APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jeffery Yates, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following challenges to his conviction: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court’s handling of the victim’s statement to the police; (3) the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding the Defendant’s involvement in a prostitution sting; (4) the trial court’s refusal to allow the Defendant to cross-examine his co-defendant about gang affiliation; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow the State to cross-examine the Defendant about prior convictions; and (6) the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft.  Finding no reversible error in the issues raised by the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Andrew Tidwell, tried for aggravated burglary and theft of property between $500 and $1,000, was convicted of theft. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by ruling that the state could cross-examine him with a prior burglary offense for which he had received judicial diversion, and that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a direct appeal as of right by the State from a denial of its petitions to have Defendants Daniel Cleveland and Matthew Harville declared habitual offenders pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-601 et seq. On appeal, the State argues that the language of section 603(2)(A) of the MVHO statute contains an error, and therefore legislative intent and the “entire scheme” of the statute require this Court to interpret the provision in question by changing its conjunctive construction to disjunctive. We disagree, and we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William P. Livingston, Jr., appeals the dismissal by the Hamblen County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review of the record, we affirm.

The state appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s order suppressing drug-related evidence seized from the home of the defendant, Billy Dewayne Walker, pursuant to a search warrant. The state contends that the trial court erred in finding that the information contained in the affidavit accompanying the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. We agree and reverse the trial court’s ruling.

The Defendant, Clyde T. Smith, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Purchasers of real property filed suit for breach of contract, negligence per se, intentional misrepresentation, breach of warranty of title, and emotional distress against various parties, alleging that purchasers had purchased the subject property in reliance upon misrepresentations by defendants as to the merchantability of title to the property, only to discover later that the property had been illegally subdivided by defendants. Purchasers contended that they suffered catastrophic pecuniary and other loss as result of alleged misrepresentations, due to extremely limited legal uses that could be made of illegally subdivided parcel. At trial, jury found that each of the defendants had committed intentional misrepresentation, and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $170,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Defendants appeal on numerous grounds. Finding that the trial court erred, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, Christopher Kirkendall, was convicted of facilitation of attempted second degree murder and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but modified the sentences, holding that enhancement factors (3), (10), and (21) were applied in violation of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The state filed an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The supreme court granted the state's application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration as a result of its opinion in State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005). Based upon the Gomez decision, the judgments of the trial court must be affirmed.

The petitioner, Walter Earl Preston, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his sentences are illegal, thereby rendering his judgments of conviction void. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Author Ray Turner, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief contending that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) established a new rule of law that was retrospectively applicable to his case and entitled him to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Appellant, Brian Carl Lev, appeals the denial of judicial diversion following his guilty pleas to two counts of statutory rape. After review, we reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand for deferment of the proceedings as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (2003).

The petitioner challenges the denial of his habeas corpus petition, in which he contended that his absence from voir dire violated his constitutional rights and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) because he did not personally waive the right to be present. We initially note that, at the time of the petitioner's trial, a personal waiver of the right was not required. We conclude that there is no jurisdictional defect apparent from the record. Therefore, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Eddie Hatchett, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient because the state failed to negate his claim of self-defense. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, John A. Judkins, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Criminal Court following termination of his judicial diversion. Judkins was indicted for aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property and was granted judicial diversion and placed on supervised probation for a period of three years. Simultaneously with the entry of an order of judicial diversion, a negotiated plea agreement was presented and approved by the court to the indicted offenses which provided that Judkins would receive two three-year sentences and one eleven month and twenty-nine day suspended sentence for the three crimes. The agreement further provided for concurrent sentences to be served on "straight probation." A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging that Judkins had committed additional offenses. Following termination of judicial diversion, in the absence of a sentencing hearing, Judkins was sentenced to three years confinement in the Department of Correction. Judkins argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not imposing the effective three-year sentence of "straight probation" as provided in the plea agreement. After review, we conclude that the Sentencing Act does not contemplate the coexistent grant of judicial diversion and service of a sentence imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement as the two are inconsistent in purpose. Accordingly, the trial court's consideration of the terms of the plea agreement in the sentencing decision was error. The case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing.

The appellant, James T. Brackins, pled guilty to robbery. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant received a six (6) year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court's suppression of various statements allegedly made by the defendant, Michael D. Street. At the suppression hearing, the trial court excluded the statements based solely upon the fact that the State failed to comply with discovery Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring notice to the defendant. The trial court did not reach the constitutionality of the statements or otherwise recite its reasoning for admission of some statements and exclusion of others. In consequence, we remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration and additional findings.

The petitioner, Kelvin A. Lee, appeals pro se from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief without a hearing. Specifically, he alleges that he was improperly transferred from juvenile to criminal court and that the trial court failed to comply with the terms of his plea agreement. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has not presented any claims that justify habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of his petition.

A Giles County Jury convicted the Petitioner, Kendrick F. Love, of multiple felony cocaine offenses, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Donald Wayne Joiner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court following revocation of probation. In July 2001 and July 2002, Joiner was convicted of multiple felony and misdemeanor offenses, resulting in an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement with the Department of Correction. On October 28, 2003, while still an inmate in the Sullivan County Jail, Joiner escaped from confinement. At the time of Joiner's escape, in addition to the thirteen-year sentence, he was also under an effective eighteen-year suspended sentence, which was imposed consecutively to the thirteen-year sentence of confinement. Based upon Joiner's escape, his eighteen-year suspended sentence was revoked. On appeal, Joiner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement of the eighteen-year sentence instead of reinstating his probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demarcus O'Shea Walker, pled guilty to various offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years, which it ordered the Defendant to serve on probation. While the Defendant was on probation, a probation violation report was filed and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of this case. I have very little dispute, if any, with the law as set forth in the majority’s Opinion.  Likewise, I have no dispute with the majority’s statement that “[t]he determinative issue, as we perceive it, is whether the action was correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.” I, however, respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of the law to the facts of this case.

Alma Edna Smith ("Wife") sued Don Edward Smith ("Husband") for divorce. The Trial Court entered its Final Decree on July 20, 2004, finding and holding, in part, that both parties were entitled to a divorce and that Wife was to be awarded various items of personal property and the marital home with Husband to assume the indebtedness on this property. Husband received two other parcels of real property and certain items of personal property. Husband appeals the division of property. We modify the Trial Court's property division in this short duration marriage as it concerns the marital home, and we affirm as so modified.

This is an action to enforce a foreign judgment. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Because the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants was proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified to clarify that the dismissal is without prejudice.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order designating Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father less than equal parenting time. We affirm.

In 2002, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the circuit court. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and incorporated the court’s permanent parenting plan. The trial court ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for three years, awarded the parents joint custody of their minor son, and ordered both parents to pay child support. The wife filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decision regarding joint custody. The husband filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and child support. We reverse the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony, child custody, and child support, and we remand this case tot he trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.