APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Redonna Hanna, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of first degree murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the trial court's instructions as to criminal responsibility. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State engaged in a vindictive prosecution and failed to perform testing on evidence which would have supported his claim of self-defense. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie W. Reeves, of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less. The trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David D. Harris, pled guilty to seven counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court on June 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve three consecutive eight-year terms on supervised probation. The State appealed, and this Court reversed the portion of the sentence that ordered the Defendant to serve twenty-four years of probation on the three consecutive eight-year sentences, holding that a probationary sentence for aggravated robbery is contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Upon re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year prison terms and ordered that the sentences run consecutive to each other and consecutive to a sentence that the Defendant is currently serving in Williamson County. The Defendant appealed the trial court's re-sentencing order and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his request for a new sentencing hearing and; (2) whether the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant's request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, for a reduced sentence. After a through examination of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing; however, because we conclude that the trial court erroneously believed that it was without the authority to impose concurrent sentences, we reverse and remand for it to determine whether the three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

The defendant, Robert L. Leach, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As to victim Sarah McBride, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felonies; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while committing or attempting to commit robbery or aggravated rape. As to victim Jean Poteet, the jury found the same three aggravating circumstances and the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was seventy years of age or older or was particularly vulnerable due to a significant handicap or significant disability, physical or mental. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape convictions. In this appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the constitutionality of the death penalty, and the application of certain capital case procedures. We conclude that no harmful error exists, and we affirm the convictions and sentences. The case should be remanded, though, for correction of clerical errors by which the judgments for Counts 5 and 6 have respectively been switched to Counts 6 and 5.

This is an appeal by permission, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Jeffery McCraney, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for various narcotics charges arising out of the search of his motor vehicle. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of that search, ruling that the search of the Defendant’s vehicle was unconstitutional. The State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. We granted the State permission to appeal, and the State asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’ s Motion to Suppress. We hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion because the search of the Defendant’s vehicle violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Appellant, Ronald B. Finch, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated rape. As a result of these convictions, Finch was sentenced to concurrent thirty-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Finch raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Marcus Thompson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and one count of selling and delivering cocaine. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fines totaling $150,000. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including speedy trial, sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but reduce the amount of the appellant's fines to a total amount of $50,000.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of seven years incarceration as a Range II multiple offender convicted of a Class D felony. On appeal the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in denying him any form of alternative sentencing. Appellate review is available for these two issues despite the fact that the appellant failed to file a timely motion for new trial under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b). However, review of these issues is dependent on either a timely filed notice of appeal, or in the interest of justice, a waiver of the timely filing of a notice appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). Because the appellant filed a late motion for a new trial, his notice of appeal is likewise tardy. Neither has the appellant sought a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under these circumstances the appeal is DISMISSED.

The defendant, Calvin Jerome Oliver, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged his attempted aggravated robbery convictions into his aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The trial court sentenced him to seven years for the aggravated burglary conviction and eight years for each aggravated assault conviction, all to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eighteen-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the DOC. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred by refusing to apply and give proper weight to mitigating factors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of a clerical error regarding the aggravated burglary judgment.