APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Melissa A. Mellinger, was convicted by a jury in the Wilson County Criminal Court of two counts of first offense driving under the influence (DUI), Class A misdemeanors. The trial court merged the convictions, imposed a three hundred fifty dollar ($350) fine, and sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be suspended upon serving two hundred seventy-three (273) days in the county jail. The trial court also suspended the appellant's driver's license for one year. On appeal, the appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Johnson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Kenneth E. Coffey, for possession with intent to sell and deliver 241.1 grams of marijuana, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (Supp. 2000). Following the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the Defendant pled guilty to Possession of Marijuana for Purpose of Sale. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year in prison and imposed a $2,000.00 fine. The Defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his conviction for second degree murder. He argues: (1) the trial court at his original trial improperly instructed the jury regarding the definition of “knowing”; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument at the original trial; and (3) he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Dwan L. Crisp, pled guilty in the Obion County Circuit Court to one count of rape and was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed for testing of human biological evidence under the Post-Conviction
DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Darrow Lynn Williams, seeks post-conviction relief from his 2001 second degree murder conviction. The Tipton County Circuit Court denied post-conviction relief, and now on appeal, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prepare and devise a trial strategy. Because the record supports the lower court’s decision, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The defendant pled guilty to driving while under the status of a habitual motor offender; two counts of driving under the influence, seventh offense; two counts of driving on a revoked license, eighth offense; and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court gave the defendant an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by not granting him alternative sentencing. Plain error requires us to vacate the judgment of conviction for driving on a revoked license (count three) because of double jeopardy prohibitions. The other judgments from the trial court are affirmed in all respects.

Defendant, Joseph Scott Hayes, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, one count of stalking and one count of coercion of a witness. Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of coercion of a witness. The trial court found the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction on the charge of stalking. The trial court sentenced Defendant to four years imprisonment on each count of aggravated assault and three years imprisonment for his conviction for coercion of a witness. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentences for aggravated assault to run consecutively, and his sentence for coercion of a witness to run concurrently with his aggravated assault convictions for an effective sentence of eight years. Defendant now appeals challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that he made out a prima facie case of mental incompetence and should therefore have been granted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based on our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Fred Elliot Hunter, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver three hundred (300) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class A felony. The appellant was sentenced to twenty-one (21) years as a Range I Standard Offender and fined $2,000. The trial court denied the appellant's motion for new trial, and he appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellant's motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting the appellant's manslaughter conviction; (5) that the trial court erred in failing to consider appropriate mitigating factors in sentencing; and (6) that the trial court failed to order alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Carlos A. Curry, was convicted by a jury of first offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant. However, the jury acquitted the Appellant of four counts of vehicular homicide. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. Because we find that the trial court did not err in sentencing the Appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Convicted by a jury of first degree murder, the defendant, Shawn Hodge, appeals and claims (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying a jury view of the crime scene, (3) the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of a threat made against a defense witness, (4) the defendant was prejudiced by an attempt by the state to pay a prosecution witness, (5) the court inadequately instructed the jury on the elements of the offense, and (6) the court erroneously admitted the testimony of an allegedly incompetent defense witness. We affirm the lower court's judgment.

The Defendant, Dewayne Jordan, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder of one victim, first degree felony murder of a second victim and aggravated robbery. The Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and to ten years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction. The ten-year sentence was to be served concurrently with the two life sentences. The Defendant now appeals his convictions, raising the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, (2) whether the trial court properly admitted the Defendant's statement into evidence, and (3) whether the trial court properly ordered that the Defendant's two life sentences be served consecutively. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals contending the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to receive jail credit from an unrelated charge against the 150-day mandatory minimum sentence he received in his plea to sixth offense D.U.I. Also, the State alleges error in the trial court modifying the defendant's payment plan for paying fines and costs to less than the defendant agreed to pay when the trial court accepted the defendant's plea agreement. We conclude it was error to allow this defendant to receive any jail credit toward his mandatory minimum of 150 days for his sixth D.U.I. offense where the credit accumulated on an unrelated charge. We further conclude the trial court was within its discretion to modify the payment plan, not the overall fine, upon determining the defendant did not have the ability to pay. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Charity H. Keith, appeals from the revocation of her probation, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her original sentence to run consecutively to her subsequent sentences in Davidson County. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David L. Robinson, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. He claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys (1) failed to challenge the fact that no African-Americans were on the jury, (2) failed to appeal an issue properly regarding a state witness's testimony, (3) failed to file a motion to sever his case from his codefendant's case, and (4) failed to call a potential defense witness to testify. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The appellant, Dewayne A. McDaniel, a/k/a Anthony McDaniel, was convicted by a jury of theft of property. Specifically, the jury convicted  the appellant of the second charge contained in the indictment, exercising control over property with a value of $10,000 but less than  $60,000 without the consent of the owner, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender.

The appellant’s motion for new trial was denied by the trial court in an order entered May 10, 2001.  The trial court entered an order granting a delayed appeal on June 28, 2002. The trial court’s order granting the  delayed appeal indicates that the request for the delayed appeal was made by the appellant’s attorney, even though no motion for a delayed appeal appears in the technical record before this Court. The notice of appeal was not filed until September 13, 2002. Because of the untimeliness of the filing of the notice of appeal the appeal is dismissed.

We granted permission to appeal in this post-conviction case to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Jaco's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered even though he was not informed of the psychiatric certification mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(c) for sex offenders before release on parole. We hold that Mr. Jaco's guilty plea met the standard of knowing and voluntary. A defendant need not be informed of all criteria that affect his possible release on parole in order for his guilty plea to be constitutionally sound. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

We granted review to determine whether the employee's action for reconsideration of his workers' compensation benefits was filed too late pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999). The trial court found that the employee's action to reconsider his prior award was untimely because it was filed more than one year after his employment with his pre-injury employer had ended and also found that the employee's settlement with his pre-injury employer had waived his right to reconsideration. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court's ruling on the ground that the action was untimely. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree that the employee's action to reconsider his award of benefits was untimely because it was not filed within one year of his loss of employment with his pre-injury employer as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Panel.

The defendant, Bobby Blair, appeals as of right the sentence imposed by the Humphreys County Circuit Court following his plea of nolo contendere to the sale of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction consecutive to an effective sixteen-year sentence for prior convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine and felonious possession of methamphetamine. The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

American Excavators, LLC ("Plaintiff") entered into a subcontract agreement with RCR Building Corporation ("Defendant") which required Plaintiff to perform excavation and utilities work for the Williamson County community services building. The subcontract agreement provided for certain excavation work to be done for a lump sum and states that "[a]ny additional undercutting and refilling of areas due to unsuitable soils will be done for a unit price of $12.50 per cubic yard." Plaintiff claims that while performing the work, it encountered a large amount of unsuitable soil that it removed and replaced. Plaintiff later submitted change orders to Defendant requesting to be paid for the removal of the alleged unsuitable soil. Defendant paid a portion of the change orders, but refused to pay the entire amount. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reinstate the jury verdict. I would
reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial on all issues.

The defendant was found guilty of six counts of aggravated rape, seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, five counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the photographic identification, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a scar upon the defendant's abdomen, (4) the trial court erred in not requiring the State to make an election of offenses as to the aggravated rape convictions, (5) the trial court did not properly instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, and (6) the sentence was improper. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This extraordinary appeal arises from the lower court's denial of Appellants' motion to dismiss under the doctrine forum non conveniens. The case is comprised of thirty-one lawsuits, based on automobile accidents in Mexico involving Ford and Firestone products, that are consolidated in Davidson County, Tennessee for pretrial purposes. Using the approach set forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Zurick v. Inman, the trial court found that dismissal of the case was not necessary. For the following reasons, we reverse the ruling of the lower court.

The defendant, Steve McKenzie, pled guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor, and was sentenced, respectively, to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended except for seven days, and thirty days, to be served on probation. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved two certified questions of law: (1) whether the trial court should have dismissed the charges or ordered another preliminary hearing because the tape recording of the initial hearing was inaudible; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of his alleged illegal arrest. On appeal, the defendant pursued only the second question, which the State argues is not dispositive of the charges, resulting in this matter not properly being before the court. We agree that the certified question is not dispositive and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.