APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of primary residential custody of the parties’ minor
children to their father. We affirm. Daniel Lee Stevenson (Mr. Stevenson) and Tracy Dawn Stevenson (Ms. Stevenson) were married in October 1992 and separated in July 2001. Mr. Stevenson filed for divorce in August 2001. The trial court, sitting without a jury, declared the parties divorced on November 19, 2002, and awarded Mr. Stevenson primary residential custody of the parties’ two minor children. Mother appeals only the award of primary residential custody of the children to Mr. Stevenson.

Plaintiff's civil rights action against an Assistant District Attorney for prosecutorial misconduct was dismissed by the Chancellor. On appeal, we affirm.

The Appellant, Allison L. Brewington, appeals the decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering reinstatement of his original sentence. Brewington pled guilty to the aggravated assault of his girlfriend on October 28, 2002, and received a four-year suspended sentence. On December 5, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Brewington violated his probation by harassing the victim on two occasions and failing to report his arrests for these offenses to his probation officer. On appeal, Williams raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in revoking his probation because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty of harassment, (2) whether the trial court erred by requiring him to serve his entire sentence in confinement, and (3) whether the trial court improperly considered allegations not contained within the violation warrant. After review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Brewington’s probation and ordering reinstatement of his original four-year sentence.

In this case the defendant, the Board of Commissioners of the City of Fairview, declined to grant a certificate of compliance to the plaintiffs, who sought to operate a retail liquor store at the entrance of Bowie Nature Park in Fairview, Tennessee. The plaintiffs contend they met all the legal requirements in effect at the time of their application; and that the defendant based its decision on a pending ordinance which required a minimum distance of 1000 feet between liquor stores and public parks. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Thomas Farr, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to thirty years on the murder charge and to eight years on each of the solicitation charges, which terms were concurrent to each other but consecutive to the thirty year term, for an effective sentence of thirty-eight years. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his lawyer was ineffective and that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Monoleto D. Green appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings and, as a result, his guilty plea was involuntary. Because he has failed to demonstrate error in the lower court's ruling, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted of reckless homicide for the stabbing death of her adult daughter. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a maximum sentence of four years for a Class D felony as a Range I offender. The defendant appeals this sentence claiming it is excessive and that the trial court erred in permitting the judge who presided over the defendant’s preliminary hearing to testify at the sentencing hearing. We find these issues do not merit a reversal of this case and affirm the trial court’s decision to impose the maximum sentence.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Corey Lamont Radley, of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; contests the admission of certain evidence; and complains that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Julie Jiles ("Plaintiff") and her husband, Bryan Jiles, sued the State of Tennessee ("State") for medical malpractice regarding medical care Plaintiff received at the Sevier County Health Department. The case was tried before the Claims Commission and an Order of Judgment was entered in March of 2003, holding, inter alia, that the standard of care was not breached and  dismissing Plaintiff's case. In dicta, the Judgment also suggested that another health care provider was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Anthony Lamont Singleton, pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana, fourth offense, a Class E felony; evading arrest and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve his sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court should have sentenced him to community corrections. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

David Franklin ("Franklin") operates an adult bookstore in Chattanooga known as Cinema 1, Inc. ("Cinema 1"). Numerous undercover visits by Chattanooga Police Department officers discovered a significant amount of sexual activity happening at Cinema 1. This sexual activity violated the Chattanooga city ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments. Based on police reports detailing what the undercover officers observed at Cinema 1, the Mayor of Chattanooga revoked Franklin's adult oriented establishment license, a decision later affirmed by the Chattanooga City Council and then the Trial Court. The primary issues on appeal concern whether the Chattanooga ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments provides the necessary procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment to be considered facially constitutional under the federal Constitution. We conclude the licensing scheme provides the necessary First Amendment procedural safeguards. We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to revoke Franklin's license. The judgment of the Trial Court, therefore, is affirmed.

The appellant, David K. Wachtel, III, was convicted in the Sumner County Criminal Court of three counts of domestic assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Sumner County Jail for each conviction, with one sentence consecutive to the other two, and placed the appellant on probation. On appeal, the appellant raises issues concerning the trial court's rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jerry Mitchell appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed that his guilty plea to the offense of attempted first degree murder was involuntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would serve only three years of his fifteen year sentence. The lower court found that the petitioner failed to prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence and denied relief. Because the petitioner has not carried his appellate burden of demonstrating error in the lower court's ruling, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of arson, a Class C felony, and two counts of reckless homicide, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to ten years confinement for the arson conviction and seven years for each reckless homicide conviction with all sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing the trial court’s consideration of enhancement factors was improper and his sentences should run concurrently. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of theft of property valued over $1,000. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with one year of incarceration and the remainder to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and raises issues regarding the length and manner of service of her sentence. We remand to delete the reference to the Department of Correction but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition. The petitioner had pled guilty to rape of a child under age thirteen in exchange for a sentence of fifteen years at 100%. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request to call two witnesses and by denying his request to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of those witnesses. The post-conviction court also excluded certain medical records of the victim. After thorough review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a new hearing. At the new hearing, the post-conviction court should admit the testimony of the petitioner’s two witnesses and the victim’s medical records. Should the court exclude certain portions of the testimony, offers of proof shall be allowed in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103.

I agree this case must be remanded to address both deficiency and prejudice relating to ineffective assistance of counsel. I write separately to elaborate on my concerns, especially relating to deficiency.

Defendant, Clifton Brown, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder of John Maupin, one count of premeditated first degree murder of John Maupin, one count of aggravated burglary of Ricky Howard's home, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping of John Maupin. Prior to the case going to the jury, the State asked for and received a nolle prosequi as to the charge of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree felony murder, and found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. Defendant waived a sentencing hearing and agreed to be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, three years for the aggravated burglary conviction and two years for the reckless homicide conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for all three convictions. In his brief, however, Defendant limits his argument on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, and Defendant does not present any argument to support his contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated burglary. Defendant has thus waived a review of the issues pertaining to his aggravated burglary and reckless homicide convictions. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 10(b). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm all three judgments of the trial court.

Wife appeals trial court’s ruling on remand that former husband did not dissipate substantial marital assets through extramarital relationship, specifically asserting that the trial court failed to properly consider or apply the two-prong test set forth by the appellate court for determining whether dissipation has occurred. We affirm.
 

This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors regarding the use of a county road in rural Humphreys County. After one of the landowners began to use the road to cross the neighboring landowners' property, the neighboring landowners erected barricades in the road and later filed a trespass action in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County. The landowners who desired to use the road counterclaimed to establish their right of way along the road. Following a bench trial, the trial court sided with the landowners desiring to use the road. On this appeal, the landowners who desire to prevent the use of the road take issue with the trial court's refusal to consider parol evidence regarding the meaning of the references to the road in the deeds. We affirm the trial court's decision that the references to the road in the deeds are not ambiguous, as well as its decision to admit extrinsic evidence to determine the location of the road. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court's decision regarding the location and dimensions of the road.

Defendant, Joseph Rushing, was indicted for one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of count one, rape of a child. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to count two, aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-three years imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant's statements to the police to be introduced at trial; (2) the sentence imposed on Defendant was excessive; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction for rape of a child; and (4) Defendant's conviction and sentence violated principles of fundamental fairness. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William F. Cartwright, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Putnam County Criminal Court for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to concurrent sentences of nine years for possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and eleven months, twenty-nine days for simple possession of cocaine. However, the trial court ordered these convictions merged. The petitioner contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, (2) that the trial court erred in not requiring the state to elect which offense it was prosecuting, and (3) that his convictions for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine and for simple possession of cocaine violate double jeopardy. We hold that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not err by not requiring the state to elect between offenses with regard to his cocaine convictions. We also hold that although the trial court ordered the cocaine convictions to be merged, it should have entered only one judgment of conviction and noted the merger of the counts in that judgment. We vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Mario McNeal, was convicted by a jury of five counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to ten years confinement for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and three years confinement for his aggravated assault conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Cherie Mae Phillips, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received a sentence of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendants, George A. Vance and Vincent Vance, of aggravated gambling promotion for operating twenty-nine Free Spin machines in Bristol. The trial court sentenced Defendant George A. Vance to two years of supervised probation followed by four years of unsupervised probation and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $130,521.00. The court sentenced Defendant Vincent Vance to one year of supervised probation followed by one year of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions because there was no evidence that they knowingly engaged in a gambling enterprise and the Free Spin machines were not principally designed as gambling devices; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing the testimony of a patent attorney concerning the issuance of a patent on the Free Spin machine; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing evidence concerning comparable products, games and promotions similar to the play on the Free Spin machines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.