APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Property owners applied to the City of La Vergne for a building permit to install new doors on their car wash. Their purpose was to convert the car wash to a car lot. The city issued a building permit to the property owners, who proceeded to perform the work necessary to convert the property to a car lot. Months later, the city informed the property owners that they had to obtain planning commission approval of a site plan before they could operate a car lot on the property. The property owners appealed to the board of zoning appeals, which upheld the city’s decision. The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, and the court upheld the decision of the board of zoning appeals. We affirm the chancery court’s decision.

The Defendant, Beth Anne Manis, was convicted by a jury of one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C Felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a). Thereafter, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve five years, six months in confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to negate her claim of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by declining to give a special jury instruction on self-defense; (3) the Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the absence of a jury verdict form regarding self-defense; and (4) the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a partition suit. The residential property at issue was purchased approximately three months before Plaintiff’s father died from a terminal condition. The deed to the property listed the owners as Plaintiff’s father and his former girlfriend, and the two of them resided together at the property for the last three months of his life. After Plaintiff’s father died, Plaintiff, his sole heir, brought this partition suit individually and as executor of his father’s estate. Plaintiff asserted that his father’s former girlfriend should not receive any of the proceeds from the sale of the home because she did not financially contribute to its purchase. The former girlfriend took the position that Plaintiff’s father gifted her a one-half interest in the home because she agreed to act as his live-in caregiver in the last three months of his life. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the elements of a gift and split the proceeds of the sale of the home equally, after accounting for some expenses paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the proof did not establish a gift. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a jury trial. The defendants own and manage an apartment complex in Memphis, Tennessee. In 2010, two pit bull dogs left one of the apartments and attacked two individuals in a neighboring lot. One of the individuals died on the scene. The jury found the defendants were at fault and awarded a total jury verdict of $2.5 million. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for remittitur of the jury verdict and suggested remittitur of the award to $1.3 million. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their motion to amend their answers to assert comparative fault; denying their motion for a continuance; denying their motion for directed verdict; denying their motion for a mistrial due to comments made by plaintiff’s counsel during closing arguments; and denying their motion for new trial due to juror misconduct. In her posture as appellee, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in suggesting remittitur of the jury verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

The maternal grandparents filed this action against their daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her four-year-old son, after she ceased their visitation during her parenting time. The daughter insisted that the grandparents accept her new husband and cease contact with the child’s father, her ex-husband, before the grandparents could see her and the child again. The grandparents rebuffed their daughter’s request, choosing to visit with the grandchild during the ex-husband’s residential time instead. Following a trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the daughter placed reasonable conditions on the grandparents’ visitation pending a resolution of the family dispute, that there had not been a severe reduction in the grandparents’ visitation with the child, and there was no danger of substantial harm to the child because the child continued to visit the grandparents on a regular basis. We affirm.

This post-divorce appeal is the fourth appeal between the parties. This action involves the court’s holding of the mother in criminal contempt for her repeated failure to adhere to the orders of the court. We affirm.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Petitioner, Christopher S. Mayberry, guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent sentences of ten years for each count, to run consecutively to a prior sentence. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective and also asserts that the post-conviction court erred by “delaying the [post-conviction] hearing.” After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is a breach of contract action in which Plaintiffs sought to recover the balance of a promissory note executed to secure payment for of a deceased owner’s interest in the defendant company and to recover on a guaranty to secure the note. Defendants conceded that they did not pay the note according to its terms and counterclaimed, asserting that Plaintiffs breached a separate agreement which required the deceased owner’s estate to file amended tax returns and tender payment to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes which had been paid on behalf of the deceased owner by the company. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment; the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion, denied Defendants’ motion, and dismissed Defendants’ counterclaim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff lessor appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment concerning the interpretation of a lease in favor of the defendant lessee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An employee filed and settled a workers’ compensation claim against her employer for injuries sustained in an assault. The employee then filed a complaint under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 to -702, alleging that the assault, in conjunction with a previous incident, constituted sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durell, appeals for the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Criminal Court for Knox County, arguing the habeas court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. The petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the State withheld evidence favorable to the petitioner’s sentencing, his convictions violated double jeopardy protections, and the trial court relied on “improper, inaccurate, and mistaken information” in sentencing him. However, as noted by the State in its brief, the petitioner’s appeal is untimely, and our review of the record and the petitioner’s claims does not support a finding that the interest of justice supports the waiver of the petitioner’s untimely notice of appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Courtney Knowles, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2012 conviction for rape of a child. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was denied a full and fair hearing on his post-conviction petition. After a review of the entire record, we conclude that Petitioner was not afforded a full and fair hearing on his petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for a new evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the interests of justice require that under the circumstances of this case, and to insure the public perception of a fair and impartial hearing, the post-conviction proceedings be heard by a different judge than the judge who previously heard the proceedings. In light of our conclusion and disposition in this case, we need not address Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at this time.

The State appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional stop of the vehicle driven by Defendant, Jason Bradley Walters. The basis of the stop was the arresting deputy’s observation that Defendant violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-407, which requires a driver to dim headlights within 500 feet of an approaching vehicle. In its order, the trial court granted the motion solely based upon its determination that a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-407 is not a crime. On appeal the State argues it is a Class C misdemeanor pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-301(a), and that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed. On this point, we agree with the State. However, we remand for the trial court to make specific findings of fact based upon the trial court’s credibility determinations of the witnesses, and any other evidence, direct or circumstantial, viewed in light of the trial court’s credibility of the testimony. The trial court must then issue a new order either granting the motion to suppress or denying the motion.

The petitioner, Kamonie Ector, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Daniel L. Ginther, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his eight-year sentence for passing worthless checks in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement in spite of the Defendant’s “serious medical issues.” Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s designation of the father as the minor children’s primary residential parent after establishing his paternity. During trial, the court granted the father’s motion in limine to exclude testimony from the mother’s expert witness. The mother appeals the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and the designation of primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Joseph Wayne Wethington, appeals his Grainger County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted rape of a child, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court admitted certain testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and that his sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lacy B. and Quentin B. (collectively, “Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Morgan S. (“Mother”), to the minor child, Aryana S. (“the Child”). The Trial Court found that Petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights but that termination of her rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Rodolfo Guerra-Rosales, pleaded guilty in General Sessions Court to misdemeanor drug possession, and the court imposed a probation sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition in circuit court, alleging that his guilty plea in general sessions court was involuntary based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the claim was not cognizable and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider the petition and that his petition stated a colorable claim. After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s claim.

The Defendant, Benjamin Keith Franklin, was convicted by the Rhea County Circuit Court jury of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to four years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his conviction violates principles of double jeopardy and the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) extended to the co-defendant, Douglas V. Mashek, by the plaintiff, Tennessee State Bank (“the Bank”), via a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering real property titled to Mr. Mashek and acquired during Mr. Mashek’s marriage to the co-defendant, Deborah A. Mashek. When the Bank subsequently attempted to foreclose on the property, Mr. Mashek objected based on alterations to the deed of trust and a notice of right of rescission that had allegedly occurred after the deed’s execution and prior to recordation. The Bank filed a complaint against the Masheks in the trial court, seeking declaratory judgment that the recorded deed of trust was valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, reformation of the executed deed of trust to conform to the recorded deed. The Bank also named the title company involved in the loan transaction as a third-party defendant, alleging the title company’s liability in the event that the trial court found the deed of trust, either as executed or as recorded, to be unenforceable.1 The Masheks, proceeding pro se, filed various pleadings in response to the complaint, including a counterclaim against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, slander of title, statutory estoppel, wrongful foreclosure, and unclean hands. Upon the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion as to reformation of the executed deed of trust, declaring the deed, as reformed, to be enforceable and finding that the Bank was entitled to pursue foreclosure proceedings. The trial court found in part that the Bank or its agent(s) had employed “procedurally questionable and perhaps fraudulent” methods that were “at the very least negligent and potentially criminal in nature” to correct mistakes in the executed deed of trust and to, without authorization, affix the Masheks’ initials over a change in a date of signature on the notice of right of rescission. However, having also found that the mistakes corrected were mutual and amounted to scrivener’s errors that were not intended to and did not prejudice the Masheks, the trial court granted the Bank’s request to reform the executed deed of trust. The trial court 1 The title company is not participating in this appeal. 05/21/2020 2 awarded to the Bank a monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek, as the sole debtor named in the loan documents, in the amount of $294,566.39 for unpaid principal and interest. The trial court also awarded to the Bank reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $8,795.84, limiting such fees to those that “would be expected in an ordinary foreclosure action.” The trial court dismissed the Masheks’ various counterclaims and subsequently denied the Bank’s motion to alter or amend language in the judgment. The Masheks have appealed, and the Bank has raised issues regarding the trial court’s denial of its request to alter the court’s findings and denial of its request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses. Having determined that the Bank or its agent(s) made a unilateral mistake in materially altering the deed of trust after the document’s execution and then recording the altered deed of trust with the unilateral mistake incorporated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the reformation and enforceability of the executed deed of trust. Having also determined that the action of the Bank or its agent(s) in affixing the Masheks’ initials over the altered date on the rescission notice without authorization or notice constituted gross negligence, we reverse the trial court’s finding that no gross negligence occurred but affirm the trial court’s implied finding that the Bank could not succeed in its request to reform the effective date of the rescission notice. However, concluding that no alterations were made to the promissory note, we further determine that the trial court properly found Mr. Mashek to be liable for the unpaid principal and interest due under the terms of the note. We therefore affirm the trial court’s $294,566.39 monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the Bank and remand for a hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the Bank solely to obtain a judgment based on the promissory note. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including its denial of the Bank’s request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses and its denial of the Bank’s motion to alter or amend the language of the judgment. Finally, we clarify that no evidence has been presented in this case to support a finding of the intent necessary for forgery as a cause of action against the Bank or its agent(s).

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Janae M. (“Mother”) is the mother of Ava M., Camille W., and Michael W., III (“the Children”).1 Tommy G. (“Grandfather”) and Glenda G. (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) are the Children’s paternal grandparents. When Mother was incarcerated in 2014, Grandparents received custody of the Children. A few years later, Grandparents filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the Trial Court found that the grounds of failure to support and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court wrongly applied two different four-month periods for the ground of failure to support. Grandparents raise their own separate issue of whether the Trial Court erred in not finding the additional ground of failure to visit. We hold, inter alia, that although the Trial Court erred in applying two different four-month determinative periods for failure to support, the error was harmless in this case. We affirm.

Defendant, Ricky Lakino Covington, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Greenlee Davis, Jr., was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell within a
drug-free zone, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within a drug-free zone, and criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-year sentences for each of the drug convictions and to a thirty-day sentence for the criminal trespass conviction. The trial court merged the drug convictions, and ordered the trespass sentence to be served concurrently to the drug sentence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) denying the motion to suppress; (2) certifying Donna Roach as an expert; and (3) admitting the Knoxville-Knox County KUB Geographic Information Systems (”KGIS”) map in to evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.