APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's failure to merge his sexual battery and attempted false imprisonment convictions into his rape conviction; the denial of alternative sentencing; and the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we conclude that the acts perpetrated on the victim constituted three discrete offenses and that the trial court did not err in failing to merge them. We further conclude that the trial court appropriately denied alternative sentencing and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. For these reasons, we affirm.

The wife sued for back child support on the basis that the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement provided for a percentage of the husband's income which had not been paid. The Trial Court refused to award back support. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Larry Dotson, appeals from the lower court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we reverse the court’s dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to grant a mistrial. I respectfully dissent. The majority opines that trial counsel’s overreaching remarks made during his opening statement, informing the jury that it was the victim who first struck the defendant, so tilted the scales of justice as to require the granting of a mistrial for reasons of manifest necessity.  See generally Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d at 443; Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d at 226.

The defendant appeals his conviction for theft of property, contending that the evidence failed to establish that he took the property without the owner's effective consent. However, upon review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Freddy Lee Parrish, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronnie Finch, was convicted by a jury of facilitation of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. As a result, the petitioner was sentenced to a total of forty-nine years in incarceration. The petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed by this Court on appeal. See State v. Frank E. Huey, et al, No. M2000-02793-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 517132 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 5, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2002). The petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging inter alia ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. For the following reasons, the judgment on post-conviction petition is reversed; the judgment of acquittal is entered; and verdicts of guilt are vacated and dismissed.

The defendant, Kervin Collins, was involved in an altercation with his father, the victim. The defendant hit the victim several times with a shovel. After an indictment for aggravated assault, a Davidson County jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years as a Range I standard offender, and the defendant appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with regard to the denial of the defendant’s motion for mistrial and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Harold Frank Henderson, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated assault in return for a four-year sentence served in a manner to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement, and the defendant appealed. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to confinement for nineteen years to be served consecutively to two prior sentences. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony as to the desire of one of the witnesses, prior to the incident, to leave the house where the offense occurred, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rahim Al Zarkani, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Alfonzo Thomas Peck, of two counts of aggravated rape (a Class A felony), and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of release. On direct appeal, the defendant raises multiple issues for our review, including the sufficiency of the evidence, challenges to the admission of a prior conviction, a limiting instruction, and sentencing. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to be cross-examined regarding his prior conviction of aggravated rape. However, given the overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt notwithstanding the conviction, we further conclude that the error was harmless. Moreover, we find no error in the balance of the issues presented. Therefore, we affirm.

After the divorce where the wife was awarded alimony for two years, the wife petitioned the Court for alimony in futuro, which the Trial Court granted. On appeal, we affirm.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, William G. Arterburn, of driving under the influence, second offense ("DUI"), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI and six months for the driving on a revoked license, ordering the defendant to serve fifty percent of his sentence in incarceration. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that a rebuttal witness violated Rule 615 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, thereby denying him a fair trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal illustrates the problems that befall divorcing parents when they agree, without court approval, to a child support arrangement that is inconsistent with the Child Support Guidelines. Five years after the parents' divorce, the mother filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to increase the father's child support obligation. The trial court approved a formula devised by the parties that did not comply with the Child Support Guidelines. The parties later ignored that formula and followed another ad hoc arrangement for approximately ten years. Eventually, the mother filed a petition in the trial court seeking to hold the father in contempt for failing to pay child support and to collect the arrearage. The trial court turned the matter over to a substitute judge who determined that the father was not in contempt because both parties had followed their formula to the best of their abilities even though it was ambiguous. The trial court also set the father's support for the remaining minor child and directed the father to pay $2,375 in additional support for that child. The mother appealed. We have determined that the father owes $64,529 in back child support and that the parties' three children are entitled to this arrearage. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment regarding back child support and remand the case for the entry of an appropriate payment plan.

This appeal arises from a divorce case. After ten years of marriage, the husband filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Lincoln County. Even though both parties sought to be the primary residential parent prior to the trial, the court placed the children in the husband's custody after the wife attempted suicide. After conducting a bench trial, the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and granted the mother unsupervised visitation. On this appeal, the mother asserts that the trial court erred with regard to the custody of the children and the division of marital assets. She also insists that the trial court erred by holding her in criminal contempt. While we reverse the trial court's finding that the mother was in criminal contempt, we affirm the court's decisions regarding custody and the division of the marital estate.

Appellant, an inmate who was housed in a prison operated by a private prison operating company, filed a claim against the State for medical malpractice with the Claims Commission pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307. The Claims Commission dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction because the treating physicians and staff allegedly responsible for the injuries to Appellant were not “state employees,” as defined by T.C.A. § 8-42-101(3)(A). We affirm.

The trial court found a divorced father guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to ninety days in jail after a hearing on the mother's petition for contempt at which the father failed to appear. We reverse because the father did not receive notice of the contempt proceedings sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Appellant, Tim Holt, appeals the judgment of the Hancock County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. Holt was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Holt argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the evidence
preponderates against the trial court’s award to the employee of 50% permanent partial disability to body as a whole. The employer also argues that the trial court erred in requiring it to pay the
employee $1,302.00 for unauthorized chiropractic treatment. We conclude that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s rulings, and in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2), reverse the judgment of the trial court as to both issues.

The Appellant, Norman Kyle Lewis, was convicted by a Washington County jury of attempted first degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Lewis argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record, we conclude that the convicting evidence was legally sufficient. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

This potential class action lawsuit was filed by Don Daugherty (“Plaintiff”) on behalf of himself and all other Tennessee residents who purchased certain specified DVD players from Sony Electronics, Inc. (“Sony”). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the DVD players were inherently defective, that Sony was aware of these defects, and that Sony nevertheless marketed and sold the defective DVD players. Plaintiff brought claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment, money had and received, as well as a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Sony’s motion seeking to have all of the claims dismissed was granted by the Trial Court.  Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of all five claims. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court with respect to the claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment, and money had and received. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing Plaintiff’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim.

The petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that his judgment of conviction for aggravated assault is void because the indictment was defective in that it failed to inform him of the essential elements of the offense for which he was convicted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The conviction at issue is vacated, habeas corpus relief is warranted as to that offense, and the cause is remanded for appropriate remedial action. Because the petitioner is also imprisoned for second degree murder, he is not entitled to release by virtue of this opinion.

Following a transaction involving the sale of a business, the plaintiff filed suit against several defendants in federal court alleging causes of action grounded in federal and state law. The federal jury found some of the defendants liable, but they concluded that one of the defendants did not engage in any wrongdoing during the transaction at issue. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in a Tennessee chancery court seeking to impose a constructive trust over funds held by the defendant exonerated by the jury. The defendant removed the case to the federal district court. The district court determined that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed to the federal court of appeals, which ruled that the case was not properly removable, as it only presented a claim based upon state law. On remand to the chancery court, the defendant asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The chancery court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, and we hold that the plaintiff’s claim for a constructive trust is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we dismiss the case in its entirety.

Inmate filed a medical malpractice and negligence action against Defendants involved in his care following a slip-and-fall injury at the prison and Defendants involved in the maintenance of the prison. The trial court dismissed all named Defendants and inmate appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.