APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Christophe Swearengen, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property over $10,000, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years’ probation. After a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked Defendant’s probation for violating the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation because his violation constituted his first technical violation. The State agrees. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial, reinstate Defendant’s probationary sentence, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violation.

The Petitioner, Brian Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain communication and for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of an illegal search warrant. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Keith Hopkins, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and one count of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four years’ probation with the condition that if his probation was revoked, he could not later petition to have the remainder of his sentence suspended. The trial court later revoked Defendant’s probation but nevertheless reprobated Defendant. After a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation based on the original probation order, reasoning that Defendant was on probation when “he never should have been.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate Defendant’s probation, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violations.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability matter. The plaintiff first appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant physician. This court reversed that judgment in 2020. Upon remand, a trial before a jury resulted in a defense verdict. The plaintiff again appeals. We affirm.

In this action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on res judicata and failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs have appealed in companion appeals. 1 Upon our review, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution case at the summary judgment stage on the basis that she had failed to establish an element of the cause of action. Like the trial court, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to show that the nolle prosequi resolution of the underlying criminal matter constituted a favorable termination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on res judicata and failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs have appealed in companion appeals. 1 Upon review, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and remand for further proceedings. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

The Defendant, Gerald Tyshawn Henry, was convicted by a Knox County jury of second
degree murder and various other gun-related crimes, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty years in confinement. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our
review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction of second
degree murder. Upon our review, we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Wilson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of one count of second-degree murder and one count of facilitation of attempted simple robbery for which he received a sentence of twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Quadarius Devonta Bufford, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and his request for funds for a medical expert. He also seeks relief due to the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s multiple deficiencies of performance. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Clifford Lamar Clark, III, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

More than thirty days after denying a motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted an application for permission to appeal the denial under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Because an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, we conclude the appeal was untimely.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Carlos Monalito Clark, a career offender, was indicted for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and vandalism under $1000, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and received a Range III sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The vandalism charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues he is entitled to de novo review or a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to consider three statutory sentencing factors, failed to consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act, and failed to consider his request for community corrections. Upon review, we affirm.

The petitioner, Brandon Holliday, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This cause came before the court upon the application of the Defendant, pro se, seeking an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. More specifically, the Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s October 30, 2025, order directing her to undergo a mental health evaluation to determine her competency to stand trial and her mental state at the time of the charged offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7- 301(a). The Defendant also requests a stay of mental health evaluation proceedings.

In 2006, the Defendant, Joshua Lee Shaw, pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a Schedule II substance with intent to deliver, a Class C felony, and simple possession of a Schedule VI substance, a Class A misdemeanor.  The trial court sentenced him to four years of supervised probation.  He violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana.  The trial court ordered the Defendant’s punishment for the violation to be for “time served” and returned him to probation.  The Defendant successfully completed the remainder of his probation.  In 2024, the Defendant filed a petition to expunge his record of his two offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(k).  After a hearing, the trial court declined his request. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred.  We conclude that the Defendant does not meet the plain language requirements of an “eligible petitioner” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(k), and thus we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Kerion Dawson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to mitigated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence to be served as sixty days in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Alan Hauser, and four co-defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis and multiple counts of forgery.  On direct appeal, we affirmed Petitioner’s convictions.  State v. Lyons, No. M2019-01946-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1083703, at *23, perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Crim. App. March 22, 2021).  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the convictions.  State v. Lyons, 669 S.W.3d 775, 779-80 (Tenn. 2023).  Petitioner, a non-lawyer, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of himself and his co-defendants.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing as untimely.  Petitioner appealed on behalf of himself and on behalf of his co-defendants.   After review, we disregard claims alleged by Petitioner for the co-defendants and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court as to Petitioner.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her five children. The juvenile court found three grounds for termination and determined that termination was in the children’s best interests based on clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Roosevelt Morris, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and his effective forty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition because his sentence was imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A high school student suffered a serious injury when a classmate, who was not aiming at the injured student, threw a pencil that ricocheted off a surface and hit the student in the eye. The injured student sued the Clarksville-Montgomery County School System, asserting that the classroom teacher was negligent and that the School System was, accordingly, vicariously liable. The circuit court granted the School System’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the student’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The appellant worked as a cashier for the Shelby County Trustee’s Office and was terminated after she experienced a cash shortage and attempted to force balance. The Civil Service Merit Board conducted a review hearing and upheld the termination. The appellant sought judicial review in the chancery court, which likewise upheld the termination. The appellant filed this appeal claiming that her procedural due process rights were violated, her termination was not in accordance with the policies and procedures of Shelby County, and that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.