APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Barbara Sue Moore, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued $60,000 or more, a Class B felony, and theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received concurrent sentences of eight and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that she serve her sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Kern Holloway, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to forty years to be served at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea element of second degree murder; and the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on his pro se motion for a new trial which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant's conviction but vacate its ruling as to the pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for aggravated gambling promotion. The trial judge denied the defendant's preliminary motion to suppress certain evidence, and a Davidson County jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to two years of probation, a $1,000 fine, and five hours of unpaid community service per month for twenty-four months. He now appeals claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence gathered during and incriminating statements made as a result of a warrantless search; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated gambling promotion. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. He argues: (1) due process required the post-conviction court to hear his petition because of his attorney’s inaction even though it was filed outside the statute of limitations; and, regardless, (2) his convictions should be set aside because they are based on void indictments. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life plus ten years. On appeal, the appellant challenges his arrest without a warrant and the trial court’s failure to suppress the appellant’s statement which was taken after his arrest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Elbert M. Marable, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Marable pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. On appeal, Marable presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether his plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered and (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After consideration of the entire record, we conclude that Marable's plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Accordingly, his conviction for aggravated assault is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court.

A jury found the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court sentenced her as a mitigated offender to .9 years of unsupervised probation. The defendant appeals her conviction and alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed the improper admission of evidence regarding child restraint laws and insufficient evidence to support a conviction. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.