APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her minor child. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing Mother’s counsel to withdraw the morning of trial, without considering whether Mother had notice of the withdrawal, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Germaine Markques Long, was found guilty by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of identity theft, a Class D felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150 (2018) (identity theft); 39-14-103 (2018) (theft); 39-14-105 (2018) (grading of theft). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years for each identity theft conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a re-filed health care liability action brought by the wife of a hospital patient, individually and on behalf of her now-deceased husband, against the hospital. In the first action, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the 120-day extension to the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, which also required the plaintiffs to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization to potential defendants. The complaint asserted that one of the hospital’s doctors and four of its nurses were negligent in treating the husband in the hospital’s emergency department on July 26, 2009, and that the hospital was vicariously liable. The doctor and nurses, but not Saint Francis, successfully moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 121. On interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 121’s pre-suit notice requirement. This court affirmed the trial court’s determinations that § 121 was constitutional, was not preempted by HIPAA, and did not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Accordingly, this court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the doctor and nurses. Because the claims against the hospital remained, we remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the first complaint against the hospital in April 2016. Eight months later, the plaintiffs sent the hospital a new pre-suit notice and medical authorization. Sixty-four days after that, the plaintiffs filed their second complaint against the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, asserting the second complaint was timebarred because the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization in the first action and, thus, the 120-day extension was not available and the original complaint was time-barred. The plaintiffs responded by asserting that a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization is unnecessary to obtain the 120-day extension and challenging the constitutionality of § 121, including a challenge based on the right to privacy in medical information. The trial court found that § 121 requires a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization before the 120-day extension applies, the law of the case doctrine barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating all constitutional challenges except that based on the right of privacy, and the right to privacy was not implicated. Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed the second complaint as time-barred. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Derrick Settles, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Linda Anne Dunavant, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and two counts each of first degree felony murder, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated arson. She challenges her convictions on appeal, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, specifically that the State did not negate her expert’s testimony that “the fire rekindled by accident,” and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to issue an instruction on setting fire to personal property or land, and its attempt, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Lassiter, pled guilty to four counts of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more and four counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000. He received an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and the imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Makyle Love, was convicted of aggravated rape and was sentenced to twenty-three years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

The Defendant, Roddarous Bond, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a twentythree-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the offenses; (2) the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to refer to letters that had been destroyed; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with a prior statement that the trial court had excluded. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dane Sayles, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of three hundred grams or more of cocaine for resale and resulting forty-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by refusing to apply Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), which prohibits the warrantless search of an arrestee’s cellular telephone incident to arrest, retroactively. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brenda Woods, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from her convictions for three counts of procuring an illegal vote and resulting effective two-year sentence to be served on community corrections. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Defendant, Perry Avram March, was convicted in Case No. 2004-D-3113 of second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and destruction of evidence for his role in the death of his wife and in Case No. 2005-D-2854 of conspiracy to commit first degree murder for his plan to kill his in-laws. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of fifty-six years. Defendant’s direct appeals were unsuccessful. See State v. March, 494 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) (“the conspiracy case”); State v. March, 395 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (“the murder case”). Subsequently, Defendant sought relief by filing a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, arguing that there was an error in one of the judgment forms with regard to the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Salvador Sandoval (“Employee”), an undocumented immigrant, suffered an injury while working for Tennessee Steel Structures (“Employer”). The parties settled the claim, and Employee failed to return to work at the end of the initial compensation period. Employee now seeks additional permanent disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-207(3)(B) because Employee cannot return to work after the injury as he is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States under Federal Immigration Law. Employee challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) which does not allow for additional benefits set forth in subdivision (3)(B) for any employee who is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States. The Court of Workers’ Compensations Claims held that it had no jurisdiction to make this determination and denied Employee’s request for increased benefits. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of the Supreme Court 51 section 1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) is constitutional.

The Defendant, Christopher Swift, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. The trial court later imposed a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-six years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to disqualify one of the prosecutors; (3) African-Americans were improperly excluded from the jury venire; (4) the State “intentionally mislead [the] jury” during the examination of one of its witnesses; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of hearsay; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to review transcripts of recorded jail phone calls as those recordings were played; (7) the State improperly displayed photographic exhibits during its closing argument; (8) the State withheld evidence; and (9) a new trial is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After the plaintiff was arrested by a police officer employed by the defendant town, the plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging that his civil rights were violated during the course of the arrest. Plaintiff further alleged that the town was negligent in its training and supervision of the arresting officer. The federal court dismissed the civil rights claims with prejudice, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the town. As such, the plaintiff filed a second complaint in the Circuit Court for Washington County, in which the plaintiff again alleged that the town was negligent in its supervision and training of the arresting officer. After the town filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act was not removed as to the Plaintiff’s claims because the negligence claim arose out of the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights; accordingly, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) preserved the Defendant’s immunity, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Arbra Allen Sims III, pled guilty to two counts of accessory after the fact to aggravated robbery. Defendant agreed to serve four years on each count concurrently with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve the sentence in custody with the possibility of release pending the completion of a rehabilitative program. On appeal, Defendant argues that he should have been granted probation and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on Defendant’s perceived untruthfulness about his participation in the underlying crime. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny probation.

The Petitioner, Marty Holland, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues generally that “the postconviction court erred in finding [the Petitioner] received effective assistance of counsel.” Based on the issues developed at the post-conviction hearing and the order of the post-conviction court, the issue presented is whether the Petitioner’s guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate (1) a coerced confession; (2) the validity of a bench warrant concerning an unrelated offense; and (3) a search warrant executed at the Petitioner’s home concerning an unrelated case. Following our review, we deem it necessary to remand this matter to the post-conviction court for a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner was advised of the circumstances attendant to entering a guilty plea based upon an agreement that his state sentence would be served concurrently to a previously imposed federal sentence. In all other respects, the judgment of the post-conviction court it affirmed.

The defendant, Kevin McDougle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donalson Wells Carter, was convicted of the sale of fentanyl, simple possession or casual exchange of fentanyl, possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. He received an effective sentence of thirty years. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts; (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to disclose favorable treatment of witnesses; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Aurelio Garcia Sanchez, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of five counts of rape of a child and resulting effective sentence of one hundred twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B (“Rule 10B”), from the trial court’s denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by the plaintiff wife during the course of the parties’ divorce proceedings. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court judge’s denial of the motion, we affirm. 

Jerry Frazier alleged that he sustained a compensable injury in the course of his work as a truck driver for Venture Express. The trial court held that Mr. Frazier’s January 29, 2014 accident at work caused his neck, back and mental injuries, that the 1.5 times cap on permanent disability benefits did not apply, and that Mr. Frazier was permanently and totally disabled. Venture Express has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Innerimages, Inc. (“Innerimages” or “the developer”) filed suit against homeowners Robert Newman, David and Melba White, and David and Susan Schilt as trustees for the David Schilt and Susan Schilt Trust. It sought to recover unpaid maintenance fees required by the restrictive covenants governing their real property. The homeowners filed a counterclaim, seeking various forms of relief. The homeowners also joined the following third-party defendants: Sandra Gunn, the president of Innerimages, homeowners David and Joan Barrett, and property owner Cupid’s Rose, LLC.2 After a bench trial, the court dismissed the collection action filed by the developer. The court determined: (1) that the restrictive covenants are unenforceable as to the four homeowners and their successors in title; (2) that the developer is liable for breach of fiduciary duty for its failure to honor its obligations under the restrictive covenants; and (3) that Sandra Gunn is personally liable under an alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil. Finally, the court awarded the homeowners damages in the amount of all fees paid since taking ownership of their property or, in the case of the Schilt family, fees paid over the last three years. In a subsequent order, the trial court clarified that only Mr. Newman was entitled to money damages because the other homeowners had not paid fees to the developer during the relevant time period. The court also denied the homeowners’ request for attorney’s fees. Innerimages, Sandra Gunn, and Cupid’s Rose, LLC appeal. Because this appeal presents novel issues relating to the enforceability of restrictive covenants, we take this opportunity to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.19(1)-(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000). We modify the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the principles set forth in the Restatement. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) award of alimony in futuro to Wife; (2) award of alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney’s fees; and (3) classification of certain jewelry as Wife’s separate property. We affirm.

Petitioner, Ramone Lawson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel which led to his convictions of one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, James Dominic Stevenson, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment involving the use of a deadly weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the element of identity. Discerning no error, we affirm.