APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the second civil action between these parties. In both civil actions, Mr. Federico brought suit against Aladdin Industries for breach of a written employment agreement. In the first action, Federico only sought recovery of a bonus. In this second action Federico seeks to recover the value of a so-called “phantom unit” equity plan provided for in the employment agreement. Both claims were based on the same employment agreement. Aladdin filed a motion for summary judgment contending res judicata barred this second action. The trial court granted Aladdin’s motion, and we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Humphries, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault (a Class C felony) and received Range II consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and ten years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
the element of premeditation and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Upon thorough review, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The majority affirms the Defendant Whited’s conviction for aggravated assault concluding that “a rational jury could easily infer that [seventeen-month-old] Tristian was in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury . . . .” For the reasons discussed below, I respectfully dissent.

The Defendants were convicted of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. Defendant Whited was also convicted of three counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, both Defendants argue that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of certain activity they engaged in after the crimes were committed, and that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions.  Defendant Whited argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police. Both Defendants also challenge the trial court’s sentencing determination.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects.

The Petitioner, Corvack Shaw, appeals the lower court’s denial of his motion requesting relief  from an invalid sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to relief from an unconstitutional or invalid sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Christa G. Pike, appeals her conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony. The defendant contends she was acting in defense of a third party, an inmate, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. Finding no error at trial, we affirm the conviction.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s rejection of pretrial diversion rests upon sold legal bases. To be sure, the prosecutor carefully considered and discussed all criteria relevant to his pretrial diversion determination. Thus, my departure from the majority is not grounded upon any shortcomings in the prosecutor’s effort; rather, I conclude that despite his thorough response to the petition, he ultimately relied upon grounds that do not legally support the denial of diversion.

Defendant, James N. Harrell, seeks interlocutory review of the Warren County Circuit Court’s affirmance of the State’s denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Defendant is charged with vehicular homicide by recklessness, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, underage possession and consumption of alcohol, and underage driving while impaired. After unsuccessfully requesting pretrial diversion, Defendant appealed to the trial court, who determined that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion when denying Defendant’s request. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marshall Ward Howell, entered a plea of guilty to sale of a controlled substance. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years to be served in a community corrections program after service of a period of incarceration. Five months after his conviction, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his term in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the single issue presented for review is whether revocation was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Before the court is an interlocutory appeal by the State, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The defendant, Eric Berrios, moved to suppress evidence seized during a search of his automobile. The trial judge concluded that the evidence had been illegally seized and granted the motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Johnny Shields, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The chancery court awarded Plaintiffs Weeks damages for the taking of trees by the City of Eastview. Eastview appeals, and we vacate the award of damages against Eastview for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On cross-appeal, Weeks assert the trial court erred in failing to assess damages against Defendant Ingram and in determining Weeks had impliedly dedicated a roadway known as Autumn Lane as a public roadway. We modify and affirm on these issues.

I agree with the results reached by the trial court – including the award of attorney’s fees – as affirmed by the majority opinion. I write separately to express my disagreement with the appellant’s belief and the majority’s belief that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the custodial arrangement. I recognize that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent. However, I believe the trial court did find that the circumstances regarding the child’s custodial arrangement had changed so as to “affect[] the child’s well-being in a meaningful way,” Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002); and that it then proceeded to (1) modify the existing parenting plan by transferring decision-making authority regarding the educational/extracurricular activities of the child from the father to the mother and (2) grant the mother the right to obtain a second opinion as to medical matters.

I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the judgments of conviction for the offenses of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. I disagree with the conclusion that the two convictions of vandalism must be reversed and dismissed. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.

The petitioner, Deanna Whitman, pleaded guilty to four counts of selling a schedule II drug within 1,000 feet of a school, for which she received an effective 16-year sentence to be served as a Range I offender at 100 percent. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore unknowingly pleaded guilty to the instant crimes. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition finding that the petitioner had received effective representation and had entered her pleas knowingly. Aggrieved of this ruling, the petitioner now appeals, and after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The father filed a Petition to Change Custody of child from the mother to the father, alleging change of circumstances. Following trial, the Trial Court refused to order a change of custody, but modified the Parenting Plan. On appeal, we affirm.

A Franklin County Jury found the Defendant, Troy Robert Whipple, guilty of one count of evading  arrest while operating a motor vehicle, one count of reckless driving, one count of driving on a revoked license, and two counts of vandalism, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of four years. The Defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury that an unlawful arrest is a defense to a charge of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle; (3) the trial court improperly sentenced him; and (4) the fines imposed upon him are unreasonable. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences for evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. We reverse the Defendant’s convictions for vandalism, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In an action for damages caused by flooding, the Trial Court invoked comparative fault, awarded damages, and ordered defendants to correct conditions which caused the flooding. Both parties appealed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Kenneth B. White, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to declare Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114 unconstitutional pursuant to Blakely v. Washington. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, or, in the alternative, dismiss the appeal as there is no right to appeal the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, this Court is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain a request for an appeal of a denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Finally, if treated as a Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, the claim is timebarred. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of felony murder. The Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction and contends that the indictment against him should be dismissed with prejudice due to a violation of Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerald M. Seay, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to sell and unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies.  After merging the two counts together into a single conviction for unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to sell, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction and fined him $2,000. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing him to be impeached with stale convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, James Vanover, of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years for the rape and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery to be served consecutively at 100% for an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, but we conclude that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. We remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

This is a construction case. The defendant homeowners entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff contractor to construct a house for the defendants. After the contractor had substantially completed construction of the house, the homeowners discharged the contractor. The contractor then filed suit for unpaid costs and fees. The defendant homeowners counter-sued, alleging breach of the original contract. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order granting a monetary award to the contractor for his unpaid fees, minus several credits awarded to the defendant homeowners. The record does not include any factual findings or legal conclusions detailing the basis for the award.  The defendant homeowners appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of an expert witness and in its calculation of the award to the contractor. We affirm the trial court’s admission of the expert testimony, but vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for factual findings and legal conclusions in order to resolve the remaining issues on appeal.

The defendant, Bernardino Lira, pled guilty to DUI, third offense, and driving on a revoked license, receiving concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and ten days, with all but four months suspended. He reserved as a certified question whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the stop of his vehicle. We conclude that the question is properly certified and that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the motion to suppress.

The appellant, Larry Davis, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.