APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, William Patrick Roberson, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or his sentence and later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding that it failed to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition because the petition adequately states a factual basis for ineffective assistance of counsel and the involuntariness of his guilty plea. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand to the post-conviction court for appointment of counsel and the opportunity for counsel to amend the petition.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-151 bars the State from recovering retroactive child support more than forty-five days prior to the filing of a petition seeking such support. We hold that section 37-1-151 unambiguously requires a trial court to set child support retroactive to the date a child is placed in State custody. The statute does not include any limitation on the length of time for which retroactive support may be due, and a trial judge has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily imposed period of retroactive support. Retroactive child support is to be set according to the child support guidelines, but deviation from the guideline amount is allowable if based upon a finding that applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Abernathy, Jr., was convicted by a jury of tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing testimony of police officers regarding the actions they witnessed the Defendant take during their search of his residence. He contends that the search was illegal because the search warrant that the officers executed at his residence was invalid; therefore, the officers should have been precluded from testifying as to what they witnessed while they were at the Defendant's residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The parents appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Maury County, terminating their parental rights. Specifically, the parents assert that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Carla Juanita Prince, was convicted of DUI, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor. She was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for forty-eight hours, and six months, suspended except for forty-eight hours. The two forty-eight-hour jail terms were ordered to be served consecutively, and the probationary terms were ordered to be served concurrently. Additionally, her driver's license was revoked for one year and she was fined a total of $360. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for DUI. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Lauderdale County Bank filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the obligations of the parties arising from its payment of a forged check. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant Newcourt Financial, holding Newcourt Financial was entitled to the proceeds of the check. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

In this interpleader action, two former spouses of the decedent who are mothers of the decedent's three surviving children filed conflicting claims under two marital dissolution agreements alleging beneficial interests in a $50,000 life insurance policy. One claimed an interest for herself; the other claimed an interest for her two children. The matters in dispute arise from inconsistencies in marital dissolution agreements resulting from the decedent's two divorces, and pertain to the duty of the decedent to maintain life insurance and the beneficiary designations. The trial court granted one of two competing motions for summary judgment ruling against the second wife by dividing the proceeds equally among the decedent's three children. We reverse and modify holding that the second wife, not the decedent's third child, was the designated beneficiary of the disputed policy pursuant to the second marital dissolution agreement and that the decedent's first two children had vested interests in the insurance proceeds as mandated by the first marital dissolution agreement.

An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission for the loss of seventy-eight cartons of cigarettes, which he alleged were removed from his prison cell during a search. The Commission denied his claim. We affirm the Claims Commission.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Courtof Marshall County, terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Mother asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

The appellant, Muhammed Nuridden, was found guilty by a jury in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Additionally, the appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and possession of marijuana. The appellant received a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including evidentiary issues and the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the appellant's conviction for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and remand for new trial.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing there was no substantial evidence he violated the terms of his probation, the trial court erred in allowing his probation officer to testify that he failed a drug screen, and the reinstatement of his original sentence resulted in too harsh a punishment under the circumstances of his case. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Faris Abd Al-Ali, of rape of a child. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to twenty-two years of incarceration for this offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress his statement, and also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to elect upon which offense it was seeking a conviction. Finding no merit in the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Marion Shawn Laughrun, pled guilty to two counts of theft in the Washington County Criminal Court and received a total effective sentence of two years and one day in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant probation on both of his sentences. While on probation, the appellant pled guilty to attempted robbery and received a sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a result of the new conviction, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation on the theft convictions and ordered the original sentences to be served in confinement. Additionally, the court refused to grant the appellant an alternative sentence on the attempted robbery conviction. The appellant appeals both the probation revocation and the denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Fred L. Maines, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The appellant subsequently pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement in the county jail, to be served at seventy-five percent. The trial court also imposed a three hundred fifty dollar ($350) fine and suspended the appellant's driver's license for one year. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to serve seventy-five percent of his sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charlie M. Gardner, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. In this post-conviction proceeding, the Defendant alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial; that he was denied due process by being denied the right to testify; and that the trial court erred in one of its jury instructions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Annie Ruth Gilkerson, appeals from the post-conviction court's dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition is barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Richard Daniel Filauro, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences, as provided in the plea agreement. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the defendant would not receive pretrial jail credit for the eighteen months he spent in jail before agreeing to plead guilty. The defendant contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas (1) because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept his pleas and (2) because his guilty pleas are manifestly unjust. We conclude that the defendant's sentence is illegal, that his guilty pleas are manifestly unjust, and that he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas.

Plaintiff's claims for defendants aiding and abetting the State in terminating him and for libel and slander, tortious interference with his employment contract, outrageous conduct, and negligence were dismissed in the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment.

The Defendant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, pled guilty to simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law stems from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a police officer stopping the Defendant's automobile. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a sixteen-year marriage and two children, Husband and Wife both filed for divorce. Wife stipulated that Husband was entitled to a divorce. After hearing the evidence, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan which named Mother the primary residential parent with visitation for Husband; accepted the parties' stipulation with respect to the marital property; divided the remaining contested marital property; and ordered the parties to pay their own attorney's fees. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial due to jury misconduct; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We reduce the conviction to second degree murder and remand for sentencing.

Following a remand by this Court, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $10,464.80 plus post-judgment interest from the time of filing of the trial court’s original judgment. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion’s affirmance of the trial court’s money judgment against defendants in the amount of $10,464.80. However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that awards post-judgment interest on the money judgment from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment in the first trial of this case that was reversed and remanded by this Court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of primary residential custody of the parties’ minor
children to their father. We affirm. Daniel Lee Stevenson (Mr. Stevenson) and Tracy Dawn Stevenson (Ms. Stevenson) were married in October 1992 and separated in July 2001. Mr. Stevenson filed for divorce in August 2001. The trial court, sitting without a jury, declared the parties divorced on November 19, 2002, and awarded Mr. Stevenson primary residential custody of the parties’ two minor children. Mother appeals only the award of primary residential custody of the children to Mr. Stevenson.

Plaintiff's civil rights action against an Assistant District Attorney for prosecutorial misconduct was dismissed by the Chancellor. On appeal, we affirm.