee to amend his complaint to request a specific amount of damages for back pay and front pay, but ultimately dismissed the claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of the employee’s case-in-chief, the employer moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.  At the close of the employer’s proof, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee finding that his workers’ compensation benefits were a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. At the end of trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the issue of whether to
award reinstatement or front pay to the employee. After hearing evidence on the issue, the trial court ordered the employer to pay front pay since reinstatement was not warranted under the facts of the case. The employer presented numerous issues related to the jury trial in its motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the employer asks us to review (1) the trial court’s decision to allow the employee to amend his complaint during the trial; (2) the trial court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of certain evidence; (3) the trial court’s decision to deny the employer’s motion for a directed verdict; (4) the trial court’s rejection of the employer’s proposed jury instructions; (5) the trial court’s decision to affirm the jury’s verdict while acting as thirteenth juror; and (6) the trial court’s award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the various issues raised by the employer on appeal.

The defendant, Mark Edward Ellis, pled guilty to felony escape, a Class E felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to one year as a standard offender, which was to run consecutive to his prior sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his request for suspension of this sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

I concur in the results reached by the majority and agree with most of the reasoning.  However, I do not fully agree with the analysis used to determine whether the Carol Lane Property and the Buffalo Valley Road Property were marital or separate. The analysis used by the majority starts with the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, relying on the definition of marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). While the opinion acknowledges in a footnote the definition of separate property that includes property acquired in exchange for pre-marital separately owned property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), the analysis fails to take that definition into account.1 Logically, that definition should also create a “rebuttable presumption” that is equal in weight to the one used as the basis for the analysis herein.

This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a marriage that lasted approximately ten years. Both parties sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Putnam County. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and approved a permanent parenting plan designating her as primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. In addition, the trial court classified the parties’ assets, divided the marital estate, reduced the husband’s alimony arrearage to a judgment for alimony in solido, and ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in longterm alimony. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate and with the trial court’s decision to require him to pay long-term alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of the parties’ property. However, we find that the evidence fully supports the manner in which the trial court divided the parties’ marital estate, as well as the trial court’s decision to award the wife long-term alimony.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) finding employee’s claim for latex allergy to be compensable, (b) failing to impose liability on a subsequent employer, and (c) awarding 50 percent vocational disability. We affirm.

Employment of a ShelbyCountyDeputy Sheriff was terminated and the decision was upheld by the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The administrative record was duly filed in the trial court.
Subsequently, the chancery court entered an order denying writ of certiorari. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner. After drugs were discovered in the inmate’s incoming mail, he was sentenced to punitive segregation. He sought review of his conviction in the Shelby County Chancery Court, which later dismissed his case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. The inmate filed a notice of appeal which we have determined was untimely and therefore a nullity. As a result, we must dismiss this appeal without considering the issues presented by the Petitioner.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Auto Credit failed to give Ms. Wimmer reasonable notice of the scheduled sale of the collateral.

A woman bought a used automobile, financing the purchase with a loan from the plaintiff credit company. The loan was secured through a UCC Article 9 security interest in the vehicle. When the buyer fell behind in her payments, the creditor repossessed the car and sent her notice by certified mail that it intended to sell the car and that she would face a deficiency judgment if the sale price was less than the amount she still owed. She did not receive the notice, and the certified letter was returned unclaimed to the creditor the day after the sale. The creditor sued for a deficiency of over $3,400, and the circuit court granted it judgment for the amount claimed. The buyer sought statutory damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-625 arguing that the attempted notice was inadequate, and the trial court dismissed her counterclaim. The buyer appeals this dismissal. We reverse the trial court because we find Auto Credit did not act reasonably in proceeding to sell the car without affirming that the notice had in fact been delivered.

The defendant, Leslie A. Pryor, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of theft over $10,000, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, one count of felony evading arrest, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, three counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions with the greater charge of aggravated assault, and the defendant was given an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the reasoning and result reached in the majority opinion save in one area. I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the defendant’s right to confrontation was forfeited by virtue of his wrongfully killing the victim. The majority opinion essentially holds that wrongfully causing the victim’s unavailability to testify at the defendant’s trial for murdering the victim forfeits the defendant’s right to confrontation, which allows all relevant statements by the victim to be admitted into evidence. I believe the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine should require that the defendant procure the absence of the declarant with the intent that the declarant not be a witness.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Judge Brooks, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the trial court improperly admitted the victim’s prior statements into evidence under the hearsay rule’s forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), and in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the appellant’s prior assault on the victim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. While we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay into evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between a credit and charge card issuer and two cardholders regarding allegedly unauthorized charges to their accounts by entities affiliated with the issuer. The cardholders filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Williamson County asserting that the practice of charging them for goods and services they did not agree to purchase constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice prohibited by various state consumer protection laws and gave rise to causes of action for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The issuer and its affiliates filed a motion to compel separate arbitrations against each cardholder in accordance with the class arbitration waiver clause of the arbitration provision in the cardmember agreements. The cardholders conceded that they were required to arbitrate their claims but asked the trial court to strike the class arbitration waiver clause as unconscionable. Siding with the cardholders, the trial court struck the class arbitration waiver clause and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The issuer and its affiliates appealed. We have concluded that the trial court did not err by granting the motion to compel arbitration. However, we have also concluded that the trial court erred by finding the class arbitration waiver clause unconscionable under Utah law.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
William Eric Brewer suffered a work-related injury December 17, 2001, while employed at the
Courier Chronicle. The Hartford, the defendant, is the workers’ compensation insurance carrier
of the employer and has litigated this case in its individual name. The defendant contends that the
trial court erred when it failed to find that Mr. Brewer’s injury was proximately caused by his
voluntary intoxication. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the trial court and
conclude that the defendant failed to prove that the voluntary intoxication was a proximate cause
of Mr. Brewer’s accident.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Phillip Brow, has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his
workers’ compensation claim. He contends that the trial court erred when it failed to award him
workers’ compensation benefits as a result of a fall at work that he contends aggravated a
pre-existing shoulder condition. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to causation and extent of permanent partial disability. The employer further insists the claim should have been dismissed by the trial court because the injured worker failed to give timely written notice. We conclude the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.

The Trial Court granted contestants of a Will summary judgment, voiding the Will. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment.

In these consolidated workers’ compensation appeals, we are asked to decide the constitutionality of various provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004. Specifically at issue is whether the benefit review conference requirement embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-203(a) (2005), 50-6-225(a)(1) (2005), and 50-6-239(b) (2005), violates the due process protections of the Tennessee or United States Constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine in article II, sections 1 and 2 of Tennessee’s Constitution, or the open courts doctrine found in article I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution. Additionally, we are asked to decide whether the method used to determine permanent partial disability benefits, namely the multiplier provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2005) used in conjunction with the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (“AMA Guides”), violates equal protection; due process; the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-101 (2005); and the Tennessee Handicap Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-50-103(a) (2002). The trial judge determined that each of these provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004–the benefit review conference, the multiplier, and use of the AMA Guides–is unconstitutional. After carefully considering the record and relevant authority, we conclude that the trial judge erred. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are reversed.

The petitioner, Antonio Young, appeals from the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiffs James W. McDonnell, Jr., Faith McDonnell Campbell, Anne McDonnell Durell, and James W. McDonnell, III, appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment holding that their causes of action are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. Because we find that the trial court failed to execute a final order disposing of all of Plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The defendant, Earnest Banks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine (1) whether a life insurance policy purchased by the insured as part of a divorce decree had been terminated before the insured’s death; and (2) whether the insurer or the insurance agent was negligent in failing to prevent the policy from lapsing after the insured issued an oral stop payment order and failed to pay a monthly premium. The Chancery Court concluded that the policy had not been terminated, that the insurer and insurance agent were negligent, and that the proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the beneficiary. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Chancellor’s judgment, concluded that the policy had been backdated by agreement of the parties and had been terminated by the insured before his death. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because their actions were not a proximate cause of the damages. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the life insurance policy remained valid at the time of the insured’s death and that the beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds under the policy. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because there was no evidence that their acts were a proximate cause of the damages. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated herein.

The Trial Court held that the easement at issue in this case had been abandoned. On appeal, we affirm.

We granted these appeals to determine whether the extraction of blood from a convicted and incarcerated felon for DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee’s DNA collection statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-321 (2003), is constitutional under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. These three cases come before us upon Defendant Scarborough’s interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and upon Defendant Transou’s direct appeals from his convictions in two separate cases. Transou also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of rape and aggravated burglary in one of his cases and the sentences he received for those offenses. We conclude that the DNA collection statute is constitutional as applied here. We further hold that Transou consented to having his blood drawn; that the evidence is sufficient to support Transou’s convictions of rape and aggravated burglary; and that his sentences for those crimes are valid. The judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all three cases are affirmed.