APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Matthew Melton Jackson, appeals the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court following his guilty plea to aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, theft of property over $500.00 and two counts of aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendants, Clarence Carnell Gaston, Miqwon Deon Leach, and Mario Deangalo Thomas, were convicted by an Obion County Circuit Court jury of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, second degree murder, and first degree felony murder. Finding aggravating circumstances (3) and (7) applicable to both Leach and Thomas, and aggravating circumstances (2), (3), and (7) applicable to Gaston, the jury sentenced each defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder convictions. The trial court merged the second degree murder convictions into the convictions for felony murder and sentenced the defendants to eight years for the conspiracy convictions, to be served concurrently to their life sentences without possibility of parole. All three defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Leach and Thomas each raise issues regarding the appropriateness of their life sentences without parole, and Thomas raises two additional issues of whether his trial should have been severed, and whether the verdicts of first degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder are impermissibly inconsistent. After a thorough review of the record and of applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed. However, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form for Gaston's conspiracy conviction to reflect that he was found guilty by a jury.

The mother of a fourteen year old male child appeals the action of the trial judge in denying her Petition for a change of custody. The trial court found that no material change of circumstances had been established by the evidence that would justify change of custody. We affirm the action of the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard Lynn Norton, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a trial court's entry of an order of correction filed after the entry of the final judgment satisfied the requirements for the defendant to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that neither the order nor the final judgment met the requirements for appealing a certified question of law set forth in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and dismissed the appeal. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's order of correction under Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure was entered while the trial court had jurisdiction before the filing of a notice of appeal and therefore complied with the prerequisites for raising a certified question of law on appeal under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for the Court of Criminal Appeals to address the merits of the appeal.

This appeal involves several issues regarding the disposition of certain assets of and relating to the estate of Adam James Burress ("Decedent"), who died intestate in a one-car accident on March 5, 2001. The Trial Court imposed an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds of an automobile collision policy in favor of Eva Burress, the Decedent's grandmother, in the amount which the Court found she loaned to Decedent in order to purchase the automobile, which was totally destroyed in the accident. The Appellant, Sue Michelle Burress ("Widow"), Decedent's wife, argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred in failing to award her the insurance proceeds, and in ruling that payment of the funeral expenses should take precedence over the spousal support allowances and all other claims. The Appellees, Roy and Eva Burress, Decedent's grandparents, and Jeff and Linda Burress, Decedent's parents, have appealed the Court's ruling that the mobile home in which Decedent and Widow lived prior to their separation was not permanently affixed to the grandparents' land and thus was the Widow's personal property. We modify the judgment so as to provide that the Widow's statutory year's support allowance is exempt from claim against the estate for reimbursement of funeral expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all other respects.

This second appeal in this dispute involves the trial court's modifications of a special master's report regarding the liabilities of the parties after the dissolution of their partnership. The special master reported that one partner, Mr. Eslinger, owed the other partner, Mr. Parks, $10,051.30. Mr. Parks objected, and the trial court modified the special master's report, awarding Mr. Parks an additional $45,427.04, and ordered that Mr. Eslinger pay the costs of the special master. Mr. Eslinger now appeals the trial court's modifications and award of costs. Because the record does not support the trial court's modifications, we reverse and reinstate the master's findings as amended. We modify the award of the costs of the special master.

The defendant, Jessie Jones, appeals as of right his conviction by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends (1) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense and (2) that attempted second degree murder is not an offense in Tennessee. Although we hold that attempted second degree murder is an offense, we reverse the conviction because the failure to instruct on self-defense is plain error. We remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

The petitioner, Crystal Rena Sturgill, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court's denying her post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of Class D felony theft. Essentially, she contends (1) that her guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, (2) that due process was violated by the mass sentencing procedure, and (3) that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, state employees, were subjects of a Reduction In Force ("RIF") and appeal the order of the chancery court dismissing their petition for review of the Commissioner of Personnel's decision that their respective positions were correctly resolved in the RIF.

The plaintiff filed this action in the Chancery Court of Houston County seeking to quiet title to a parcel of property located there. The court granted the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, and imposed sanctions pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. Although the appellant raises legitimate issues as to the grounds cited for dismissing the complaint, we nevertheless affirm, finding that the complaint conclusively shows that the plaintiff has no colorable title to the subject property.

This appeal involves a conflict between neighbors over whether the Stinsons have a right to use a dirt lane that runs across the edge of Mrs. Bobo's property and connects the Stinsons' property to a county road. The trial court found a prescriptive easement was proved. Mrs. Bobo appeals that judgment to this court on two grounds: (1) that the Stinsons failed to show exclusive use of the easement during the prescriptive period; and (2) that there was no acquiescence to the Stinsons' claim of right to use the easement by the prior owners of what is now Mrs. Bobo's property during the prescriptive period. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Department of Children’s Services filed petition to terminate parental rights of mother of abused, dependent and neglected minor child. Department’s termination petition was based on allegations of abandonment, mother’s failure to substantially comply with a permanency plan, the removal of the child for at least six months with little likelihood that the conditions causing removal would be remedied, and the best interests of the child. Juvenile Court granted petition terminating mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed and Remanded
 

The Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and  theft of property valued over $500. The Defendant pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated rape and to aggravated robbery.  Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years for facilitation of aggravated rape and to eleven years for aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court ordered that the two sentences run concurrently. However, the trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively to prior sentences in Humphreys and Dickson Counties. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Frankie Donald Releford, appeals his effective eight-year sentence of incarceration. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to confinement following his guilty pleas to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, a Class B felony; possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; possession of dihydrocodeinone, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant contests the manner of service of his sentences, contending that the trial court erroneously denied him probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

After the defendant, Jeremy Rodriques McPhearson, pled guilty to several unrelated offenses, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of eleven years to be served on supervised probation. When the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and trespass, the state filed a probation violation warrant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mortgage Management Inc. (“Mortgage Management”) sued Eller Media Company (“Eller”) claiming ownership of two billboards located on land purchased by Mortgage Management. Mortgage Management filed a motion for partial summary judgment and submitted proof showing it had purchased the land upon which the billboards were located at a foreclosure sale in 1993. Eller responded to the motion for partial summary judgment by claiming it was the owner of the billboards and submitting proof in support of its position. The Trial Court granted Mortgage Management’s motion for partial summary judgment and, after a trial on damages, awarded Mortgage Management a judgment in the amount of $149,721.14. We hold there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to who owns the billboards. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Case Remanded
 

The defendant, Byron Looper, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He timely appealed, presenting as issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of witnesses who would have testified as to his location following the homicide, violating his right to due process; (2) the trial court erred in keeping under seal the psychological records of one of the State's witnesses; and (3) the evidence did not support application of the aggravating factor that the homicide was committed because the victim was a state official. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole.