APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anthony Veasley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range II multiple offender to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner was indicted on charges of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder, and the other charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of forty years, to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Andrew Eakin Moore, entered an open plea of guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of resisting arrest. As a result of the guilty pleas, the petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years on all six counts, but the petitioner was ordered to serve 365 days in jail and then be placed on community corrections for the balance of the sentence. Following his release from the jail sentence, the petitioner violated his community corrections sentence and was ordered to serve the balance of the sentence. In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner attacks his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner contends on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the trial of his case. In making his claim, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance in three areas: (1) failure of counsel to effectively conduct voir dire, (2) inadequate preparation for and examination of witness Riggan, and (3) failure to prepare the petitioner to testify. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing conclusions and the record as a whole, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that he was entitled to a criminal court review of the general sessions court's ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant, Joe Robert Osborne, was convicted by a jury of one count of Driving Under the Influence (DUI). As a result, he was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with probation after service of 48 hours in jail, revocation of his driver's license for one year, mandatory attendance at Alcohol Safety School and assessed a $350 fine. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "missing witness" inference. Because we conclude there was no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Blair, of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance when the state announced a few days before trial that it was going to call an expert witness to testify; (3) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress and exclude evidence because the defense was not able to examine and test the equipment and chemicals found at the crime scene; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state's expert to testify that the defendant was not manufacturing methamphetamine for personal use; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine; and (6) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on "immediate precursor." We conclude that no error occurred, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Honnie Gunnoe and Virginia Ott Gunnoe ("Plaintiffs") sued their neighbors, Gerald Lee Lambert and Janice Lee Lambert ("the Lamberts") and L.D. Simerly and Geraldine Simerly ("the Simerlys") seeking, among other things, to quiet title to a parcel of land. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs did not own the land in question. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Charles Beard, Sr. ("Father") filed a petition seeking to have primary residential custody of the parties' two children transferred from Florence E. Beard ("Mother") to him. In the alternative, Father sought a reduction in his child support payments. After a hearing, the Trial Court refused to change the custody arrangement, again designating Mother the primary residential parent. The Trial Court did not alter Father's child support payments. Father appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, James Chitwood, pled guilty in the Clay County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and agreed to a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that he should have received an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Morgan Susanne Foxx (“Wife”) sued Steven C. Bolden (“Husband”) for a divorce. After a lengthy trial, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, divided the marital property, and awarded Husband $25,000 in attorney fees. Wife appeals claiming, among other things, that the Trial Court erred when it failed to classify any of Husband’s TVA funded retirement pension as marital property and equitably distribute it. Wife also claims the award of attorney fees to Husband was an abuse of discretion. We agree with Wife regarding the pension and, therefore, vacate the judgment as to the marital property division and remand this case to the Trial Court to determine how much of Husband’s TVA funded retirement pension is marital property and to make an equitable distribution of all the marital property, including this additional asset. We likewise vacate the award of attorney fees to Husband since the propriety of that award may be affected by the marital property distribution. We affirm the granting of the divorce.
 

Defendant, Daniel L. Robinson, entered guilty pleas on December 19, 2001, to the offenses of felony possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine, in case 2000-C-1609, and attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell, in case 2000-C-902. Defendant was sentenced to five years probation for each conviction, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of ten years probation. On January 10, 2003, a probation violation warrant was issued against Defendant, alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation based on a new arrest for homicide. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that Defendant's original sentences be placed into effect. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering revocation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the probation violation warrant.

The petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals pro se the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He argues that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination voids his guilty pleas and that the court’s failure to provide him with a transcript of the post-conviction hearing violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, he argues that the record does not reflect that counsel who represented him at the post-conviction hearing was relieved from continuing to represent him on appeal, and that he is entitled to counsel in his appeal to this court. We agree that the petitioner is entitled to be represented by counsel in the first tier appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and remand to the post-conviction court with instructions to reenter its findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the petitioner’s time for appeal to start at the date of reentry, and the petitioner to be represented by counsel on appeal.

Husband-appellant appeals order of the trial court holding him in civil contempt and designating punishment and the order of the trial court denying motion to modify alimony order. The notice of appeal was filed 30 days from the date of the trial court’s order denying the motion to modify but the filing was approximately one year after the contempt order. On appeal, we dismiss the appeal of the contempt order as untimely and affirm the order denying modification. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Dismissed in Part, Affirmed in Part and Remanded W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J.,

Petitioner, Jacob Lee Davis, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to assist him during the post-conviction hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because they (1) failed to properly conduct voir dire or preserve for appeal the issues concerning the selection of jurors; (2) failed to pursue meaningful plea negotiations; and (3) failed to adequately apprize Petitioner of his right to testify. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ernest G. Murphy, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the defendant's vehicular assault and DUI convictions and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to three years, nine months. For each misdemeanor conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days and ordered that all of the sentences be served consecutively. The trial court also ordered that the defendant serve four and one-half years in confinement and the remainder of his sentences on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and by denying full probation. Although we determine that consecutive sentencing and denial of full probation are justified, we conclude that the sentences stated at the sentencing hearing and the sentences reflected in the judgments of conviction are dissimilar. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing pursuant to law.

Petitioner, Adrian R. Arnett, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, attacking his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of setting fire to personal property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, he raises one issue: his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly request funding for and obtaining the services of an independent expert in forensic DNA analysis in order to challenge DNA evidence introduced by the State. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff corporation sued former employees/officers alleging breach of non-compete
agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unfair competition, intentional inducement to
breach a contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted employees summary judgment on all claims and, on appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on breach of non-compete agreements and conversion of intangible personal property claims. This Court reversed the summary judgment on the remaining claims and remanded the case for trial. The pending case on remand was voluntarily dismissed in the trial court and, subsequently, plaintiff sued defendants for the same remanded claims. Defendants moved to dismiss on the doctrine of res judicata (splitting cause of action) and the trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered monetary judgment against defendants. Defendants appeal. We affirm in part as modified and reverse in part.

I concur fully with the majority’s well-reasoned opinion except in one respect. The majority concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that B&L’s customer information, such as customer names, prices charged for services rendered, customer contract renewal dates and the identity of customer representatives, constituted confidential information. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning on this issue.
 

The Petitioner, James E. Swiggett, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has not established that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence him or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Gene Booker, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and 2) the trial court erred in determining that the offense of being a felon in possession of a handgun should be tried with the other offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellee-wife of deceased spouse sued a notary public and his bonding company for damages resulting in the notary public’s taking the acknowledgment of the signature of wife’s imposter to a waiver of retirement benefits and completing the acknowledgment certificate. The trial court found that the notary public owed a duty of reasonable care which he breached resulting in damage to appellee-wife and entered judgment for wife. Notary public appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Thaddeus D. Daniel, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition presents no cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, does not state the cause or pretense of the petitioner's restraint, and was not filed in the appropriate court. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights as to his two children. The parents are divorced and Mother's parental rights were also terminated; however, she did not appeal. As the trial court made no findings of fact in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k), we remand this case for a finding of facts by the trial court.