APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an imprisoned mother’s efforts to retain her parental rights with regard to four of her eight children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Lawrence County seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with regard to four of her children residing in Tennessee. Following a bench trial, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the three older children based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004) and terminated her rights to the youngest child based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). On this appeal, the mother asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusions that she abandoned the three older children and that the interests of all four childrenwould be best served by terminating her parental rights. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the three older children and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of all four of the children involved in this case.

Petitioner/Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. This is the second appeal before this Court arising from the Appellant’s filing of the underlying pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the procedures used by the Tennessee Department of Correction in reaching its decision to keep Appellant confined in administrative segregation. This Court initially remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the inmate’s status was punitive or non-punitive in nature. Upon remand, the trial court determined that his status was non-punitive. Inmate appeals. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that inmate’s status was nonpunitive and that, as such, the common law writ of certiorari was not the proper means of challenging his status, we affirm.

The Defendant, Albert Fitzgerald Turner, pled guilty to statutory rape and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction, suspended after sixty days of service. The Defendant now appeals as of right, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him “judicial diversion.” Because the trial court failed to state adequately upon the record the basis for its refusal to grant judicial diversion, we vacate the sentence of the Defendant and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Keith Dotson, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403. The trial court ordered a Range III sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Charles Henry Jenkins, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, with the sentences ordered to run concurrently. The defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his cocaine conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding from his trial exculpatory tape-recorded statements made by the confidential informant involved in the case; and (3) whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), precluded the trial court from applying an enhancement factor to increase his cocaine sentence beyond the minimum in the range. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The evidence in this case, both as to termination of parental rights and to the best interest of the children, indicates that termination of parental rights would survive even the ultimate standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Clinton Burns, III, (DOB: 06/07/86), a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent by the Knox County Juvenile Court, having been found to have committed the adult offense of aggravated robbery. He appealed to the trial court, which, after a bench trial, affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court.  The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the testimony of the victim because of the unduly suggestive nature of the procedure used to identify him. He further argues that the trial court erred in refusing to afford him a jury trial. We hold that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, but that it erred in denying the defendant a jury trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress, but reverse the judgment of the trial court affirming the judgment of the juvenile court. Case remanded for a new trial.

The petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that: (1) he was improperly considered as a multiple rapist; (2) the trial court lacked the authority to sentence the petitioner as a multiple rapist without an indictment charging him as such; (3) the trial court lacked authority to modify the petitioner's original sentence; (4) the trial court failed to expressly state how the sentence in count five (5) would run; (5) the trial court improperly filled out the judgment form for count four (4); and (6) the judgment forms indicating that the petitioner was sentenced as a multiple offender with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent (35%) are improper. The trial court denied the petition. The petitioner appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Arzolia Charles Goines, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for pursuing habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Billy R. Shelley, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of theft of property over $1,000, a class D felony, and sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Shelley raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that his prior convictions, which expired more than ten years prior to this prosecution, were admissible for impeachment purposes; and (3) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court is affirmed.

The appellant, Thomas David Collins, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to five (5) years as a Range I, standard offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant claims that: (1) the jury did not properly reject the appellant's claim of self-defense; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict; (3) the trial court improperly applied several enhancement factors; and (4) the trial court improperly denied the appellant alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in July of 1998. He appealed his conviction to this Court, and we affirmed his conviction. State v. Donald R. Eady, Jr., E2000-01152-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1543472 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 4, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 6, 2002). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied his petition. He appeals to this Court solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant, David R. McPeak, has appealed the action of the trial court, which dismissed his cause of
action for failure to timely file his petition for reconsideration of disability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant caselaw, we conclude that the petition was timely filed.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee CodeAnnotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund has appealed the action of the trial court, which determined that the Employer, Standard Iron, Inc., was responsible for payment of 25% of the award to the Worker, Gary Clark, and that the Second Injury Fund was responsible for payment of 75%.  Upon our consideration of all of the evidence, we find that the trial court properly determined all issues, but we find that the award should be modified.

The defendant, William Yates Cramer, was convicted by a Lake County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with probation after ninety days in jail and ordered the defendant to pay a fine of $600.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the state to use his prior conviction for aggravated assault to impeach his testimony, and (3) his sentence of confinement violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I & L Investments, LLC ("I & L"), and Wet Willy's Fireworks Supermarkets of Tennessee, Inc. ("Wet Willy's"), sued Cagle's Construction, LLC, and Ed Cagle (collectively the "Cagles"), seeking to enforce restrictive covenants with respect to real property owned by Cagle's Construction, LLC. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that the defendants' tender of $100,000 to I & L as liquidated damages pursuant to the provisions of a document entitled "Settlement and Mutual Release" barred the plaintiffs' attempt to enforce the restrictive covenants. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's judgment, contending that the court erred in failing to enforce the restrictive covenants against the Cagles in of their plan to construct a building on the property for the purpose of selling fireworks. We affirm.

This case is before us after remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years. On direct appeal, this court originally affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed Aug. 11, 2004). Subsequently, this court granted the Appellant's motion to rehear, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, as to the application of enhancement facts, in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon rehearing, the Appellant's sentence was reduced to twenty years due to Blakely violations in the application of enhancement factors. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-RC-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed Feb. 8, 2005), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. June 20, 2005). Subsequently, our supreme court released the case of State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, No. M2002-01209-SC-R77-CD, ____ S.W.3d ____ (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005). Therein, the court concluded that Tennessee's sentencing structure is not impacted by Blakely. This case has now been remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of Gomez. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. at Nashville, June 20, 2005). After our review in light of State v. Gomez, we affirm the conviction and sentence as imposed by the trial court.

The Appellant, Bobby Joe Lester, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and coercion of a witness. As a result of these convictions, Lester received an effective eighty-five year sentence. On appeal, Lester argues that: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror; and (3) consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we conclude that the proof is sufficient to support Lester’s convictions on all counts. Moreover, we conclude issues (2) and (3) are without merit.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Burn Harris Dockery, Jr., of reckless aggravated assault, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years, as a Range I standard offender, and it ordered that the Defendant serve sixty days in the county jail and the additional two years and ten months on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly sentenced him. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence.

In this action, the Trial Court granted appellees summary judgment which adjudicated fewer than all of the claims or rights and liability of all of the parties. We dismiss the appeal from that Judgment and remand with instructions.

The Defendant, Michael A. Pounds, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Curtis Meredith sued Crutchfield Surveys and Jerry Crutchfield for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of incorrect surveys prepared by the defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. He appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. We hold that the plaintiff's suit was not filed within the time specified in the applicable statute of repose and that the plaintiff's generally-worded charge of fraud fails to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Trial Court terminated the mother's parental rights on statutory grounds. On appeal, we affirm.

The majority concludes that the proof is sufficient to support the Appellant’s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. I respectfully dissent.

The petitioner, Gary Lee Miller, stands convicted of aggravated kidnapping, for which he was classified as a habitual offender and, therefore, ordered to serve 100 percent of his 16-year sentence. See State v. Gary Lee Miller, No. M1998-00788-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 6, 2000). He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Aggrieved by the lower court's ruling, the petitioner now brings the instant appeal. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.