APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a challenge to the Commissioner's franchise and excise tax assessment. On cross-motions for summary judgment the chancellor found for the Commissioner. We affirm.

Petitioner, Elizabeth Allison, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which she alleged that her judgment of conviction was void because the length of her sentence exceeded the range of  sentence for a Range I offender. Relying upon the supreme court’s decision in McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn. 2000), the trial court granted Petitioner habeas corpus relief. The State now appeals and argues that the trial court erred in granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a through review of this matter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, dismiss the petition, and remand this matter for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction and sentence previously imposed.

This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding stock options that were part of the marital estate. The Circuit Court for Davidson County approved a marital dissolution agreement in which the husband agreed to transfer one-half of his employee stock options to the wife as part of the division of the martial estate. After the husband's employer and the employer's brokerage firm declined to transfer the stock options to the wife, she orally requested the husband to exercise the options on her behalf. The value of the employer's stock fell after the husband did not exercise the options. The wife sought to hold the husband in contempt or to modify the divorce decree. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt but found that he had impermissibly impeded the division of the martial estate. Accordingly, the court awarded the wife $59,759.25, the stock options' before-tax value had they been exercised on the day the divorce decree was entered. In addition, the court ordered the husband to immediately sell the options originally awarded to the wife and to pay her the proceeds as a credit against the judgment. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, as well as prejudgment interest. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly concluded that the husband unreasonably impeded the wife's acquisition of the value of the stock options. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by valuing the stock options as of the time of the divorce rather than the time the wife and the husband orally agreed to exercise the options and that the court erred by requiring the husband to exercise his options to pay the judgment. We have also determined that the court erred by awarding the wife prejudgment interest but properly awarded the wife her attorney's fees.

Consumer brought products liability suit under theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty for property damage arising out of a fire caused when the consumer's son placed a pillow on top of a halogen torchiere lamp supplied by defendant Sun Lighting, Inc. and sold by defendant The Home Depot, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants and dismissed the lawsuit. The consumer appeals. Because we find the joint summary judgment motions were properly granted, we affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymond Rutter, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this pro se appeal, the petitioner contends that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his judgment of conviction for criminal impersonation of a licensed professional is void. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder of his wife. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and alleges the following errors: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the admission of hearsay testimony and failure to give a curative instruction; (3) the admission of expert opinion that the death was a result of homicidal violence when cause was undetermined; (4) cumulative errors required a new trial; and (5) improper sentencing. After review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

This appeal involves a dispute among the members of a general partnership. In 1997, a group of the partners sued one of the partners in the Chancery Court for Davidson County for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted a judgment for the defendant partner in 2000. In 2001, the same group of partners filed a similar suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The defendant partner moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. The trial court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and then granted judgment for the defendant partner on the ground that the 1997 chancery court judgment barred the second state court suit. The plaintiff partners have appealed. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff in this suit to collect on a promissory note. Appellant does not appeal the grant of judgment, but appeals the trial court's certification of that judgment as a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Chris E. Hixson, pled guilty to two counts of theft and three counts of sale of cocaine, all Class C felonies. He was sentenced to two concurrent four-year terms for the theft offenses, and to three concurrent four-year terms for the cocaine offenses, these latter terms to be served consecutively to the terms for the theft offenses, for an effective sentence of eight years. All of these sentences were ordered to be served on community corrections. The Defendant was subsequently convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to serve three years on community corrections, consecutive to the sentences imposed for the theft offenses. The effective sentence of eight years was thus unchanged. Subsequent to the burglary conviction, the Defendant violated the terms of his release and was ordered to serve two years day-for-day in confinement, after which he was to be released back into community corrections. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals, arguing that the two years of continuous confinement constitutes an illegal sentence. The State concedes that the sentence is illegal. We agree. The trial court's judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court.

The petitioner directly appeals the dismissal of his petition of writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the habeas court summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. If the habeas corpus court finds the sentence to be illegal, the court must then remand the case to the Rutherford County Criminal Court, where the convictions occurred. On remand to the original convicting court, the petitioner's guilty plea may be withdrawn if concurrent sentencing was a condition of his plea agreement.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, to be served on probation after service of eighty days' incarceration. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Robert M. Bass, appeals the sentencing decision of the Stewart County Circuit Court following revocation of his community corrections sentences. The trial court's order provides that Bass is to serve eighteen months in the county jail and, upon service of this term, return to community corrections supervision for the balance of his sentences. Bass argues that the trial court is without authority to impose a sentence in excess of one year's confinement in the jail. The State concedes error. We agree and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Terry A. Hawkins, presents for review a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Hawkins pled guilty to DUI, first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days jail confinement, to be suspended after service of forty-eight hours. As a condition of her guilty plea, Hawkins explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test administered by a private hospital in the course of medical treatment. The Appellant argues that the procedures utilized to obtain the results of the test violated both her constitutional right to privacy and due process. On appeal, the State asserts that the question presented is not dispositive and, thus, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. After review, we agree that the certified question is not dispositive. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff filed medical malpractice action against clinic, treating nurse, and supervising physician for injuries suffered as a result of alleged negligent chemotherapy treatment. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that registered nurse was not qualified as an expert on the issue of medical causation, and further noting that the deposition testimony of lone expert physician failed to establish that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Jeffrey R. Dickens, was convicted of criminal attempt to commit unlawful photographing in violation of privacy as proscribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605 (2003), a class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to six months in the Rutherford County Jail, which was suspended after service of eight days periodic confinement. On appeal, Dickens argues that his conviction cannot stand because an attempt to commit a violation of this section is not an indictable offense. Alternatively, he contends that the proof is insufficient to constitute a "substantial step" toward the commission of the attempted crime. After review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Michael E. Mills, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issues on appeal in this divorce action are: (1) Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro; (2) Whether the trial court was in error in finding wife's IRA of Wal-mart stock was her separate property in its entirety; (3) Whether the trial court erred in failing to make a downward deviation in child support. The trial court awarded to Ms. Hoback as alimony in futuro $500 per month for a ten (10) year period terminating on her death or her remarriage. Wal-mart stock of value of approximately $35,000 was awarded to Ms. Hoback as her separate property. Child support was set at $750 per month upon a finding of ability of the father to earn $60,000 per year, and based upon additional parenting time above 80 days per year granted to the father the Court reduced the month of June child support to $550 and reduced the month of July support to $375 making a downward deviation of $47.92 per month. For reasons stated below, the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, David Robert Cook, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the indicted offenses but guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to three years imprisonment for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and two years imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence for aggravated assault to run concurrently with his sentence for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (3) the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant as an especially mitigated offender. The trial court did not err by refusing to grant a mistrial, the transcript of the sentencing hearing is not included in the appellate record and sentencing issues are therefore waived, and the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Although not raised on appeal, we further conclude that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that reckless aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. Our supreme court has explicitly held that reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, we are obligated to reverse Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter.

The defendant was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, for punching a police officer and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days to serve before applying for probation. He raises seven issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting a tape recording of the officer's call to dispatch; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard the dispatcher's testimony; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the officer's testimony about her recognition of the defendant; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to publish a second officer's supplemental report to the jury; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing defense witnesses to be impeached with evidence of other crimes; (6) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by withdrawing his request to cross-examine police officers regarding prior complaints against them of excessive force; and (7) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. We find no reversible error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings and conclude that the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. We further conclude there was ample evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for assault. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Andre Edward Hicks, was convicted after a trial by jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a persistent offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hicks raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and (2) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is affirmed.

Petitioner, James Gordon Freeman, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, JoyLeigh Sandidge, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault and one count each of DUI, fourth offense, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, and failure to yield. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of two years, with the court to make a determination as to alternative sentencing after the defendant had served the mandatory 150 days in jail for her DUI, fourth offense, conviction. Subsequently, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of her sentence, and the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in this determination. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for the defendant to be placed on probation for the remainder of her sentence.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Clifford Rogers, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. Defendant received an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years for his convictions. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing. Because the trial court erroneously entered judgments of convictions for the offenses of premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, rather than merging the two offenses at sentencing, we merge Defendant’s conviction for felony murder with his conviction for premeditated murder and remand this case for entry of judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This custody case involves two parents who have never been married and have not been involved in any prior custody determination regarding the child at issue. Father had never seen the child prior to filing this custody action and had not spoken with Mother since the child's birth in 1992. He was served with a paternity action in November 2001 and adjudicated to be the child's father. On June 4, 2002, he filed this custody action. The trial court determined that custody should remain with Mother and adopted a parenting plan offered by Mother. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court's determination.