APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Wesley D. Whittington, entered guilty pleas to the charges of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant and the State agreed to sentences of one year for the felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction, to be served concurrently. The negotiated plea agreement further stated that the trial court would determine the manner in which Defendant would serve his sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s refusal to order alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant for aggravated assault. Subsequently a trial jury convicted the defendant as charged. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the parties had reached an agreement involving a pending probation revocation matter, a pending assault charge, and the instant conviction. With respect to the probation revocation, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve four years at 30% as a standard offender. On the assault conviction, the court ordered the defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75%. Finally, the defendant received an agreed upon four-and-one-half-year sentence to be served at 30% as a standard offender for the aggravated assault conviction at issue in this case.¹ The sentences were ordered run in such a manner that the defendant by agreement received an effective sentence of eight and one-half years. The defendant later filed a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial unsuccessfully raising five issues. Through this appeal the defendant continues to assert that 1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated assault conviction; 2) the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to present evidence that the victim's bodily injury resulted from another incident, not the defendant's purported use of a deadly weapon; and 3) the trial court erred in admitting a photograph allegedly showing the victim's injuries and in admitting a shirt allegedly worn by the victim at the time of the offense as these items were not provided to the defense in pre-trial discovery. However, after reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find that these contentions lack merit or have been waived. We, thus, affirm the lower court's denial of relief.

Petitioner, Roosevelt Malone, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and failed to grant Petitioner sufficient time to amend his petition. Upon review of this matter, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Stephen Daniel Grande, Sr., was convicted by a jury of the unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine and of introducing contraband into a penal institution. He received two concurrent three year sentences to be served on community corrections following service of a year of incarceration. In this appeal the appellant raises seven issues including whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. However, in his brief the appellant cites no relevant authority to support his arguments. Indeed, the brief of the appellant is little more than a written diatribe describing alleged unlawful activities on the part of the authorities in Henry County, Tennessee, and characterizing those alleged activities as unconstitutional. Under these circumstances we find that the appellant has waived review of the issues on appeal. Nevertheless, we have in the interests of justice, reviewed the primary issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Montrell Clements, was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty-two years and six years, respectively, to be served concurrently. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in No. 00-14457 to reflect the defendant's conviction offense, which was omitted from the judgment form.

The petitioner, Allen Oliver, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The petitioner pled guilty to various offenses pursuant to a plea agreement on July 2, 2001, and his petition for post-conviction relief was stamped filed in the clerk’s office on July 3, 2002. Because the judgment of conviction did not become final until thirty days after its entry, the petition for post-conviction relief was timely filed. Thus, we reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for further proceedings.

A Tipton County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Frost, of bribery of a public servant. The trial court subsequently ordered the defendant to serve three years as a standard offender in community based alternative sentencing. The defendant now brings this direct appeal of his conviction, challenging (1) the trial court's decision to admit certain exhibits over his objection; (2) a certain portion of the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding his indicted offense; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, N'Kosi Tuggle, entered a plea of guilt to aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that he should have been classified as an especially mitigated offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Darrell M. Anderson, was convicted of aggravated assault and simple assault. The trial court imposed a Range III, ten-year sentence for the aggravated assault and a concurrent 11-month, 29-day sentence for the assault. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Michael Allen Conrad, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to three counts of attempted statutory rape, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the agreed sentences of two consecutive and one concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day terms on probation. The defendant contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would not have to register with Tennessee's sexual offender registry. He argues that had he known that he was subject to the registry, he would not have pled guilty but would have gone to trial. We conclude that the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas to prevent manifest injustice.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to investigate his case and meet with him regularly. He further contends his trial counsel never held a hearing on his motion to suppress his identification, thus rendering his plea involuntary. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Donald Clark, guilty of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-seven years as a violent offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction, (1) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and (2) the trial court's failure to charge the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, but that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of reckless aggravated assault. However, we find that error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, George Glenn King, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury for first degree murder for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. He was also convicted of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, for which he received a concurrent sentence of eight years. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the state's eliciting expert testimony on the ultimate issue of his insanity and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument constitute plain error. He also argues that the trial court should have merged his convictions for premeditated and felony murder arising from a single killing. We agree that the defendant's first degree murder convictions should be merged, but we otherwise discern no plain error and affirm the judgments of conviction as modified.

The Defendant, Jerry Lee Honey, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. A trial jury subsequently convicted him of first degree premeditated murder and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The defendant then unsuccessfully pursued a new trial motion. In this appeal the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement and that the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find neither of the defendant's claims meritorious. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronald W. Jenkins, II, pled guilty to reckless homicide, felony reckless endangerment, and DUI, second offense. The Defendant was thereafter sentenced to two years for the homicide, one year for the reckless endangerment, to be served concurrently, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI, to be served consecutively. The Defendant's driver's license was also suspended for a period of two years. The Defendant's sentences were suspended after service of 150 days, and he was placed on three years of probation. Within a few months of beginning his probationary period, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of driving on a revoked license. A probation violation warrant was filed, a hearing conducted, and the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals, complaining that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence is excessive. Because this Court previously determined that the petitioner's sentence was not excessive on direct appeal, we dismiss this issue. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court and affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

Michael Todd Drinnon appeals the dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief and attacks his convictions for a variety of reasons, mostly related to the claimed ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as raising issues that had been previously determined and for failure to allege or establish grounds for reopening his previous petition. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues the trial court erred in excluding testimony as to the victim's prior aggressive conduct, as well as his access and familiarity with firearms, and in not instructing as to aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense and that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.