APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jeremy S. Crosby, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Lewis A. Grimes, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, William L. Miller, of possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, evading arrest, assault, resisting arrest, and driving on a revoked driver's license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years, with six days in the county jail and the remainder to be served in Community Corrections. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and assault. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Reginald Thomas, appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

We granted the applications of the State and Ray Driver d/b/a Driver Bail Bonds pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 in order to determine whether the imposition of sentence upon Stanley Ray Davis, the defendant, effectively terminated Driver's obligations under an appearance bond, and whether Driver is liable for the payment of the fine and costs assessed against the defendant. Although the issue was contested in the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its brief and oral argument to this Court, the State concedes that Driver's obligation to secure the defendant's appearance terminated upon imposition of sentence upon him and entry of judgment. We hold that Driver's obligation terminated upon Davis' sentencing and reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Campbell County for further orders in aid of this opinion.

The defendant, William Vanblaricum, was convicted by a Franklin County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with probation after thirty days in jail and one hundred hours of community service. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay a fine of $350.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Amos, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Defendant was convicted by jury verdict of two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated assault, and misdemeanor resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to ten years for each felony conviction and six months for the misdemeanor conviction, with the first three felony conviction sentences to be served consecutively and the remaining sentences to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his two aggravated burglary convictions and one aggravated assault conviction; 2) the trial court erred in failing to allow the defense to impeach the testimony of one of the State's witnesses by means of a prior juvenile conviction; 3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004); and 4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Harold Wayne Shaw, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping in 1996. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See State v. Harold Wayne Shaw, No. 01C01-9707-CR-00259, 1998 WL 731573 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, Oct. 21, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1999). On remand, the petitioner was resentenced. The petitioner appealed, challenging his sentence for the second time, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Harold Wayne Shaw, No. M1999-01119-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1606585 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 27, 2000), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 2001). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in various ways. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Algernon Cross, of one count of facilitation of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of a schedule II controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fourteen years. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred on two of its evidentiary rulings; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Miqwon Leach, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to allege aground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court

The Trial Court awarded fees to the Guardian Ad Litem who asked the Trial Court to award him fees and costs for collecting the initial award. The Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation based upon a new law violation, to wit: introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Specifically, she contends that: (1) no proof was presented that Soma is a controlled substance or legend drug; (2) the trial court improperly took judicial notice that Soma is a controlled substance; (3) no proof was presented of unlawful intent; and (4) the revocation order does not properly state the evidence relied upon and reason for revoking probation. Upon our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of a new law violation; we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences.

After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11)the capital sentencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the “catch-all” statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Antonio Dewayne Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, Bledsoe contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and, as a result, his nolo contendere plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant challenges the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Specifically, he avers that the District Attorney General abused his discretion and failed to consider all relevant factors. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the District Attorney General's further consideration of all applicable factors, discussion of the evidence supporting those factors, and an explanation of the weight accorded to each.

The defendant, Jeffery Hayes, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and one count of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Edward Jones pleaded guilty to solicitation of first degree murder, for which he received an eight-year incarcerative sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court's failure to grant his request for alternative sentencing, he brings the instant appeal challenging his manner of service. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Debra Ann Williams ("Mother") and George Jay Williams, IV ("Father") were divorced in 1998. Mother was designated the custodial parent of the parties' two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Modification and Contempt seeking, in part, a change in custody or visitation, and relief from the requirement that Father carry life insurance or, in the alternative, that Mother also be required to maintain life insurance. Mother filed a counter claim requesting, in part, increased child support and the right to claim the tax exemption for both children. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "that there has been no change in circumstances which would justify the modification of the final judgment" as requested by Father and dismissing Father's petition for modification. The Trial Court, however, increased child support in accordance with the guidelines and held that for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines, Father was not entitled to a reduction in his annual earnings for state income taxes he may pay. Father appeals raising issues regarding custody, visitation, life insurance, child support, and attorney's fees. We reverse as to the award to Mother of the tax exemption for one child, and affirm as to all other issues.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Tims, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Robertson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal document. This Court finds that justice does not require waiver.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

In Tennessee, a determination of child support is statutory. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1994).¹ Accordingly, I would approach resolution of this appeal by resort to the applicable statutes.

The petitioner, Kelvin Lee Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntaryguilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.