APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint.

This is a wrongful death action. On April 28, 1998, Cynthia Low Armes ("Sister"), the sister of the late Terry Allen Lowe ("decedent"), instituted this action against Granville Simpson ("Granville") and his wife, Judy Simpson ("Judy"), (collectively, "the Simpsons"), alleging that the Simpsons were negligent in allowing three men, including Granville, to go armed on the Simpson's premises on December 10, 1995, and that their negligence directly contributed to the shooting death of the decedent. The trial court granted the Simpsons summary judgment on the ground that the complain was not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Sister appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration: Did the trial court err in holding that Sister was aware of the injury and the cause of action on December 10, 1995, and therefore her action was barred by the statute of limitations?

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to enforce a plea bargain agreement. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in theCircuit Court for Davidson County after the Department of Correction refused to release him in accordance with his understanding of the agreement. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief pursuant to a common-law writ of certiorari can be granted.1

This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiff, David John Erdly, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing his suit for divorce, dividing the marital estate, awarding plaintiff child custody and support and awarding the defendant, Janene Marie Erdly, alimony for the remainder of her life.

This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent.

Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first
degree premeditated murder, for which he received concurrent life sentences. Defendant
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of one of the deceased
victims. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support.

The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain
portions of the opinion. Contrary to the assertions of the petition the opinion does not require the giving of a special “proximate cause” instruction in every homicide case. The opinion requires the giving of a general causation instruction whenever the homicide offense does not itself explicitly or implicitly include a causation instruction. As the State recognizes, some of the homicide offenses include elements that implicitly instruct the jury that a causation finding is necessary. Also without merit is the State’s assertion that the suggested pattern jury instruction set out in footnote 16 conflicts with existing law and relieves the State of its burden of proof. The State’s petition confuses criminal negligence and causation. Both elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, we emphasize that the language in footnote 16 is merely a suggestion which may be accepted, revised, or rejected by the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee. Accordingly, the State’s petition to rehear is DENIED. Costs of this petition are taxed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
 

The petitioner, an attorney identified as John Doe, filed a petition for contempt alleging violations by the respondent, an attorney identified as Jane Doe, of the confidentiality requirement of Rule 9, section 25 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court directed the parties to address as a threshold matter the constitutionality of Rule 9, section 25. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Attorney General and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we hold that section 25 of Rule 9 violates free speech protections of Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We further conclude that sanctions for criminal contempt are not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the petition for contempt is denied.