APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Gary June Caughron, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial. He was convicted in 1990 for the first degree murder of Ann Robertson Jones and received the death penalty. He was also convicted of first degree burglary and assault with the intent to commit rape for which he received consecutive ten-year sentences. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993).

The trial court granted the motion of defendant First National Bank of Boston (“First National”) for summary judgment, which the plaintiff (“Lipman”] appeals, insisting that there are genuine issues of material fact.

I concur with the court’s opinion. Insurance companies have the right to assume that the risk they undertake will not later be enlarged by the courts. See Schultz v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 465, 474, 404 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1966). Accordingly, the courts are not at liberty to rewrite policies of insurance to provide coverage where no coverage was intended. See Spears v. Commercial Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 544, 548(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Dr. Johnson did not contract for prior acts coverage when he purchased his UPI insurance policy. Accordingly, UPI never provided coverage for claims such as Blendora Ann Echols.

We have reviewed the Petition to Rehear filed on behalf of the Attorney General and conclude that the Petition should be denied for the following reasons.

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief from convictions based upon guilty pleas. The Defendant entered guilty pleas, with sentencing left to the discretion of the trial judge, to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and four counts of armed robbery. At the sentencing hearing conducted on April 3, 1989, he received a total effective sentence of 150 years. This Court affirmed his sentences on direct appeal.1 The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in December of 1991; and following appointment of counsel, he filed a supplemental petition in June of 1997. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the petition in July of 1997. The Defendant now appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm, but we grant D efendant relie f in the form of a delayed appeal.

The child of these parties, who were never married to each other, was born March 11, 1996. The paternity issue was determined in June, 1996 by the Juvenile Court, which also directed the payment of child support. The appellant questioned his liability for support because the child was conceived without his consent. He did not prevail.

These parties were divorced in Arkansas on April 17, 1996. A Property Settlement Agreement was incorporated in the judgment which awarded custody of two children to Mother.

Robert Lee Dickinson, Jr., appeals the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee at Chattanooga, insisting that the Juvenile Court erred in its determination of Mr. Dickinson’s Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from child support payments based upon evidence that he is not the father of the child he has been supporting. The Juvenile Court ruled that Mr. Dickinson’s motion was barred by res judicata; therefore, Mr. Dickinson is still obligated to pay current and past due child support payments.

Following the denial of his mo tion to suppress evidence, the Defendant, Timmy Beavers, entered a best-interest plea to second degree murder, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence. An agreed upon sentence of thirty (30) years was entered by the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice case brought by an inmate at a state correctional facility. The
plaintiff brought the lawsuit against various prison officials and the prison doctor alleging federal
constitutional violations as well as medical malpractice. The trial court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and remand for further
discovery. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the remainder of the claims.

Defendant Todd Frederick Brooks (Father) appeals, and Plaintiff Linda Faye Carter (Mother) cross-appeals, the final divorce decree entered by the trial court which awarded the parties joint custody of their three minor children, designated the Father as the primary custodial parent, ordered the Father to pay child support to the Mother, and distributed the parties’ property. We affirm the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, with one modification, but we reverse the court’s custody decision and we remand for the court to recalculate the Father’s child support obligation pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines.
 

The defendant, William Henry Barney, was convicted of eleven counts of rape of a child and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving a total effective sentence of eighty years. Upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’s affirmance of these judgments, the defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We granted the application in order to determine whether the language of the indictment was  sufficient under State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), and to determine whether the multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy. We conclude that the indictment is sufficient under Hill. In addition, we conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery are justified and do not violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy.

This case concerns a dispute over the division of marital property, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Donald F. McCormick (Husband), appeals from the Final Decree of Divorce that, inter alia, awarded Appellee, Margaret Ann McCormick (Wife), proceeds from a 1 Husband’s W-2 form from the Frigidaire Company reveals that his wages for 1996 were $94,063.26. 2 In 1996, Wife’s gross annual earnings were approximately $9,000.00. 2 401K account, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney’s fees.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant Edmund George Zagorski has filed a petition to rehear this cause
pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39 contending that our opinion conflicts with and/or
overlooks principles of law regarding trial counsel’s duties to investigate mitigation
evidence and fully advise a defendant regarding a potential mitigation defense. We
have reviewed all of the arguments raised in the petition, and we find them to be
without merit.

We granted this appeal to address whether a trial court can consider prior grants of diversion or previously expunged offenses in determining a defendant's suitability for diversion. In the case now before us, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion because the defendant had previously been placed on diversion on two different occasions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's application for judicial diversion. Upon review, we hold that evidence of prior diversions may be considered in determining whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for diversion.

The Tennessee Civil Service Commission upheld the termination of a veteran supervisory employee for sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming a state employee, and failure to maintain a satisfactory and harmonious working relationship with fellow employees. The Chancery Court of Davidson County affirmed the Commission’s order. On appeal the employee asserts that he was denied progressive discipline prior to termination, and that he was denied due process of law. On the strength of the proof, he also claims that his conduct does not fit the definition of “conduct unbecoming” or support a conclusion that he failed to maintain a harmonious working relationship, and that his conduct was constitutionally protected. We affirm the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the probate rule of ademption by extinction applies to the specific bequest of a house, where the house is sold at foreclosure before the testator’s death and sales proceeds representing the testator’s interest are identifiable after his death.

The appellee, Robby McCurry, filed a second motion to rehear on December 28, 1998, petitioning this Court to reconsider our decision in the above styled case. The appellee filed this petition without first seeking permission from this Court as prescribed in Rule 39(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not well taken.

This appeal involves the fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the Tennessee Board of Paroles to revoke the parole of a person accused of committing child sexual abuse. The Board revoked the parole based solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements made by his alleged victim. The parolee filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision-making process. After the trial court denied the petition, the parolee appealed to this court. We have determined that the Board’s hearing officer acted arbitrarily and illegally by applying an incorrect standard to determine whether good cause existed for not allowing the parolee to confront or to cross-examine his only accuser.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the parolee’s petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the Board either to conduct a proper parole revocation hearing forthwith or to return the parolee to parole status.

This is a post-divorce action to modify child support and alimony. The mother sought to increase child support, and the father sought to terminate periodic alimony payments. The trial court granted the mother’s request for an increase in child support, with a portion of the child support to be placed in an educational trust, and denied the father’s petition for modification of alimony. Both parties appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify.

In this capital case, the defendant, Preston Carter, pled guilty and was  convicted on two counts of felony murder. A jury sentenced him to death on both counts, finding that the murders of Thomas and Tensia Jackson were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5).  The jury imposed sentences of death based upon the presence of this sole aggravating circumstance.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Petitioners-Appellants, Robert 1 Sandra Lynn Todd Bryant, wife of Respondent and mother of the minor children involved, joined the Petitioners in the petition to terminate the Respondent’s parental rights. In the petition, she consents to the termination of her parental rights. 2 Respondent’s wife subsequently left the couple’s home in Colorado to pursue job training in Florida. Upon completion of the two month job training course in Florida, she moved to Utah while Respondent continued his military career in Colorado. 2 Leland Bryant and Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant,1 appeal the trial court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Appellee, James Ashley Bryant, with respect to his minor children, Megan Rae Bryant, born December 13, 1991, and Devon Michael Bryant, born December 30, 1993.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a conclusory allegation in an affidavit that information was provided by a “concerned citizen source” is sufficient to establish the presumptive reliability of the information for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.1 There is a distinction in Tennessee law between “citizen informants” and “criminal informants” or those from the criminal milieu. Information provided by an unnamed ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need not establish that the source is credible or that the information is reliable. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983). On the other hand, where information is provided by an anonymous criminal informant, the affidavit must establish (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) the reliability of the informant or the information. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989).
 

In this case Appellant challenges the action of the trial court in denying his application for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, holding him to be in criminal contempt of court and denying his application for modification of alimony.