APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Christopher C. Rigsby, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following his conviction of aggravated assault. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering the defendant to serve the six-year sentence in the Department of Correction, we affirm.

This opinion adjudicates John Robert Tory, Jr.'s appeal from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief. He filed the petition to challenge his 1992 jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a hearing in which counsel argued but no evidence was presented, the post-conviction court rejected the petitioner's claims that his especially aggravated robbery conviction violated double jeopardy principles, that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand an instruction on second degree murder as a lesser included offense. Because the record and the applicable law support the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

The appellant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the appellant to death based upon the existence of three aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of defendant or another; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to run consecutively to his sentences for first degree murder and to a prior out-of-state sentence. On appeal, appellant presents forty-five issues. After an extensive review of the record and the applicable law, we find that none of these issues warrants a reversal of this case. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

We have this case on direct appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from the judgment of the circuit court approving the order of a hearing committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility that suspended Charles F. Galbreath, the appellant, from the practice of law for a thirty-day period. The circuit court essentially adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the hearing committee. Galbreath does not contest those factual findings but argues that the sanction imposed is excessive. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This lawsuit emanates from a 1989 sale of land, which included a portion of land to which the seller did not have title. Two subsequent assignees of the original buyer filed a cause of action against the seller, seeking rescission or reformation of the 1989 transaction and alternate relief. The trial court awarded plaintiffs’ damages and declined to award equitable relief. We affirm.

Defendant, Ricky Raymond Bryan, was first tried and convicted of the first degree murder of Charlotte Scott in 1995. At the conclusion of Defendant's first trial, the trial judge, acting in his capacity as thirteenth juror, granted Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant's second trial was held in April 1996, and the jury once again found Defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, this Court remanded for a new trial because the introduction of Defendant's statement of November 15, 1994, violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. At the same time, this Court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Bryan, 990 S.W.2d 231, 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Following a third jury trial, Defendant was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the person who killed the victim, Charlotte Scott. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation as required at the time of the offense in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Convicted by a jury of assault and aggravated stalking, the defendant, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals. In addition to claiming that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence, he claims it was error for the trial court to enhance a charge of misdemeanor stalking to the felony of felony stalking. The lower court imposed the felony stalking conviction based upon a previous conviction of stalking that was adjudicated after the commission of the offense in the present case. Based upon our review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the stalking conviction; however, the aggravation of the stalking offense to a felony was improper. Thus, the lower court's actions are reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendant Jarvis Williams was convicted of seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 360 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the length of his sentence. Co-defendant John Williams was convicted of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 161 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Jesse Cleo Minor, entered a best-interest plea to one count of attempted rape of a child. He is currently serving an eight-year sentence. See State v. Jesse Cleo Minor, No. M1998-00424-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1179143 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 15, 1999). The post-conviction petition at issue herein was filed by the petitioner's daughter Leann Morrison as next friend. The petition alleges that the petitioner is in poor health and suffers from irreversible dementia that seriously affects his cognitive abilities. The petitioner attacks his conviction based upon the following four allegations: (1) he was incompetent and unable to understand the prior proceedings and therefore incapable of entering a voluntary guilty plea; (2) the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence; (3) false and/or materially misleading statements were offered to the trial court; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The appellant, Delsie Lucille Sartain, was convicted by a jury for the reckless aggravated assault of a five-month-old baby, which resulted in permanent injuries. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years and two months incarceration as a range I standard offender. Sartain appeals the sentencing decision, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than the less restrictive alternative of probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly granted the defendant post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed direct appeal on the ground that counsel's failure to file a motion for new trial resulted in the waiver of all issues on direct appeal except for sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal after concluding that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to grant a delayed appeal and that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice from counsel's performance. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court properly granted a delayed appeal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals, affirm the trial court's grant of a delayed appeal, and remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review of the issues presented by the defendant's motion for a new trial.

The appellant, Benton William Pamplin, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of simple assault and resisting arrest. On appeal, Pamplin presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to strike, for cause, a prospective juror who was a uniformed deputy sheriff and whose office presented testimony at the trial, and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts. After review, we conclude that the trial court's refusal to strike the prospective juror constituted reversible error in that it denied Pamplin his right to a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Doyle Gilbert Newsom, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of fifth offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving on a revoked driver’s license, and violation of the implied consent law. He received sentences of six years at 60% incarceration as a career D.U.I. offender, and 11 months, 29 days for driving on a revoked license. In this appeal the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the D.U.I. conviction because the testimony of an accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated; (2) he was improperly sentenced to 11 months, 29 days for driving on a revoked license; and (3) the prior judgments of conviction are invalid. We find no merit to any of these contentions. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Washington County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Christopher Whitaker, for three counts of robbery, and one count of theft valued over $500. The defendant pled guilty to all four counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentencing and sentenced the defendant to serve six years in prison. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

A Henry County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Dedrick Dewayne Chism, of two counts of selling more than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the state improperly withheld an exculpatory witness’s name from the defense, and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to impeach a state witness with his prior conviction and bad acts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mindy S. Dodd, appeals from her convictions by a jury in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She received sentences of life and twenty years, respectively, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support either conviction. We affirm the judgments of conviction.