APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant pled guilty to four charges arising out of events in Carter County and thirteen charges arising out of events in Washington County. Other than a forgery charge in Carter County, the charges all stemmed from criminal acts occurring on March 12, 1999, when the defendant and a friend broke into two vehicles parked at a local night spot in Johnson City, stealing various pieces of sound equipment. When confronted by two security guards, the defendant knifed one guard and ran into the other with his car. A high-speed chase involving the defendant and officers of the Johnson City Police Department ensued. The chase, crisscrossing between Washington and Carter Counties, ended with the apprehension of the defendant, who was subsequently charged with, and pled guilty to: DUI; driving with a suspended license; aggravated assault of the two security guards; felony evading arrest (two counts); automobile burglary (two counts); theft under $500 (two counts); aggravated assault of two Johnson City police officers; and assault of another officer. According to a plea agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court denied probation and any community-based alternative to incarceration and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court appropriately sentenced him as to the manner of service of his sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals from his conviction for vehicular homicide, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 12, 1998, the petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to one count of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to twenty-five years incarceration in the Department for the conspiracy conviction. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his convictions were based upon unlawful guilty pleas, that his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that his plea counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and an amended petition was filed contending that the petitioner was misinformed about his release eligibility date. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.

In this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal, the defendant, an incumbent district attorney general, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss a presentment returned against him by the grand jury. He asserts that the General Assembly, in Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-112, vested the sole or exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute an incumbent district attorney general in the Attorney General and Reporter's office. After review, we disagree with the defendant and affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of conspiracy to commit theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of two years on each conviction, suspended, with the defendant placed on four years of probation, and ordered to pay $10,000 restitution at $225 per month for the duration of her probationary period. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for judicial diversion. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant now contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough examination of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over the workmanship of residential renovations. The interior designer hired by the owner to undertake the renovations withheld final payment to the contractor who performed the work because the owner was dissatisfied with the renovations. After the contractor obtained a judgment against the interior designer in the Williamson County General Sessions Court, the interior designer perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court for Williamson County and filed a counterclaim against the contractor. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the interior designer’s claims against the contractor and entered a judgment against the interior designer for the remaining balance of the construction contract. The interior designer has appealed. While the trial court erroneously concluded that the Contractor’s Licensing Act of 1976 prevented the interior designer from pursuing its claims against the contractor, we have concluded that the trial court reached the proper result. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a weapon with an agreed sentence of two consecutive two-year terms. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing.

The petitioner, Marvin Matthews, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition is barred by the statute of limitations, among other reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) he was denied the right to testify at trial and at sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court dismissed Charles Griffin's petition for post-conviction relief. Asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, he appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Thomas J. Faulkner, Jr. stands convicted of four counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of theft over $1,000. He received his sentence at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Grainger County Circuit Court and is presently serving an effective 73-year sentence for these crimes. In this direct appeal, he raises numerous issues related to admission of evidence, release of a juror, sufficiency of the evidence, severance, jury instructions and sentencing. Upon review, we are unpersuaded of error and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jerry L. Cox appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of motions in which he raised various claims related to sentence calculation and sentence validity. In part, Cox seeks the benefit of various sentence credits for the sentence he is presently serving in the Department of Correction. He also alleges that one of his sentences is void or has expired. Because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of Cox's motions challenging his sentences, we dismiss the appeal.

I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with the view indicated in section VII of the majority opinion that the law is split regarding the need for supplemental post-trial instructions to be submitted in writing pursuant to Rule 30(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. I believe that the Rule and binding precedent require such to be in writing.

Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of the offense of felony murder and received a life sentence. He raises the following two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; and (2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing certain expert testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marvin D. Brown, a/k/a/ Melvin Leroy Taylor, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of theft of property, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to twelve years and ordered that it be served consecutive to a previously imposed sentence, for which parole had been revoked. In this appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him for theft but, rather, the proof supported a conviction of joyriding, a Class A misdemeanor. Based upon applicable law and a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brian Russell Webb, was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving, violation of the implied consent law, speeding, evading arrest, theft of property valued at more than $10,000 and vandalism. He pled guilty to the DUI, and upon motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the charges for reckless driving and violation of the implied consent law. The Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion for the remaining charges, which the prosecutor subsequently denied. The Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the prosecutor's denial of his application for diversion. After a hearing, the trial court found that the State had abused its discretion and ordered the Defendant placed on pretrial diversion. In this appeal, pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9, the State contends the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.