APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Defendant, Morris Rucker, appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tenn. Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60.02 motion to set aside his judgments and/or for injunctive relief, arguing that the judgments are invalid because they do not bear the required file-date stamps. Following our review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Antonio Lamont Booker, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment revoking his probation and placing his sentence into effect. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves a claim brought by a landowner challenging the validity of certain annexation ordinances that incorporated his property into the City of Harriman (the “City”). In December 2014, the landowner filed a declaratory judgment action against the City in the Roane County Circuit Court (“trial court”), alleging that several 1959 annexation ordinances passed by the City were void ab initio because a river adjacent to the City prevented land on the opposite side of the river from being contiguous with the City’s original boundaries. The landowner alleged that as a result of the first annexation’s purported invalidity, all subsequent annexations based on contiguity with the lands annexed in the 1959 ordinances were void by extension. The landowner sought a judgment voiding the challenged annexation ordinances, recovery of the real estate taxes he had paid to the City for his real property included in the annexed land, and a permanent injunction preventing the City from imposing any charges or taxes against him. The City responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, arguing that the landowner’s sole remedy would have been an action in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51- 103 (2015). In the alternative, the City argued that dismissal was proper because the landowner had not joined necessary parties who would be affected by the judgment he sought. Determining that other landowners with title to real property inside the annexed areas in question were indispensable to the landowner’s claim, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and directed the landowner to join the necessary parties. The trial court also directed the landowner to amend his complaint to specify the challenged ordinances and affected properties. In November 2016, the landowner filed a motion for class action certification, which the trial court denied following a hearing. On March 10, 2017, the trial court dismissed the landowner’s complaint, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The landowner subsequently filed a “Motion to Set Aside Order,” which the trial court denied. The landowner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Matthew Tyrone Sisson, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years and eight years for the two convictions and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay during the hearing, giving too much weight to enhancement factors, failing to apply additional mitigating factors, and running the sentences consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Lynden Myrick, appeals his jury convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of five and one-half years’ imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges the following errors: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement because the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his voluntary manslaughter conviction, challenging the evidence establishing cause of death; (3) that admission of a photograph of the victim’s injuries was more prejudicial than probative; and (4) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the amended death certificate which was testimonial in nature. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis without a hearing on his “newly discovered” evidence. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sumner County jury convicted James Allen Gooch, Jr., Defendant, of sale of 0.5 ounces or more of marijuana within one thousand feet of a Drug-Free Zone and the attempt to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range III persistent offender, to an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. After Defendant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion, the trial court determined that Defendant’s sentence was void and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The trial court then sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the State waived the ability to seek a Range II sentence when it filed a notice of intent to seek a Range III sentence. He further argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence him because the State did not have an arrest warrant charging him with the present offenses. Lastly, he asserts in his reply brief that the State “committed a fraud upon the court” because his resentencing was based upon a presentence report that was erroneously admitted without personal knowledge. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Johnny Lorenzo Wade, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -13-202, -13-403. The trial court merged one of the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus forty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1)that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion alleging that the seizure of his cell phone was illegal; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting a video taken from his cell phone because it was not relevant and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting the statement of a co-defendant under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; (5) that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to identify an item of evidence without personal knowledge of the item; (6) that the trial court erred in allowing an employee of the Defendant’s cell phone provider to testify as an expert witness on the operation of the provider’s cellular network; (7) that the trial court erred in allowing a police investigator to testify as a lay witness about “the plotting and pinging of the Defendant’s cellular telephone records”; and (8) that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentences because such sentences “were excessive.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sevier County jury convicted Ronald Lee Freels, Jr., Defendant, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-five years as a persistent offender with 100% service. On appeal, Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Roy Lee Branner, entered an open guilty plea to two counts of violating the habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO) statute; two counts of driving under the influence (DUI); two counts of violating the implied consent statute; two counts of leaving the scene of an accident; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia; one count of evading arrest; one count of resisting arrest; one count of domestic assault; one count of false imprisonment; one count of failing to appear; and nineteen counts of passing worthless checks. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective sentence of fifteen years, with five years to be served in confinement, followed by ten years of supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing for the first five years of his sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Stephanie Ann Cole, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree premeditated murder and received a life sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on multiple claims, and the postconviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide his professional advice regarding the Petitioner’s decision to enter a guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Darin Paul Deckard, appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement after the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Sean Patrick Goble, appeals the dismissal of his petition for postconviction DNA analysis as time-barred. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts, and the State agrees, that the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act does not have a statute of limitations. After review, we reverse the judgment and remand for the post-conviction court to determine whether the petition should be granted or denied on the merits.

The Defendant, Jamarcus Jackson, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, for which he is serving an effective forty years, consecutively to an eightyear sentence in an unrelated case. See T.C.A. §§ 39-10-210 (2014) (second degree murder), 39-13-101 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2016) (assault), 39-13-103 (2014) (reckless endangerment). On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction, (2) the trial court erred in its method of conducting jury selection, depriving him of a peremptory challenge, (3) the court erred in ruling that his prior failure to appear and robbery convictions were admissible impeachment evidence if he testified, (4) he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative trial error, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Maegan Davis, the Defendant, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence and one count of driving under the influence per se and reserved a certified question. In her appellate brief, the Defendant states the following questions for appeal: “(1) Was the initial stop of the [D]efendant supported by probable cause that the [D]efendant had committed an offense?”; “(2) When the [D]efendant was detained, was that detention supported by probable cause that the [D]efendant had committed the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant?”; and “(3) Should the blood taken from the [D]efendant be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 7 of the Tennessee Constitution where the [D]efendant was detained for more than ninety (90) minutes without being given a field sobriety test?” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal because she failed to properly certify her questions of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988).

This appeal involves the plaintiff’s filing of a complaint for unjust enrichment and conversion against his business partner’s spouse after the plaintiff discovered that his partner converted partnership funds for personal use. The trial court dismissed the complaint following a bench trial. We affirm.

The petitioner, Robert Townsend, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Freeman York, Petitioner, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to restore his driving privileges. Petitioner asserts that the revocation period of his license has expired and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. Petitioner also argues that the trial court failed to properly set out its factual findings and legal conclusions in its order. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that the trial court set out sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law in its written order. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for reinstatement of driver’s license. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Raymond Thomas Sweatt, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of robbery and carjacking and resulting effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Rachris R. Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court denying the petition.

Petitioner, Raphael Love, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In a pending divorce proceeding, Wife filed four separate contempt petitions against Husband. After a court appearance on Wife’s third and fourth petitions, without taking evidence and without finding Husband in contempt, the trial court ordered that Husband be taken into custody and confined in jail for a period of thirty days. A mittimus subsequently issued, and Husband appealed. For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s order is reversed and the issued mittimus is vacated.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract action. Premier Imaging/Medical Systems, Inc. (“Premier”) contracted with Coffey Family Medical Clinic, P.C. (“CFMC”), an organization formed by Dr. D. Bruce Coffey, M.D. (“Dr. Coffey”), for a five year servicing contract (“the Contract”) under which Premier would provide service for a CT Scanner (“the Scanner”). Pioneer Health Services of Oneida (“Pioneer”) and Dr. Coffey later entered into an agreement whereby Pioneer assumed certain obligations, apparently including the Contract. At CFMC’s request, Premier began billing Pioneer. Pioneer eventually stopped making payments under the Contract. Premier sued CFMC in the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”) to recover on the remainder of the Contract. CFMC argued that Pioneer became a substituted obligor under a theory of novation. After trial, the Trial Court held that CFMC failed to prove novation, awarded Premier $89,166.60 for the twenty months remaining on the Contract, and granted prejudgment interest of ten percent from the end of the Contract for a total of $105,534.70. CFMC appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not err in holding that CFMC was unable to meet its burden of proving that novation, implied or otherwise, occurred. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Edgar Ray Bettis, of first degree murder, second degree murder, and unauthorized use of a vehicle, and he received an effective life sentence. After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal, the Petitioner sought postconviction relief on the grounds that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to evaluate the Petitioner’s competency; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statement; (3) allowing a substitute medical examiner to testify; (4) failing to object to photographs entered into evidence; and (5) failing to secure a forensic pathologist to counter the State’s expert. After a thorough review of the record and law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. Plaintiff gave potential defendants written notice of his malpractice claim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Plaintiff then filed his complaint. In doing so, he relied upon a 120-day extension of the one year statute of limitations as provided for in § 29-26-121(c). Each defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. By an order entered April 1, 2015, the trial court granted the joint motion to dismiss of three of the defendants. The court’s order concluded that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred. Plaintiff did not appeal the court’s judgment and, with the passage of time, it became final. Meanwhile, the motions to dismiss of the other defendants, all of which were essentially based upon the same ground as that of the joint motion of the dismissed defendants, were awaiting resolution by the trial court. Before this could happen, however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint. Nine months later, plaintiff sent a new pre-suit notice. Four months after that, plaintiff filed a second health care liability action against the same defendants, including those dismissed by the trial court in its April 1, 2015 order. All defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motions. Later, the trial court decided that its April 1, 2015 dismissal order was incorrect. It concluded that plaintiff’s first complaint was not time-barred because, according to the court, plaintiff provided proper pre-suit notice. On the defendants’ further motions, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We did likewise. We now reverse the judgment of the trial court denying defendants’ motions to dismiss.