APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Eric Tyre Patton, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of conspiracy to sell 150 grams or more of heroin and 300 grams or more of cocaine with at least one overt act occurring within a drug-free school zone (DFSZ) and possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within a DFSZ.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from GPS tracking devices and wiretaps; that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to identify four confidential informants (CIs); that the trial court erred by admitting testimony about a prior bad act and by denying his motion for a mistrial; that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on witness credibility; that the State improperly withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and that he is entitled to relief under cumulative error.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.  

The Petitioner, Emmanuel Deshawn Bowley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief from drug- and weapon-related convictions, for which he is serving an effective sixteen-year sentence.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s performance in the appeal of the convictions and (2) he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the existence of multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in the appeal of the convictions.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Cedric Evans, Petitioner, sought post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for second degree murder and felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Corey Dendy, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact a witness prior to the Petitioner’s guilty plea and that the Petitioner’s guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from the custody of Polly H. (“Mother”) and Billy H. (“Father”) in March 2020 after receiving a referral regarding the family and allegations of abuse, and after Mother’s partner was found at the home with Mother and the children in violation of a permanent restraining order against Mother’s partner. In December 2020, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. DCS alleged, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights on the day of the trial. The trial court found that DCS proved four of the five grounds for termination of Mother’s rights by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate holding that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Crockett County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tiffany T. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Miranda and Baylee (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on four grounds and finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing solely that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS proved four grounds for termination of parental rights against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The Appellant, David Ian Lemons, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of eleven drug and weapons offenses, ranging from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-three-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive because the trial court improperly applied an enhancement factor and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. The State acknowledges that while the trial court may have partially misapplied an enhancement factor, the Appellant’s twenty-three-year sentence is not excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action concerning a newly-constructed home, the plaintiffs asserted,inter alia, claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligence, and unfair and deceptive business practices by the defendant construction company and its owners.  The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants based upon expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of injury to real property.  We determine that although the trial court properly applied the three-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ claims of injury to their real property, the trial court improperly determined that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment would not apply to toll the accrual of such limitations period concerning the plaintiffs’ claims for damages caused by the defendants’ failure to seal the utility penetrations beneath the home, a fact which allegedly was concealed by the defendants.  We also determine that the plaintiffs stated claims of breach of contract, including breach of any express or implied warranties provided by the contract, and that the trial court improperly dismissed these claims based on the incorrect statute of limitations.  We therefore vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract and contractual warranty claims, as well as the claims based on the defendants’ failure to seal the utility penetrations, and we remand those claims to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We affirm the remaining portion of the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.  

As part of a divorce decree, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for three minor children.  The court’s plan provided for substantially equal parenting time and joint decision making for major decisions.  The plan was expressly conditioned on the parents remaining within the children’s current school district after the divorce.  The father argues that neither equal parenting time nor joint decision making were appropriate based on the evidence presented.  And he maintains that the court lacked authority to include a residency requirement in the plan.  He also contends that the court failed to address some of his claims.  We conclude that the court, either expressly or implicitly, resolved all claims between the parties.  And because the court did not abuse its discretion in establishing the parenting plan, we affirm.

Following the return of his seized property under the forfeiture statutes, claimant asked the administrative law judge to award him attorney’s fees under two separate statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The administrative law judge awarded fees under only the former statute. Upon review by the chancery court, the decision to award fees under section 4-5-325(a) was reversed; the chancery court also ruled that claimant’s request for fees under the federal statute was waived or abandoned. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that claimant is not entitled to fees under section 4-5-325(a). We remand to the trial court for consideration of the previously pretermitted claim for attorney’s fees under section 1988(b). 

The Defendant, Darick A. Hinerman, was convicted by a Robertson County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended).  The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, and (3) the trial court erred during jury instructions.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the post-conviction court’s refusal to vacate his guilty plea to second-degree murder after the vacating his guilty plea to attempted aggravated rape based on trial counsel’s failure to inform Petitioner that he would be subject to mandatory lifetime community supervision for the attempted aggravated rape conviction.  The State argues that the post-conviction court erred by vacating the attempted aggravated rape conviction.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for reinstatement of the original judgment of conviction and sentence previously imposed for attempted aggravated rape. 

Defendant, Corey Taylor, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years, suspended to supervised probation.  Following a hearing on a warrant alleging a violation of probation based on new arrests and failure to report, the trial court found defendant in violation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the probation violation warrant on speedy trial grounds.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Petitioner, Randy Oscar Blakeney, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery and received a sentence of life plus forty years in confinement. Subsequently, he filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Felipe Gonzalez-Martinez, appeals his Jefferson County Circuit Court Jury convictions of rape of a child, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement to the police, by admitting into evidence a video recording of the interview that produced his statement, by admitting into evidence handwritten notes exchanged by the defendant and the victim, and by imposing consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Aggrieved of his Madison County Circuit Court Jury convictions of simple possession of marijuana, possession with intent to deliver not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, the defendant, Larry Donnell Higgins, Jr., appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. Because the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s verdict. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. As noted by the majority, the decision to enter a mistrial rests within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Bell, 512 S.W.3d 167, 187 (Tenn. 2015); State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 279 (Tenn. 2002). “This court will not interfere with the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 126 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 187). A mistrial should only be declared if there is manifest necessity. State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tenn. 2003). Manifest necessity arises “when a trial cannot continue, or a miscarriage of justice would result if it did.” State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). “The purpose for declaring a mistrial is to correct damage done to the judicial process when some event has occurred which precludes an impartial verdict.” State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The party seeking a mistrial has the burden of establishing its necessity. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 137 (Tenn. 2008).

The defendant, Patti Elizabeth Smith, appeals the denial of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion to reduce the sentence imposed for her 2018 guilty-pleaded conviction of reckless endangerment. Because the defendant has served the entirety of her sentence and been released from custody, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Demario Quintez Driver, of rape and coercion of a witness, and the trial court sentenced him to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for rape and that the State’s closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this appeal from attorney disciplinary proceedings, the hearing panel found that the attorney’s testimony about his income in a juvenile court proceeding to reduce his child support obligation violated Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 8.4(c).  The hearing panel said that the attorney’s answers were carefully crafted to give the appearance of literal truth but were in fact dishonest in that they intentionally omitted relevant information fairly called for in the questions.  The hearing panel found that the presumptive sanction was disbarment, but it reduced the sanction to a one-year suspension in light of the attorney’s prior unblemished forty-year legal career.  The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the circuit court, which affirmed.  The attorney now appeals to this Court.  He maintains that, in context, his answers were truthful and responsive to the specific questions asked, and that there was no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  He also contends that the sanction imposed by the hearing panel is overly harsh and an abuse of discretion.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment upholding the hearing panel’s decision.

As the result of a guilty plea to rape and robbery entered over 18 years ago, Billy James Matthews, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years. See Billy James Matthews v. State, No. W2005-02939-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2843291 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2007). After the denial of habeas corpus relief, see Billy James Matthews v. Warden Glenn Turner, No. W2004-01547-CCA-R3- HC, 2005 WL 957112, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2005), and post-conviction relief, Billy James Matthews v. State, 2006 WL 2843291, at *1, Petitioner sought relief via the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because the interests of justice do not mandate waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association concerning the scope and applicability of restrictive covenants. Two restrictive covenants are at issue. One is a covenant contained in the neighborhood’s 1984 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions that limited usage of the homes to residential use as “a residence by a single family.” The other is a covenant contained in a 2018 Amendment that relaxed the 1984 residential use restriction by authorizing short-term rentals of no less than 30 consecutive days, subject to specific criteria. The plaintiff, who purchased a home in the development in 2015 and has been leasing it on a short-term vacation rental basis to third parties as a business venture, seeks a declaratory judgment that he may lease his home for rentals as short as two days. For its part, the homeowners’ association seeks to enforce the restrictive covenants in the 1984 Declaration as well as the 2018 Amendment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association on both issues. In doing so, the court held that restrictions in the 1984 Declaration prohibited non-residential renting. The court also held that Plaintiff’s current use of his property is subject to the 2018 Amendment, which authorized short-term leasing subject to stipulations including that “[t]the length of the lease must be for a minimum of 30 consecutive days.” The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The juvenile court terminated on grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for her children. The court also determined that termination was in her children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined the petition must be summarily dismissed due to numerous and substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B section 2.02, including the failure to file a copy of the motion for recusal, supporting documents filed in the trial court, and a copy of the trial court’s order denying recusal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Jacady Dwight Terry, was convicted by a jury of violating the motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”) law, for which he received a five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the MVHO order into evidence because it was void; (2) by concluding that the MVHO violation was a strict liability offense and declining to give a mens rea instruction; and (3) by refusing to apply the “lesser penalty” provision of the criminal savings statute to the Defendant’s sentence.1 Following our review, we affirm.