APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Joshua William Algood, entered a nolo contendere plea to aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars ($1,000). The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 150 days in the county jail with the remainder of a three-year effective sentence to be served on community corrections. As special conditions of the defendant's probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to have no contact with the victims, pay restitution of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), obtain a GED, submit a DNA sample, maintain full-time employment once out of jail and establish paternity of his minor child and begin paying child support to the child's mother. The defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in imposing the special conditions requiring he establish paternity of his minor child and pay child support. We agree with the defendant and reverse and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings pursuant to this opinion.

This appeal involves the construction of a holographic will. Following the decedent’s death, two documents in her own handwriting were found among her papers which the probate court admitted as her holographic will. The will contained devises of real and personal property to named
individuals and charities. At her death, however, the decedent owned property in excess of the devises made in her will. The executor filed three separate petitions to construe the decedent’s will.  The children of the decedent’s sister argued that the decedent died intestate as to the excess personal property and her personal residence, which the decedent did not specifically devise in her will. The probate court held that the decedent’s will contained a residuary clause, therefore, all of the decedent’s remaining assets passed through the residuary clause to the individuals and charities named in her will on a pro rata basis. In addition, the probate court held that the decedent died intestate as to her residence, which passed to her sister’s children by intestate succession. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Terry Wayne Buckner, was convicted of two counts of sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to serve one year in confinement for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's failure to order alternative sentencing and the trial court's consideration of enhancement factors which were not submitted to a jury. After a thorough review, we modify Defendant's sentence for each conviction to a sentence of one year of split confinement with three months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other.

This appeal involves the division of marital property. Following almost fifteen years of marriage, both the husband and the wife sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County. The trial court, disregarding the marital dissolution agreement and quitclaim deed that the husband induced the wife to sign following their separation, awarded 58.5% of the marital estate to the husband and the remainder to the wife. The husband asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by declining to follow the marital dissolution agreement and by overvaluing the marital property. We find that the trial court properly ignored the marital dissolution agreement and the quitclaim deed and that its valuation of the marital property is supported by the evidence. We have also determined that the manner in which the trial court divided the marital property was equitable.

This case involves a dispute regarding whether Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over a Georgia bank regarding a contract for business services provided by a Tennessee business. The trial court found no personal jurisdiction over the Georgia bank and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We find that the Tennessee Long Arm Statute does give Tennessee courts personal jurisdiction over the Georgia bank; therefore, we reverse this case and remand it for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Edwin Matthew Bryant, appeals pro se from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for two counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony, and resulting sentences of four years each to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his writ of habeas corpus without appointing counsel and that his sentences are illegal because the trial court sentenced him to incarceration and imposed restitution and because the trial court enhanced each of his sentences from two years to four years without finding any applicable enhancement factors. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

A Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Loretta A. Wright, for one count of misdemeanor child abuse. The Defendant pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court's sentence is excessive. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

The defendant, Rodney Southers, originally charged with aggravated robbery, was convicted of robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I, six-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his pretrial statement and (2) that the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, an at-will employee, was terminated from her position with St. Thomas Hospital because an investigation led Hospital employees to the conclusion that Appellant was involved in the harassing and stalking of another employee. Appellant sued Hospital and two employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from her termination. Appellees moved for summary judgment, which was granted. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment action. Crossroads Market, LLC, a grocery, was owned by two brothers whose differences escalated to a point that necessitated an action to dissolve the LLC. The trial court granted the petition to dissolve the LLC and ordered the LLC be sold at auction to the highest bidder. Appellant, one of the brothers, was the successful bidder; however, a dispute arose immediately following the auction concerning the liabilities of the LLC. The Appellant insisted that a certain $300,000 promissory note was not a liability of the LLC while his brother, the Appellee, the holder of the note, insisted it was. The court, finding that the LLC had identified the promissory note as a liability on its financial reports and tax returns from the inception of the LLC, ruled that the note was a liability of the LLC when it was purchased at auction by the Appellant. Appellant appealed. We affirm.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, Kenneth Wayne Ball, of one count of driving under the influence, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 months and 29 days, of which 10 percent was to be served before eligibility for rehabilitative release programs. In this appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test despite the officer's lack of reasonable grounds to believe that he was intoxicated and despite the officer's failure to follow the 20-minute observation protocol. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mike Littles, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.¹ The sole issue presented for review is whether the petitioner entered an involuntary plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Daryl Smith received a serious injury to his right knee as a result of a work-related accident in 1993 when he was employed by Tri-State Steel. Mr. Smith was awarded compensation for his permanent partial disability to his lower right extremity which included lifetime medical benefits for this right knee injury. In January of 2000, Mr. Smith fell, striking his right kneecap at a construction site while in the course and scope of his employment with Southern States Electrical and Plumbing.  Following emergency room care, Mr. Smith was treated by a series of doctors who were furnished by his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier and who provided conservative care which failed to provide relief for his knee injury. Ultimately he was released by the company doctor to return to work without restrictions or impairment. Mr. Smith continued to have difficulty in walking, standing and working on his knee and ultimately sought medical treatment at his own expense with Dr. Richard Fishbein. Dr. Fishbein performed two additional surgeries that ultimately repaired a torn cartilage and damage to the anterior cruciate ligament of the right knee.

Dr. Fishbein attributed this surgical repair to the fall which occurred during Mr. Smith’s employment with Southern States. However, the trial court found that this treatment was related to the original knee injury and was the responsibility of Tri-State Steel under the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204. The trial court found that there was no compensable injury as a result of the January 2000 fall and awarded nothing to Mr. Smith. The court ordered Tri-State to pay for the medical care as a part of their obligation to provide future medical benefits for the 1993 injury. Tri-State perfected this appeal. Although Dr. Fishbein found that Mr. Smith had an additional 10 to 12 % more impairment to his right extremity as a result of the 2000 fall, Mr. Smith failed to perfect an appeal of the dismissal of his claim against Southern States. Therefore, this appeal is limited to determining which of the two former employers will be responsible for the medical care that Mr. Smith received and any future care that may be necessitated because of this work-related incident. We find that the proof fails to preponderate in favor of the trial court’s decision and reverse.

The defendants, Carrie Ann Brewster and William Justin Brewster, appeal from their Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the defendants claim that the convicting evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions to suppress their pretrial confessions. Because the record supports the convictions and the trial court's ruling on the pretrial motions to suppress, we affirm; however, we modify the especially aggravated burglary conviction to one of aggravated burglary.

The defendant, Kirk Williams, was indicted for driving under the influence and obstructing traffic. After granting a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop, the trial court permitted the state an application for a discretionary appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the effect of the ruling was a dismissal of the charges, this court accepted the appeal under Rule 3 and waived the timely filing of notice of appeal by the state. The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a trial on the merits.

This case is about post-divorce modification of child support. At the time of the parties’ divorce,
they adopted a permanent parenting plan which designated the father as the primary residential
parent of the parties’ son and the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ daughter.
Each had a child support obligation to the other, which was offset with the father paying the
difference to the mother. The daughter graduated from high school. As a result, the father’s child
support obligation to the mother was terminated, and the mother was ordered to pay increased child support to the father for their son. The trial court also ordered the mother to reimburse the father for the son’s health insurance premiums and to pay the father’s attorney’s fees. The mother appeals, arguing that her child support obligation could not be modified because the evidence did not indicate a significant variance in the mother’s income as required by Tennessee law. We affirm the ruling of the trial court as modified.
 

Plaintiff's action against defendant for the negligent hiring of the perpetrator of a crime against plaintiff was dismissed by the Trial Judge on a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's proof. We affirm.

In this parental termination case, the father, JCG appeals the termination of his parental rights to BJG.

This is a breach of contract case. The service contract between the plaintiff shopping mall and the
defendant security company provided that the security companywould “defend, indemnify, and hold harmless” the mall for claims brought against the mall that related to or resulted from the services of the security company. An automobile accident on the mall parking lot resulted in the death of a child. The child’s mother sued the shopping mall and the security company for wrongful death. The complaint alleged that the driver of the car was under the observation of a security company agent who “was or should have been in contact with the driver” when the accident occurred. The security company refused to defend the mall, maintaining that the lawsuit did not result from the services it provided. The trial court granted summary judgment to the security company, holding that the security company had no duty to defend the suit. We reverse, finding that the language in the complaint was sufficient to trigger the duty to defend.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother and father were married, and two sons were born during the marriage. The father physically abused the mother during the marriage. In 1996, the parties divorced. Later in 1996, a consent order was entered giving the father custody of the children. The order did not require the mother to pay child support. Both parties remarried, and the mother moved to Alabama. The mother exercised visitation with the children until the early part of 1999. Around that time, the mother stopped visiting the children entirely. The father claimed that
he did not know why the mother stopped visiting, and the mother said that the father and his new wife threatened her with physical harm if she attempted to see her sons. About four and a half years after the mother’s last attempt to visit with the children, the father and his new wife filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights and to permit the father’s new wife to adopt the children. The father and his new wife asserted that the mother had abandoned the children by willfully failing to support or visit them. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights but declined to permit the adoption at that time. The mother now appeals. We reverse the finding of the willful failure to support and affirm the finding of willful failure to visit. However, we vacate the
termination of parental rights on the basis that the trial court failed to make specific written findings regarding the best interest of the children, and remand for further proceedings on this issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Vacated and
Remanded.

This is a child support case. Father/Appellant seeks reversal of the amount of child support arrearage set by the trial court and relief from the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Mother/Appellee. The trial court’s calculation of arrearage is based upon a trial exhibit that is not in keeping with the governing orders of support. Consequently, the calculation constitutes a retroactive modification of support, which is disallowed under T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5). We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

The Appellant, Roy Edward Tolliver, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County jury of one count of cruelty to animals and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. On appeal, Tolliver argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and (2) the sentence is excessive. After review of the record, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

The Appellant, Ricky Ray Reed, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Tipton County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Reed collaterally challenges his jury conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, Reed argues that trial counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In 1992, the defendant, Drama Sue Davis, alias, pled guilty and was sentenced for DUI, a Class A misdemeanor. Judgment was not entered, and the matter was reset so the defendant would have time to pay the fine and costs. She was to appear at the next setting unless she had paid the fine, costs, and restitution in the interim. Although the costs had been only partially paid, she did not appear at the next setting. A capias was issued, but the defendant was not arrested until ten years later, with the judgment then being entered by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant asserts that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-206, the capias was void after five years, with the trial court thus lacking jurisdiction to impose sentence; and she was denied her right to a speedy trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.