APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this personal injury negligence action, the defendant died while the litigation was pending.  The plaintiff failed to file a motion for substitution of party within ninety days of the original defendant’s death being suggested on the record.  Over a month later, the plaintiff moved the trial court to enlarge the time to substitute the parties pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02(2).  The trial court denied the motion for an enlargement of time.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The Domestic Relations Court for Meigs County dismissed a petition for order of protection, and the petitioner appealed to the Chancery Court for Meigs County (the “trial court”). The trial court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the appeal. Because the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse.

The defendant, Mario Ramirez Rodriguez, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2007 guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of rape of a child.  Discerning no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court but remand the case for the entry of a corrected judgment form for Count 2 that reflects the pretrial jail credits awarded to the defendant.

Aristotle once explained that “it is possible to fail in many ways . . . while to succeed is possible only in one way[.]”[1] With some notable exceptions, in order for an issue to be proper on appeal, success depends on the following requirements: (1) that an issue be properly raised in the trial court; and (2) that the issue be properly raised on appeal. Of the three arguments Appellants presented in this appeal, none meets both of the above requirements, though they all fail in different respects. As a result, we affirm the decision of the trial court and award Appellee attorney’s fees for defending against a frivolous appeal.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Benjamin Barton, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.08 percent (“DUI per se”), and reckless driving. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in confinement. The Defendant moved for a new trial and for the trial court to reconsider his sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and the motions were denied. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdicts, that he is entitled to a mistrial due to a discovery violation regarding expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation, that the trial court abused its discretion in failing suspend his sentence due to his health, and that there are errors on the judgment forms. We conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on his convictions but that the sentencing forms are in conflict with the trial court’s oral judgments, and we remand for the trial court to correct the forms.

Defendant, Estevenico Chandler, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated criminal trespass and theft of property and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twentynine days on unsupervised probation. Following a hearing on a violation of probation warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the two consecutive sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Louis Bernard Williams, III, was convicted of felony evidence tampering, a Class C felony, and three respective counts of simple possession of marijuana, cocaine, and hydrocodone, Class A misdemeanors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-408, -17-415, -17-418. On appeal, the pro se Defendant contends that (1) his residence was improperly searched because the search warrant listed the incorrect address; (2) the evidence obtained in that search should be retroactively suppressed because the Defendant was not convicted of the offense alleged in the search warrant; (3) the evidence should have been suppressed because the confidential informant referenced in the search warrant affidavit was not identified and did not testify at trial; and (4) the trial court should have recused itself due to showing bias against the Defendant by denying his motion to suppress and the court’s imposition of an incorrect release eligibility in two previous cases. We affirm.

This appeal involves a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01(3) summons issue. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss after finding that plaintiff intentionally delayed the issuance of the summons for the complaint in contradiction to Rule 4.01(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Delvon J. White, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence of incarceration in two cases, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not either reinstating his probation or ordering a sentence of split confinement followed by modified conditions of probation to address his mental health and substance abuse. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in Judge McMullen’s opinion and only write separately to respectfully address Judge Holloway’s view expressed in his dissenting opinion that the trial court need not establish installment terms for the payment of restitution for the judgment to be complete and final.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his young son.  The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Johnny Summers Cavin, entered guilty pleas to burglary and theft of property valued more than $2,500 but less than $10,000. He also entered guilty pleas to unrelated charges from a separate case. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of two years and six months each on supervised probation, to be served consecutively to the sentences he received in an unrelated probation violation case. In a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered him to pay a total of $5,500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose restitution and that, alternatively, the trial court erred in setting the restitution amount at $5,500, asserting that the victim’s pecuniary loss was not substantiated by evidence and that the amount is unreasonable based on the Defendant’s income. Upon review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of the instant case, and the appeal is dismissed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of this case.

The Defendant, Destiny Hall, was convicted at trial of evading arrest through the use of a motor vehicle, and she received a
one-year sentence, suspended to probation supervised by community corrections after service of thirty days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Deon Smith, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, auto burglary, and theft, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of multiple statutory grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s modification of child support.  Father filed a petition to modify custody.  The trial court modified the parties’ parenting schedule but reserved its determination of child support for future adjudication.  Subsequently, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order requesting that the parties submit their own competing proposed orders concerning child support.  Ultimately, the trial court issued its final order setting child support based solely on the documents attached to Father’s proposed order.  Because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from which to make a ruling.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for it to conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the parties to put on their proof as to child support.

The Defendant, Meredith Muse Thompson, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to making a false police report, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-502 (2018).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years’ probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case stems from the sale of a 2000 Mercury Sable (“the vehicle”) purchased by Amy Jennings from John M. Lance Ford, LLC, an affiliate of AutoNation, Inc. (“AutoNation” or “Defendant”), in 2017. Ms. Jennings signed all of the paperwork associated with the sale, including an arbitration agreement. In September of 2018, Ms. Jennings and her husband, Dorian Jones, filed suit against AutoNation in the Chancery Court for Washington County (the “trial court”) alleging multiple causes of action arising from the sale of the vehicle. Generally, Ms. Jennings and Mr. Jones alleged that AutoNation breached several warranties and fraudulently induced Ms. Jennings into the sale. Eventually, AutoNation filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court granted on August 10, 2020. Mr. Jones filed an appeal to this Court. Because an appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration and staying litigation is nonfinal, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Donte R. Swainer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2018 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly determined that the petition was time-barred.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Harry Pearson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises from an action before the Tennessee Claims Commission for personal injuries filed on behalf of a minor child who broke her arm when she fell from playground equipment at Tims Ford State Park. The complaint asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and gross negligence per se. It alleged that the State was negligent by failing to adequately maintain its property, and by failing to discover, rectify, and/or warn against a dangerous condition, and allowing park visitors “to use the playground which did not have a safe surface area.” The State denied liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C), insisting it had no notice of any dangerous condition; it also raised the “Recreational Use Statute,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 to -105, as an affirmative defense. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the claims commissioner granted. The commissioner found the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. The commissioner found that Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 70-7-102 of the Recreational Use Statute provided immunity to the State as a landowner against premises-liability claims and that the gross negligence exception under the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(a)(1), did not apply. The commissioner also held that the claimants failed to show that notice of the alleged dangerous condition had been provided to the State, which is an essential element of the Claims Commission Act. The plaintiffs appeal one issue, asserting a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the State’s failure to maintain the playground was gross negligence. We affirm the Commissioner’s decision on both grounds.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant Laronda Turner’s convictions and that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by co-defendant Demarco Hawkins. Because the record shows that Hawkins’ accomplice testimony implicating Defendant Turner was not sufficiently corroborated, I believe that Defendant Turner’s three convictions for first degree premeditated murder should be reversed and that these charges should be dismissed. In addition, because the record demonstrates that the State violated Brady in failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by Hawkins during several proffer sessions with the prosecution prior to trial, I am of the opinion that the trial court erred in denying a new trial to both Defendant Turner and Defendant Thomas on this basis. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the trial court, dismiss the charges against Defendant Turner, and remand the case for a new trial for Defendant Thomas.

The Defendant, William Jesse Clouse, pleaded guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court to three counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-106 (2018) (subsequently amended).  The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for split confinement.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.