APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority opinion, but I question its reliance upon the fact that our supreme court denied permission to appeal in Bland v. Dukes to validate Bland’s holding. Our supreme court has advised us not to attach significance to such a denial. See Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. 1993).

The case before us concerns the untimely death of Montrell Mason and the aggravated robbery of Clinton Anderson and Christopher Fears. The defendant stands convicted of Mason's felony murder in the perpetration of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and weapon possession. We affirm the convictions and sentences.

The appellant, Lilly Bell Gifford, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to the sale of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced her to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. However, the appellant was permitted to serve the bulk of her sentence on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of her probationary sentence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Syreeta Patterson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to six years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for alternative sentencing, and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Hunt, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years incarceration for the aggravated rape conviction, twelve years incarceration for the aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years incarceration for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. The trial court ordered the sentence for aggravated rape be served consecutively to the remaining sentences, for an effective thirty-seven year sentence. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of aggravated rape and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant’s sentence for aggravated rape to twenty-two years and the sentences for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping to ten years, for an effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration. We also vacate the judgment of conviction for count two of indictment number 00-12640, which judgment was entered in error. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jeremy Loader, pled guilty on July 12, 2002, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to two counts of theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony, and two counts of arson, a Class E felony in Case No. 02-002. In Case No. 01-146, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of burglary other than a habitation, a Class D felony. The terms of Defendant's plea agreement set the length and manner of service of Defendant's sentence as follows. In Case No. 02-002, Defendant would serve four years on each of the theft of property convictions, all suspended but nine months, and two years for each of the arson convictions, all suspended but 144 days, with Defendant placed on probation for the remainder of his sentences on each count. For Case No. 01-146, Defendant would serve four years for each arson conviction, all suspended but nine months, with Defendant placed on probation for the remainder of his sentences. The sentences in Case No. 02-002 and Case No. 01-146 would be served concurrently for an effective sentence of four years. In exchange, the State withdrew other charges against Defendant. Defendant spent nine months in jail before entering his guilty pleas because he was unable to make bond. The trial court granted Defendant's request for judicial diversion, and Defendant was placed on judicial diversion for a period of six years. Defendant's judicial diversion in both cases was revoked on April 21, 2003, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with pretrial jail credit of nine months, in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement. Defendant does not appeal the revocation of his judicial diversion but argues that the trial court erred in ordering a sentence of confinement. Defendant contends that the terms of his plea agreement called for a sentence of split confinement, with the period of confinement already served, in the event his judicial diversion was subsequently revoked. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not conducting a sentencing hearing prior to imposing Defendant's sentence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal is from the chancellor’s decision in a property line dispute. In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, we affirm.
 

The petitioner, Keith Dale Thomas, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of first degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense. He received a total effective sentence of life plus two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Steven Douglas Tutt, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's order that retired his motion for expungement. We dismiss the appeal.

This case essentially involves a dispute between the owners of adjoining properties in Grainger County. Specifically, the dispute focuses on (1) the ownership of a private road ("the disputed private road"); (2) the easement rights, if any, of the plaintiff Benjamin S. Pressnell with respect to a right-of-way over the property of the defendants Steve Hixon and wife, Betty Hixon; and (3) damages allegedly sustained by Pressnell and another plaintiff by virtue of the Hixons' interference with Pressnell's right to use the disputed private road and the easement. The trial court, following a bench trial, found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

First Tennessee Bank National Association ("the Bank") sued Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan on a note that allegedly was "fully mature, owing and unpaid." The note had been cross collateralized with two other notes payable to the Bank. The three notes and the attendant guaranty agreements and security agreements were executed either by Bad Toys, Inc., Larry N. Lunan, or Susan H. Lunan ("Defendants" or as appropriate "the Lunans"). In addition to other collateral, shares of stock were pledged as collateral for the notes. Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan answered the complaint and filed a counter-complaint in which Susan H. Lunan joined as a counter-plaintiff. The counter-complaint alleged, in part, that the Bank had breached its fiduciary duty to the Lunans by failing to sell the pledged stock and that the Bank either had been grossly negligent or had intentionally caused harm to Defendants by refusing to sell the stock. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. Defendants opposed by filing the Lunans' affidavit claiming that the Bank had agreed to sell the shares of stock as soon as they were pledged, even though the Lunans were forbidden by an agreement with other shareholders from selling the stock themselves, and that the Bank failed to sell the shares of stock as it had agreed to do. The Trial Court held the Lunans' affidavit should be stricken, in part, and granted the Bank            summary judgment. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This case involves a child custody dispute between the parents of two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the parties an absolute divorce and designated the mother as the primary residential parent. In addition, the court below awarded the parties equal parenting time and provided for an alternating visitation schedule in the Permanent Parenting Plan. The mother subsequently filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider the custody arrangement, which the trial court denied. The mother filed this appeal contesting the determination of custody by the Circuit Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The defendants, Cornelius D. Hicks and Troy Lee Springfield, and two codefendants, Bryan T. Oldham and Kenyale M. Pirtle, were charged with aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for firing a gun at the victim, Keiston Campbell, as he drove his car down a Henning street. Pirtle subsequently pled guilty to aggravated assault, and a fifth individual involved in the incident had his case handled in juvenile court. The three remaining defendants, Springfield, Hicks, and Oldham, were tried jointly before a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury, which acquitted Oldham but convicted both Hicks and Springfield of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Hicks as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended and the defendant placed on supervised probation following service of 250 days, to be served consecutively to a sentence for an offense for which he was on probation at the time of the instant offense. Springfield was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence for violation of parole. The sole issue Hicks raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Springfield challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions to sever his trial and for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Gregory Morrow, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and two counts of possessing marijuana. The appellant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and raises complaints regarding the application of Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for a merger of the appellant’s two cocaine convictions and his two marijuana convictions.

The appellant, Alfonso Martinez, was found guilty by a jury in the Henderson County Circuit Court of felony possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant’s sole issue is the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-424 and 39-17-425 (2003). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant has waived his issue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Darry Miller appeals from his Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams. He claims that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction. We disagree and affirm.

The Defendant, Darrell Wayne Syler, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted child rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery and thirteen counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting a homemade videotape depicting the Defendant and his wife engaged in sex acts, and that his convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation must be reversed because the State failed to establish one of the statutory elements of that offense. We reduce the Defendant's sentence to an effective term of twenty-eight years, and otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Robert Love Taylor, was convicted by a jury of driving while declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. He was sentenced to four years incarceration and fined $3,000 for the offense. Two motions for new trial were filed

Plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall in the court house and sued the County for maintaining a dangerous stairway. Following trial, the Court entered a Judgment for defendant. We affirm.

This case arises out of an automobile accident. Appellant appeals from a Judgment entered on a jury verdict. The jury found the two Defendants to each be 50% at fault and Plaintiff to be 0% at fault. The jury awarded $0 damages to the Plaintiff. We find that the trial court did not err in its duty as thirteenth juror and that there is material evidence to support the verdict. We affirm.
 

The defendant, Neal Levone Armour, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's revocation of probation. Because the record supports the trial court's actions, we affirm.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied the motion of the defendant, Eric Eugene Gilmore, to set aside his 2001 guilty pleas to a number of charges. We affirm.

The appellant, Memphis Bonding Company, appeals the trial court's order requiring a partial refund to the defendant, Willie James Bassett. Because the governing statute does not permit a refund under the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The trial court denied Mother's petition to change custody of the parties' minor children from Father to Mother. We affirm.