APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, Darryl Eugene Watts, pled guilty to rape, furnishing alcohol to a minor, and exposing a minor to pornography. He was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries received when he was arrested by officers of the Nashville Metropolitan Police. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the actions of the officers constituted an assault and battery, and further argues that the government is vicariously liable through respondeat superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the government after finding that a stand alone allegation of respondeat superior was insufficient to sustain a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for damages resulting from intentional torts. Rather, the court held that Plaintiff needed to plead a separate and distinct claim of negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Government. Plaintiff has appealed the ruling of the trial court. Because we find that the trial court correctly found that the GTLA requires a plaintiff to assert separate claims of negligence against governmental entities in cases arising from intentional torts, we affirm.

The petitioner, Scotty Dewayne Robinson, pleaded guilty to theft of an amount less than $10,000.  Pursuant to his plea agreement, the petitioner received a three-year incarcerative sentence as a Range I offender to be served consecutively to the federal sentence he was currently serving. The petitioner filed an untimely appeal, and this court accordingly dismissed the appeal. State v. Scotty Dewayne Robinson, No. E2001-02342-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 20, 2002). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that as a result, his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner brings the instant appeal challenging that denial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Billy Mac Montgomery, pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours, and imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The State contends that the question presented is not dispositive and, therefore, that this court is without jurisdiction over the appeal. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Allen D. Baldwin, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the robbery conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by ruling that the State could impeach him with his prior convictions for robbery and theft if he chose to testify.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed suit against the Warden of the West Tennessee State Penitentiary on grounds of retaliation and violation of inmate’s civil rights arising from inmate’s reclassification and transfer. The trial court granted Warden’s Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Darryl J. Leinart, II, was indicted on one (1) count of possession of marijuana and one (1) count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him contending that the warrantless search of his residence was illegal. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and the State filed this appeal. We find the State failed to carry its burden in the trial court of proving that the warrantless search of the defendant's residence was valid. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

The Defendant, Bill Vaughn Halton, pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery and to one count of sexual assault. The Defendant filed a petition to suspend fees and court costs. After a hearing, the trial court waived the Defendant's counseling and probation fees, but concluded that it had no authority to waive the Defendant's court costs. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to waive court costs. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we remand this case to the trial court to consider whether or not the Defendant's court costs should be waived.

The trial court denied Father's petition to decrease child support upon finding Father was voluntarily underemployed. It also determined Father's previous payments of child support in excess of the court ordered amount were a gift and refused to credit them to Father's subsequent arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, James M. Loveday, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Because the record reveals that the petitioner filed his petition outside the one-year statue of limitations, we conclude that this case is not properly before this court. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Gerald Buchanan, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. He claims his judgment of conviction is void because it classifies his release eligibility status as thirty percent in violation of our statutory sentencing scheme. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Brian L. Woods, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Woods argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Ken Childress, was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twenty-five (25) years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as improper in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542, U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and the Tennessee Supreme Court has determined that Blakely has no effect in Tennessee, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a Circuit Court determination, in a de novo appeal from juvenile court, that a juvenile was delinquent on the basis of a sale of marijuana to another juvenile. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, and we reverse the trial court.

The petitioner, Roy Wilson, pled guilty to four (4) counts of aggravated rape, eleven (11) counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, seven (7) counts of aggravated robbery, and two (2) counts of aggravated burglary, for convictions stemming from multiple indictments. As a result of the guilty
pleas, the petitioner received a fifteen (15) year sentence for one (1) of the aggravated rape convictions that was ordered to run consecutive to all of the other convictions, which ran concurrent to each other for a total of fifteen (15) years, for a total effective sentence of thirty (30) years. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his guilty plea on one (1) of the aggravated rape convictions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of the petition. Because the petitioner failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Travis Young, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty (20) years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appealed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury verdict; (2) whether the trial court improperly refused to dismiss the especially aggravated kidnapping charge; and (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regard to especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action to quiet title filed by the grantor against an assignee of the grantees relative to an installment land contract. Remote grantees of the grantor were joined as third party defendants by the original defendant/assignee relative to portions of the land involved in the installment land contract and held by the third party defendants under deeds from the grantor. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the grantor and against the assignee of the grantees in the installment land contract. He further granted summary judgment to the remote grantees of the grantor in the third-party action by the assignee against them. The assignee appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Aleta Renee Souder, appeals her Sullivan County effective incarcerative sentence of 18 months on her guilty-pleaded convictions for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana for resale, a Class E felony, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of a switchblade knife, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant had sought a probationary sentence or some form of alternative sentencing, which the trial court rejected. Our review of the record discloses no basis to disturb the trial court's sentencing decision, and we affirm the judgments.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee slipped and fell at work injuring her right arm. The employee’s medical expert testified she had developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) in her right arm as a result of her on-the-job injury.  The trial court found that she was “permanently disabled to the extent of 100% to the body as a whole.” The employer contends that the trial court erred: 1) in finding that the employee developed RSD from the fall; and 2) in awarding benefits to the body as a whole instead of to the arm, a scheduled member. The employee contends that the judgment should be modified to find that the she sustained permanent and total disability as a result of her injuries. For the reasons as set out herein, we modify the trial court’s judgment to find that the employee is entitled to a permanent partial disability award for total loss of her right arm as a scheduled member.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct on the part of defendants resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a will contest. In May 2002, the decedent had a stroke at age ninety-five. She had no children, and the plaintiff nephew and the defendant niece and defendant nephew took over her care.  The three parties established a conservatorship, became co-conservators, and placed the decedent in a local nursing home. Later, the parties agreed to move the decedent to a nursing home closer to the defendants. Soon after the move, without informing the plaintiff, the defendants brought a lawyer to the decedent so that she could draft a last will and testament. In October 2003, the decedent died. The decedent’s will left her $550,000 residuary estate to the defendants, and left only two pieces of furniture to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed the instant petition to contest the will, alleging that the decedent was unduly influenced by the defendants. After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the will, concluding that the burden of proving undue influence had not been met. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the decedent received independent advice in the drafting of her will.

The appellant, Jared C. Brown, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and he received a sentence of two years. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of a search warrant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the question is not dispositive of the appellant's case and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the dismissal of a legal malpractice complaint because it was untimely and for lack of standing constituted a "favorable termination," which is a required element of a malicious prosecution cause of action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim was based on a favorable termination of the legal malpractice action but granted summary judgment to one defendant after determining there was no genuine issue of material fact as to his involvement in the legal malpractice claim. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the plaintiffs' cause of action for malicious prosecution was not based on a favorable termination because the underlying legal malpractice complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds that did not reflect on the merits. Since both defendants were entitled to summary judgment, the Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated in this opinion.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Silcox, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued over $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for criminally negligent homicide; and (2) the trial court improperly ordered that the Defendant's sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mandel Benton, who was originally charged with statutory rape, was convicted of attempted statutory rape. The trial court imposed a sentence of one hundred and eighty days to be served in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The judgment is affirmed.