APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a dispute between an insurance company and one of its insureds. Following a fire to her home, the insured brought suit requesting that the insurance company be required to pay a claim for personal property damage. The insurance company defended on the ground that the insurance policy was void because a misrepresentation by the insured on her application for insurance increased the “risk of loss.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. The trial court agreed with the insurance company and granted summary judgment in its favor. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

Defendant, Alina Frankie Sherlin, was indicted for first degree murder. After a jury trial, she was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to fifteen years in incarceration. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and Defendant appealed to this Court. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting a videotape from the ambulance ride depicting Defendant’s actions after the incident; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness that the trial court deemed unavailable; (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to call a surprise witness; (4) whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony about the victim’s motorcycle gang membership; (5) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting Defendant from introducing nude photographs and sexual videos of a witness for impeachment purposes; (6) whether the trial court properly excluded testimony regarding a threat made by the victim toward Defendant; (7) whether the trial court erred by excluding Defendant’s medical records; (8) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to point out specific areas of photographs that were discussed during the videotaped deposition of the unavailable witness; (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof; (10) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing statements (11) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction ; and (12) whether cumulative error by the trial court necessitates a reversal of Defendant’s conviction. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Joseph J. Levitt (“Owner”), the owner of the Applewood apartment complex located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, appeals the September 14, 2016 order of the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to the City of Oak Ridge, the Oak Ridge Board of Building and Housing Appeals, and Denny Boss (collectively “the City”) in this suit seeking to overturn the City’s order that six of the Applewood buildings be vacated and demolished. Owner raises issues on appeal regarding the adminstrative warrants and whether the decision of the board was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. We find and hold that the adminstrative warrants satisfied the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-117 and that the decision of the board was not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment.

Paul A. Westby (“Employee”) suffered gradual hearing loss during his employment with Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Employer”). Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim when Employer closed its plant. Employer argued the claim was barred by the statute of limitations because Employee failed to report his injury despite learning of his hearing loss years earlier. The trial court allowed the claim based on the “last-day-worked” rule and awarded Employee 60 percent permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to both ears. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the last-day-worked rule and that the PPD award is excessive. This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

A bondsman for Appellant Cumberland Bail Bonding (“Cumberland”) was arrested after law enforcement determined that he was trading bonds for sex. A panel of circuit court judges entered a sua sponte order suspending Cumberland’s authority as a bonding company in Marion County and a subsequent order suspending the authority of A Bail Bonding Company (“A Bail Bonding”) and A+ Bail Bonding, whose proprietor was also the owner of Cumberland. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the bondsman engaged in professional misconduct, that Cumberland did not explicitly prohibit the misconduct in its employee manual, and that Cumberland failed to notify the court of the bondsman’s arrest. The bonding privileges of all three Appellants were suspended for a period of six months. The Appellants challenge the suspension, asserting that they were denied their due process rights and that the trial court erred in suspending their bail bonding authority. The State responds that the appeal is moot but that there was in any event no error. We have addressed the underlying issues and have determined that the trial court’s actions were in error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bashan Murchison, of nine counts of felony drug offenses. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments and sentence. See State v. Bashan Murchison, No. E2014-01250-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 659844 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 12, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Melvin Dwayne Dunn, Jr., was convicted by a jury of nine counts of burglary; one count of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; one count of evading arrest; and one count of possession of burglary tools. He was sentenced as a career offender and received an effective sentence of thirty-six years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his attempted theft conviction. He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by the Defendant during bond negotiations. After thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant publisher of an allegedly defamatory newspaper article concerning plaintiff. The article was based upon a one-onone, private interview between the public information officer for the White County Sheriff’s Office and a newspaper reporter. The court determined that the interview given by the public information officer constituted an “official action” of government that the article fairly and accurately reported. As such, the court concluded that any alleged defamatory statements included in the article were privileged under the common-law “fair report privilege.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing in part, that the fair report privilege does not apply. Because we conclude that the interview did not constitute an official act of government, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

In this health care liability action, the defendant doctor filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. After the motion was granted, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, requesting the court to compel the plaintiff or his counsel to provide the court with a copy of the expert’s signed written statement that was relied upon in executing the certificate of good faith that accompanied the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the matter should have been raised in the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or a motion for discretionary costs. Upon our review of the statute, we do not find a requirement that the request for the expert witness’ statement be made in the manner held by the trial court; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further consideration of the defendant’s motion.

This is a divorce case. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce designating Husband as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child and concluding that Husband is not under-employed for purposes of calculating child support. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment as to the issues raised on appeal.

An inmate in state custody who was being housed in a county jail filed suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for injuries he suffered while on a work detail. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-123(d)(2) grants counties that allow inmates to work on road details and other projects immunity from liability for injuries. The inmate appeals, contending he was not in the class of inmates defined in section 41-2-123 and, consequently, that the county’s immunity was removed. Concluding that section 41-2-123(d)(2) controls over the provisions of the Tort Liability Act, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the county was immune and its dismissal of the suit.

The Defendant, Bryant Eugene Page, Jr., pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, as a Range III offender, with an agreed sentence of twelve years, but with a Range II release eligibility of 35% rather than a Range III release eligibility of 45%. More than a year later, the Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence, asking the trial court for a sentence of six years, at 35%, arguing that his sentence was not in range. The trial court summarily dismissed his motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when the trial court did not reduce his sentence because: (1) his motion was timely but the court clerk refused to file his motion; (2) his sentence is illegal because it is out of range. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a dispute between an insurance company and its insured regarding the application of exclusion clauses in a homeowners’ insurance policy and a personal umbrella liability policy. After malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims were filed against the insured in Alabama by a law firm, the insurance company accepted the defense under a reservation of rights and filed the present action seeking a declaration that it is not required to provide coverage for the damages complained of in the Alabama lawsuit. Following a bench trial held on stipulated facts, the trial court determined that the insured was, in fact, entitled to certain coverage. We reverse.

A landowner’s real property was sold at a delinquent tax sale on August 14, 2013. The taxpayer subsequently conveyed her interest in the property to a third party that redeemed the property within the one-year redemption period. In the interim, new legislation took effect that altered the redemption process. The purchaser at the tax sale and two creditors of the taxpayer moved the court to set aside the redemption, contending that the redeeming party failed to comply with the new law. The trial court held that the redemption procedure set forth in the new legislation applied, that the redeeming party did not follow the redemption process set forth in the new legislation, and thus, that the redemption failed. The redeeming party appeals. We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the redeeming party was entitled to redeem but erred in concluding that the new statute applied to this redemption and that the redemption failed due to the redeeming party’s failure to follow the new redemption process; accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Allen Stumbo, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sixty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him; and (4) no hearing was held as required by T.C.A. § 39-17-1324 to determine the existence of a prior qualifying felony conviction to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s sentences for all the convictions except employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For reasons contained herein, we vacate the sentence for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing on that count.

A juvenile court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The father appeals the termination of his rights. We conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s termination on these grounds and affirm the judgment.

In this divorce action, the wife was found to be in “willful, direct and summary contempt of court beyond a reasonable doubt,” based on her responses to the trial court judge’s questions during a motion hearing. The wife has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We decline to award to the husband his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

Defendant, Rebecca Michelle Spears, appeals after the trial court granted the State’s motion to disqualify trial counsel on the basis that trial counsel was a necessary witness. Because we determine that trial counsel was a necessary witness and any testimony given by trial counsel would be related to contested issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his convictions of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse, the defendant, Tyrail Jermaine Cooke, appeals. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the entirety of his pretrial statement to the police; that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the video recording of his pretrial statement; that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs, testimony, and other evidence relating to bruising in the victim’s genital area and a hole in the wall in the closet of the defendant’s residence; that the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant’s request for a special jury instruction regarding the right of parents to use corporal punishment to discipline their children; that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s improper comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent during his closing argument; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the 29-year effective sentence is excessive; and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued a defendant for filing an unauthorized financing statement. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and later a motion to disqualify the judge, both of which were denied. The court also ordered Defendant to file an answer. When Defendant failed to comply, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment. Defendant’s husband intervened shortly thereafter, claiming that he filed the financing statement. Defendant’s husband likewise filed a motion to dismiss and a later motion to disqualify. The court denied both motions and ordered husband to file an answer. When Husband failed to do so, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment against Husband. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed. We affirm. Deeming this appeal frivolous, we award Plaintiff attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Defendant, Mardoche Olivier, was convicted by a jury of one count of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he “received any signal” from law enforcement “while operating a motor vehicle” to bring that vehicle to a stop or that he “intentionally fle[d] or attempt[ed] to elude” either officer. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an action for grandparent visitation. The child’s father died when she was seven weeks old, and when the mother denied visitation to the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation. After a trial, the court determined that the mother opposed visitation, the presumption of substantial harm was not overcome, and grandparent visitation was in the child’s best interests. The court ordered grandparent visitation the third weekend of each month, Thanksgiving break in odd years, every Christmas break, and every summer break. The court also gave the grandmother four of the parental rights found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B)—the right to educational records, the right to be free from derogatory remarks, the right to be notified of medical emergencies, and the right to be notified of extracurricular activities and the opportunity to participate in or observe them. The mother filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the grandmother filed a response and a motion to strike the hearsay contained in mother’s motion. Grandmother also requested attorney’s fees in connection with her motion to strike hearsay. The trial court entered an “amended” order that was substantively the same as its original decision granting grandparent visitation, and it ordered the mother to pay the grandmother’s attorney’s fees in connection with the grandmother’s motion to strike hearsay. On appeal, the mother asks this court to determine (1) whether the trial court erred “by awarding appellee grandmother a visitation schedule which is essentially a ‘tweaked’ parenting plan, along with the rights of a parent under Tennessee law,” and (2) whether the trial court erred by awarding the grandmother her attorney’s fees in opposing the mother’s motion to amend. We have determined that the extensive visitation schedule impermissibly interferes with the mother’s parental rights under the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore, it is not “reasonable” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c). We have also determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(3)(B) is inapplicable in actions for grandparent visitation; therefore, the grandmother is not entitled to any of the rights listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. Further, we have determined that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the grandmother because we find no contractual or statutory basis for the award. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court to establish a grandparent visitation schedule that comports with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c) and minimizes interference with the mother’s fundamental constitutional rights

A delinquent taxpayer’s property was sold at a tax sale on January 22, 2014. The taxpayer subsequently conveyed her interest in the property to a third party that redeemed the property within the one-year statutory redemption period. The proceedings were stayed a year and a half due to the redeeming party’s bankruptcy; after the stay was lifted, the trial court held a hearing on the tax-sale purchaser’s motion for additional costs and then entered an order finalizing the redemption. In that order, the trial court ruled that the redeeming party was required to, among other things, pay interest on the price paid by the tax-sale purchaser at the tax sale for the entire period between the tax sale and entry of the final order. The redeeming party appeals, arguing that the statute only allowed interest to be charged from the date of the tax sale through the date the redemption process began. We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Michael White, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to determine whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to a blood sample drawn from an individual pursuant to a search warrant because the arresting officer failed to leave a copy of the warrant with the individual. The Defendant, Angela Faye Daniel, was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officer obtained a search warrant and transported the Defendant to a medical facility for a blood draw. The officer failed to give the Defendant a copy of the search warrant. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant on the basis of the exclusionary rule set forth in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, a good-faith exception should be applied to Rule 41’s exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.