APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I join in the majority’s insightful analysis of Tennessee’s constitutional standing doctrine building upon the principles articulated in Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 286–92 (Tenn. 2024). I quite agree with the majority that the claims we decide today are “quintessential” public rights cases and the three-part test of City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013), applies to the standing issues in both cases. I agree that Ms. Hunt does not meet this test and has no constitutional standing to pursue her claims. I also agree that Mr. Wygant’s challenge to the House map does not present a nonjusticiable political question and that he has no standing to challenge the entire House map.

Defendant, Jonathan Hall, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of a related domestic violence charge and an effective eight-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of confinement, four years for the aggravated assault charge to be served at 100% and eight years for the possession of a firearm charge to be served at 85%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with most of the majority’s excellent opinion, including its conclusions concerning Mr. Wygant’s claim. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion on Ms. Hunt’s standing.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Pejhman Ehsani,
for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed
a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the criminal court’s order denying
his motion to dismiss the charges against him in this case. Upon full consideration, the
application is denied for the reasons stated below.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted Defendant, Justin David Whaley, of
vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless driving, driving under the influence of an
intoxicant (“DUI”), reckless vehicular homicide, and multiple driving-related
misdemeanor offenses, and the trial court merged the convictions into one conviction for
vehicular homicide by intoxication and sentenced Defendant to nine years’ incarceration.
Defendant appealed, and while his direct appeal was pending, he filed a petition for writ of
error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted coram nobis relief in part, vacating Defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide
by intoxication and DUI but denying relief as to Defendant’s remaining convictions. Both
Defendant and the State appealed the trial court’s coram nobis order, and this court
consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal with both parties’ appeals of the trial court’s coram
nobis order. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for his
convictions for vehicular homicide and DUI; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained by a search warrant for a blood draw; (3) the admission of the results of
the analysis of his blood sample and the retrograde extrapolation as unreliable; (4) the
admission of testimony of a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) employee
as improper lay opinion; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to visit the scene;
and (6) the jury instructions on mistake of fact and reckless vehicular homicide. Defendant
also contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants relief and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant coram nobis relief for all his convictions. In its crossappeal,
the State asserts that the trial court erred by granting partial coram nobis relief.
Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting coram nobis relief for Defendant’s
convictions of vehicular homicide by intoxication and DUI, and we reinstate those
convictions. Because the trial court only imposed sentences for the vehicular homicide by
intoxication conviction, we remand for a sentencing hearing for the remaining convictions and the entry of corrected judgments reflecting separate sentences for each conviction. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2022, the Petitioner, Keshon Ford, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of ten years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The habeas court entered an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred when it denied his request for appointment of counsel and when it summarily dismissed his petition. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by a mother, individually and on behalf of her daughter, against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the State of Tennessee after her daughter sustained paralyzing injuries while attending a public school. After a four-day bench trial, the trial court found that both defendants were negligent and that each was fifty percent at fault for the child’s injuries. The trial court found that the plaintiffs should be awarded total compensatory damages of $10,902,348.02, but it reduced the judgment to $600,000 ($300,000 against each defendant) in accordance with the applicable statutory caps. Metro has appealed, while the State has not. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, a party may seek dismissal of a lawsuit that was filed “in response to that party’s exercise of the right to free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105(a) (2021). In this appeal, we consider whether lawyers sued by their former client for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment may seek dismissal of the lawsuit on the theory that it was filed in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition—namely, the filing of a lawsuit on behalf of their client. We hold they may not. Assuming that filing a lawsuit is an “exercise of the right to petition” within the meaning of the statute, a lawyer who files a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise that right. Instead, the lawyer at most facilitates his client’s exercise of the right. Because the lawyers here cannot show that their former client filed the malpractice and fraudulent concealment action in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition, the action should not be dismissed under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, a party may seek dismissal of a lawsuit that was filed “in response to that party’s exercise of the right to free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105(a) (2021). In this case, two lawyers sought to dismiss a tort action brought by the sister and brother-in-law of a former client. The lawyers had represented the former client in a series of unsuccessful lawsuits against the sister and brother-in-law related to their administration of a family trust. Dissatisfied with their representation, the former client sued the lawyers for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment. Based on that alleged conduct, the sister and brother-in-law also sued the lawyers under the tort-of-another doctrine. The lawyers sought to dismiss the tort action on the theory that it was filed in response to the lawyers’ exercise of the right to petition in the underlying trust litigation. We hold that the lawyers failed to show that the tort action was filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition. Assuming that filing a lawsuit is an “exercise of the right to petition” within the meaning of the statute, a lawyer who files a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise that right. Instead, a lawyer at most facilitates his client’s exercise of the right. Because the lawyers here cannot show that the action was filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition, the action should not be dismissed under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B.
(“Father”) to their Child, Kaylee B. Mother gave birth to Kaylee in June 2022, and the
parents had a second child, Madison B., in December 2023.1 The Tennessee Department
of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
to each child in two separate petitions filed in the Sevier County Juvenile Court (“trial
court”).2 The trial court conducted a joint hearing on both petitions and entered two
separate orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to each child. The trial
court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Kaylee based
upon two statutory grounds. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Kaylee’s best
interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B. (“Father”) to their Child, Madison B. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison and Madison’s older sister, Kaylee B., in two separate petitions filed in the Sevier County Juvenile Court (“trial court”).1 The trial court conducted a joint hearing on both petitions and entered two separate orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to each child.2 The trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison after finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based upon the ground of mental incompetence. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Madison’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Darrell Peterson, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff sought to determine whether the defendant was an heir to the estate. The trial court determined that the defendant was not an heir and divided the estate accordingly amongst the legal heirs. We now affirm.

The Defendant, Cody R. Mashburn, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and criminal simulation. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that the Defendant would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years, but the trial court would determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and imposed a sentence of full confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence because, among other things, it improperly sentenced the Defendant without considering the results of a validated risk and needs assessment. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify a permanent parenting plan to name him as the primary residential parent for his two daughters. The trial court found a material change in circumstance based on, inter alia, the mother’s remarriage and frequent out-of-state travel, and it concluded that modification was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. The mother contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Gibson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Damone Pewitte, of three counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant broadly challenges whether the election process was sufficient to protect against the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, the Defendant raises three inter-related issues regarding the election process on plain error review: (1) the State made its initial election outside the presence of the jury and did not mention its election to the jury until its rebuttal closing argument; (2) the State referenced examples of uncharged conduct during its closing argument; and (3) the language from the trial court’s unanimity instruction was different from the State’s election and closing argument. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony, at a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years at 100% for each offense, with five of the six sentences to be served consecutively. The court also ordered community supervision for life and placement on the sexual offender registry. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (4) the court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for the correction of a clerical error in the offense date on the judgment for Count 6.

The Defendant, Lucian A. Clemmons, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he asserts constitutional and evidentiary claims related to the trial court’s exclusion of prior statements he made to the lead detective following his arrest. Additionally, as to the murder conviction, the Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In June 2021, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chaisty Dawn Jones, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder perpetration of aggravated burglary in Count 2, aggravated burglary in Count 3, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in Count 4, and simple possession of marijuana in Count 5. At trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and convicted her as charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2 and imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a “duty to retreat” prior to acting in self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Count 1 and Count 2.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

In 2018, the Defendant, Ronald Gray, pleaded guilty to several drug related charges in
exchange for a total effective sentence of eleven years. He was ordered to serve a portion
of his sentence in confinement and then released on May 1, 2018, to Community
Corrections. In 2019, the trial court entered an amended judgment to reflect an enhanced
sentence for his “plea to Violation of Community Corrections.” The order indicated that,
as of June 5, 2019, his Community Corrections was revoked, he was reinstated and
transferred to state probation, and he had to restart the eleven years of probation. In June
2020, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for the Defendant based upon a probation
violation. In 2024, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be incarcerated for the
duration of his sentence based on the probation violation. The Defendant appeals, but his
notice of appeal was not timely filed. As such, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Allen Fitzgerald Ailey, pleaded guilty in two cases to felon in possession of a weapon, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell or deliver oxycodone. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received concurrent four-year sentences for the drug offenses to be served consecutively to a sentence of six years for the weapon offense, with the manner of service of Defendant’s sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of judgments on the counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

The Defendant, Cristobal J. Quintana II, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; possessing an open container of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (DUI), 55-10-402(a)(2) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (sentencing for second-offense DUI), 55-10-416 (open container law), 55-12-139 (2020) (financial responsibility).  He was also found civilly liable by the trial court for violation of the implied consent law. See id. § 55-10-406 (2020) (subsequently amended) (implied consent).  The trial court imposed an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, forty-five days of which was to be served in jail, and the balance on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for second offense DUI and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and the finding on the implied consent violation.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms for Counts 1, 2, and 3.

This is an appeal from the denial of two class action certifications. The trial court found
that the classes proposed by the Appellants did not meet the requirements of Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action to enforce a 2020 arbitration award (the “Award”), which was confirmed by the Chancery Court for Davidson County in 2021. The subject of the arbitration was Chevy Chase ASC, LLC (“CCASC”), a two-member Tennessee limited liability company, which was formed and operated by Chevy Chase G.I. Investors, L.C. (“Plaintiff”), and AmSurg Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Award stated, in pertinent part, that the voluntary dissolution of Plaintiff would “trigger the mandatory dissolution” of CCASC. Following Plaintiff’s voluntary dissolution, however, Defendant refused to dissolve or wind up the affairs of CCASC. Defendant contended that it had the statutory right under the “dissolution avoidance” provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-245-101(b) to continue operating CCASC as a single-member limited liability company. Relying on the Award and the 2021 court order confirming the Award, Plaintiff commenced this action to compel Defendant to dissolve CCASC and wind up its business affairs. Finding the Award to be unambiguous, the Chancellor ordered “the immediate liquidation and dissolution of CCASC.” This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.