APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Marc Baechtle, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the aggravated sexual battery and rape convictions due to statute of limitations and ultimately imposed a 25-year sentence for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that trial counsel advised him not to testify and failed to impeach a witness. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Matthew Sealey, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition as the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, William Scott Hunley, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Maurico Grandberry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

After counsel announced that the parties had settled their differences, the trial court entered a consent judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. One year later, one of the litigants moved to set aside the judgment arguing lack of consent and fraud. The moving party claimed that it never approved the settlement or consented to entry of the dismissal order. The trial court denied the motion. Because the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Khamphonh Xayyasith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-111 (2018) (domestic assault). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions and imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for aggravated assault and eleven months, twenty-nine days for domestic assault. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting a recorded jail telephone call, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A property owner filed suit against the owners of a neighboring property, alleging that the neighbors had created a nuisance and trespassed by diverting surface water onto his property and causing a sinkhole to develop. After a trial on the matter, a jury returned a verdict finding that the neighbor had not created a nuisance and had not trespassed. The trial court judge confirmed the jury’s verdict and dismissed all claims against the neighbor with prejudice. Because the record contains material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, we affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ permanent parenting plan to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

The defendant, Reginald Bond, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Dennis Allen Rayfield, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that the trial court committed errors which deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Emmanuel Wallace, Defendant, and co-defendant Joshua Aretz were indicted for their roles in the shooting death of Savon Easterling in Clarksville in August of 2015.  Defendant was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery.  Defendant elected to proceed to trial.  After the presentation of the proof, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the offense of aggravated robbery.  The trial court submitted the lesser-included offenses of attempted aggravated robbery, attempted robbery, and attempted theft of property for the jury’s consideration.  After deliberating, the jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder and felony murder but not guilty of attempted aggravated robbery and all lesser included offenses.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective life sentence after merging the convictions.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed to this Court.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent because he was found guilty of felony murder and not guilty of the underlying felony.  He also argues that the trial court improperly responded to a jury question in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c).  After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief.  Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Johnny Lee Jenkins, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. One of the counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was dismissed after the Petitioner filed a motion for new trial, and this court reversed and vacated the voluntary manslaughter conviction on direct appeal and remanded the case for entry of corrected judgments to reflect a conviction for reckless homicide. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically contending that trial counsel failed to argue the inclusion of lesser-included offenses. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Courtney Perry, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion.

Former firefighter who alleged miscalculation of his Line of Duty disability benefits brought an action for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the City of Memphis. In this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) we affirm the trial court.

This is an appeal by a pro se appellant. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

An issue regarding attorney’s fees remains pending.  As such, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this divorce case, a husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend, arguing that the court should not have granted the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences or approved the parties’ marital dissolution agreement when the husband purportedly withdrew his consent to the divorce, lacked the capacity to enter into a marital dissolution agreement, and was under duress at the time he executed it. He also argues that his due process rights were infringed. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also award the wife her attorney’s fees for this appeal and remand to the trial court for a calculation of those fees.

Aggrieved of his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, the defendant, Zacarias Salas-Rufino, appeals, challenging the admission of certain telephone calls and the testimony of the medical examiner on the issue of “excited delirium.” Discerning no error, we affirm.

In the underlying declaratory judgment action, an insurance company sought a judgment that an automobile insurance policy issued to a mechanic does not provide coverage for an accident involving the mechanic. After examining the mechanic under oath, the insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy contained a business purpose exclusion for accidents occurring while road testing a vehicle, which the mechanic stated he was doing at the time the accident occurred. The mechanic responded with an affidavit asserting that he was driving the vehicle for personal errands. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the mechanic’s purpose for driving the vehicle. At trial, the mechanic testified that he was running personal errands at the time of the accident but offered no explanation for his contradictory sworn statements. Following the close of proof, the insurance company renewed its argument regarding the policy’s exclusion and moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the matter to a jury, which found that the exclusion did not preclude coverage of the accident.

The pro se Petitioner, Michael Bailey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in seven cases that resulted in his convictions for eight counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault and an effective sentence of two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Wilson County Grand Jury charged Defendant, Clarence Willis Moore, Jr., with four counts of selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care agency in violation of the Drug-Free School Zone Act.  Following trial, a jury convicted Defendant in counts one and three of sale of “Schedule II, cocaine, within 1,000 feet of a school zone.”[1]  The jury found Defendant not guilty in counts two and four.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant’s Class B felony convictions were not subject to a one classification increase under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(b)(1) because the offenses occurred within the prohibited zone of a childcare center.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(3) (2016).  The court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to twenty-five years in Count 1 and twenty-two years in Count 3, ran the sentences consecutively, and imposed a fine of $2,000 on each count.  Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(c), the court ordered Defendant to serve the minimum twenty-year sentence on each count.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the offenses occurred within 1,000 feet of a childcare center or a child care agency.  Because the evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of section 39-17-432(b), the court erred in ordering Defendant to serve the minimum sentences for the two Class B felonies.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction and the total effective sentence of forty-seven years with a release eligibility of forty-five percent but modify the sentence to exclude the harsher penalty requiring service of the twenty-year minimum sentence on each count.  We remand for entry of new judgments of conviction for Counts 1 and 3 consistent with this opinion.

This case concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights to his son. The trial court predicated termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and found termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings and affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. 

This is the third appeal in a dispute among a general contractor, a subcontractor, and an equipment supplier. Each party blamed the others for delays in a construction project. After the first appeal was dismissed for lack of a final judgment, the trial court held each party partially responsible for the delays and partially responsible for liquidated damages assessed by the owner. In the second appeal, this court modified the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the subcontractor sought to recover from the general contractor discretionary costs of $10,962.42, attorneys’ fees of $220,724.53 under the Prompt Pay Act of 1991, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-34-101 to -704, and “[a]dditional charges.” The trial court awarded some of the requested fees but excluded $100,350 of attorneys’ fees attributed to legal services rendered during the first and second appeal because the subcontractor’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees was untimely, i.e., the relief had not been requested in the pleadings in the prior appeals. The trial court also denied $29,685 in fees incurred in the trial court proceedings for legal services that were “unrelated to [the general contractor].” The trial court also found the subcontractor was not entitled to recover the “[a]dditional charges” because the remand from the Court of Appeals did not authorize such expenses. This appeal followed. The principal issues in this appeal concern the subcontractor’s claims for attorneys’ fees and additional expenses and whether the general contractor’s surety is secondarily liable for one of the judgments. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

After being denied parole, Fred Auston Wortman, III (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against the State of Tennessee (the “State”), the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”), several board members and other state employees, and two assistant district attorneys in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the “trial court”). Several defendants moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed to this Court. Because the trial court’s order is not final, however, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed.