APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Preston Williams pleaded guilty to six crimes, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received an effective eight-year sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to suspend his sentence, the defendant now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Michael K. Kennedy, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

In 1992, the petitioner, William T. Yelton, was found guilty by a jury of theft of property, two counts of coercion of a witness, fabricating evidence and harassment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-one-year sentence. After his convictions in Tennessee, the petitioner was sent to Alabama presumably to serve time on a life sentence from which he had previously been paroled in that state. Six years later, the petitioner was returned to prison in Tennessee. In 2001, he filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that he was unlawfully detained on an expired/pardoned sentence. The petitioner filed a second petition in January of 2004. The trial court denied the second petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

This appeal involves a dispute over a periodic long-term spousal support award. Following a twelve-year marriage, both parties requested a divorce from the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court conducted a bench trial and declared the parties divorced. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in spousal support until her death or remarriage. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the spousal support award. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to long-term spousal support but is entitled to $350 per month in transitional support for three years.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Sanford Barnes, of reckless endangerment, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of forty-five years for the felony convictions, plus consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his five convictions; (2) the trial court improperly classified the Defendant as a career offender; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered that the Defendant’s sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darvell S. Owens, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of the habeas corpus statutes, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has not responded to the State’s motion. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, James Gary Turner, was indicted for reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. The State subsequently dismissed the reckless endangerment charge, and the defendant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, a Class D felony. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years for the felony evading arrest conviction and one year for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served consecutively to his federal sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his Class D felony evading arrest conviction; the trial court erred in sentencing him to one year for the misdemeanor conviction; and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence for the felony evading arrest conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lemar J. White, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On appeal, White raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he challenges the proof with regard to the element of premeditation. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner was convicted of criminal contempt of the Juvenile Court of Williamson County, and sentenced to 590 days for 59 comtempts. She fled the State and apparently is a resident of California. A direct appeal was rejected because of her fugitive status. She now seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus, on the theory that the conviction and sentence are void. She remains a fugitive and the court dismisses her petition on appeal.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, he asserts the trial court should have given him pretrial jail credit for time served in federal prison on an unrelated federal conviction. Following our review, we affirm the sentence but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

Wife appeals from trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony in divorce proceeding. Wife contends the trial court made numerous errors in the classification and division of various assets and in the alimony award. Husband contends that the trial court did not err in its
division of marital property, contends that Wife can be rehabilitated, and seeks an award of rehabilitative alimony to terminate at a specific date. Husband further contends that trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, and Husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs related to defending
this appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, modify in part and remand.

The appellants, Jessica Trotter-Lawson and Andrew Sheriff, pled guilty to theft of property over sixty thousand dollars. As a result of the plea agreement, each appellant received an eight-year sentence. Both appellants applied to the trial court for alternative sentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the appellants to serve the entire sentence in incarceration. Both appellants filed timely notices of appeal, challenging the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After a review, we determine that a sentence of split confinement would best serve the interests of the public and the appellants. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded for entry of sentences of split confinement reflecting a period of twelve months of incarceration in the Shelby County Correctional Facility with the remainder of the eight-year sentence to be served on supervised probation.

The Appellant, Darrell Jones, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jones was indicted for first degree murder; however, the plea agreement permitted Jones to enter a guilty plea to the reduced charge of second degree murder. As part of the agreement, he accepted a forty-five year sentence as a Range III offender despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Jones raises the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Jones of the ramifications of pleading outside his range. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The attorney for the petitioner was held in contempt for failing to appear as ordered and failing to advise the Juvenile Court of a Chancery action. We hold the evidence does not support a finding of criminal contempt.

The defendant, David Sever Watkins ¹, was convicted by a White County jury of sale of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and the sentence.

The petitioner, Vinson D. Mason, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was found guilty of attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery. He contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing, and that the defendant was sentenced in violation of Blakely. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the two convictions for aggravated robbery merge.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Colia Louis Streeter, was convicted of one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court merged Defendant's conviction in count two into his conviction in count one, and sentenced Defendant to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that, at most, the transaction constituted a casual exchange of cocaine rather than an unlawful sale. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Perry Franks, pled guilty pursuant to a "best interest" plea to one count of aggravated rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive a Range I sentence of fifteen years for each offense, to run concurrently. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his lawyer was ineffective and that his dual convictions violate due process under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Leonard J. Young, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence resulting from the 1999 murder of Hillary Johnson. On  August 23, 2002, a Shelby County jury convicted the appellant of one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft of property over $1,000.00. Following a separate sentencing hearing on August 24, 2002, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense, the murder was committed to avoid prosecution, and the murder was committed during the perpetration of a theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 2002). The jury further determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. On November 8, 2002, the trial court entered judgments of
conviction sentencing the appellant to death for the murder, sixty years  as a violent offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping, and twelve years as a career offender for the theft. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The appellant now appeals as of right, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when as a result of a death in his immediate family he was unable to continue to preside over the trial; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish venue of the murder in Shelby County; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of premeditated first degree murder; (5) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce various photographs of the victim; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain victim impact evidence; (7) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the appellant’s prior offenses were offenses in which the statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution; (8) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the (i)(6) aggravating circumstance; and (9) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and sentence of death.

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff, Alice Holden, appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgement to defendant, Fred’s Stores of Tennessee, Inc.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

This case involves a dispute over the enforcement of non-compete and confidentiality agreements in an employment contract. A company selling satellite telephone and GPS equipment filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking to enforce a non-compete agreement against a former employee who was allegedly interfering with its business relations with customers and suppliers. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court determined that the employee had breached the agreements and enjoined the employee from competing with his former employer for one year in North America. The employee has appealed, asserting that the non-compete agreement is unenforceable or, in the alternative, that its geographic coverage is too broad. We have determined that the non-compete agreement is enforceable but that its geographic coverage should be limited to the United States rather than to North America.

The Appellant, Derrell Bender, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion for Reduction or Modification of Sentence" filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Bender pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years as a Range III career offender. In his motion, Bender requested that the trial court impose a sentence within the sentence range of a Range I standard offender. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Bender was "not an appropriate candidate for a suspended sentence." Bender seeks review pursuant to a "Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari." Because the trial court's order fails to address Bender's request for sentencing as a Range I offender, we reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion.