APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the defendant had committed crimes other than those for which he was on trial and because the error cannot be classified as harmless, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he requested DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-303. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis because the evidence was already tested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Robert Landon Webster, guilty of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his right to confrontation was violated because the State failed to call a confidential informant as a witness at trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Presson, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an “economic motive” defense and failing to call witnesses at trial to support that defense; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a severance for charges that involved two separate victims; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge certain jurors during voir dire; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing “to call” the Petitioner as a witness at trial; (5) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s references to the term “pedophile” and to pornography during its closing argument; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request such instructions; (7) that trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court require the State to make an election of offenses” and “by failing to object to the trial court judge’s election of offenses”; and (8) that post-conviction relief is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh (“Wife”) sued Waleed Fawzi Abed (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, granted Wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan with respect to the parties’ minor son (“the Child”) awarding Wife 285 days to Husband’s 80, and awarded Wife a judgment for the value of a Cadillac less $2,500 Wife received on the sale of her original vehicle for a total judgment of $13,400. Husband appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court found no statutory factors applicable to justify such a paltry award of parenting time to him and that the Cadillac at issue was not even marital property subject to division. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment with respect to the residential parenting schedule and remand for the Trial Court to award Husband significantly more time with the Child. Finding that the Cadillac was not marital property, we modify the Trial Court’s award of $13,400 to Wife to $2,000 to account for only the sale of Wife’s original vehicle. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm as modified, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a divorce case between parties who amassed a great amount of wealth and lived an extravagant lifestyle for many years. There are no minor children involved, and this appeal is limited to the trial court’s identification, classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the trial court’s awards of alimony to Wife, and Husband’s convictions for several counts of criminal contempt. One of the most salient issues raised by Husband on appeal relates to the trial court’s decision to use a financial statement prepared by Husband in 2012 to value several properties in the marital estate rather than the certified appraisals that were prepared in the course of litigation for the purpose of valuing the marital estate. According to Husband, this resulted in the court grossly overvaluing the marital estate. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s identification and classification of marital property as well as the trial court’s findings and sentencing related to Husband’s criminal contempt. We vacate the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital property and awards of alimony. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, John Armstrong, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for being untimely filed; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case presents the issue of a seller’s liability for damages caused by an allegedly defective water heater. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant seller concerning the plaintiff’s claims of products liability, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and unfair or deceptive trade practices, finding these claims to be barred by the expiration of the ten-year statute of repose applicable to products liability actions. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the seller regarding the plaintiff’s remaining claim of breach of express warranty. Determining that no material factual disputes existed, the court held that the seller was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the seller had demonstrated that it had fully complied with the warranty on the water heater at issue. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend, also requesting a more specific order. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend except that it provided a more definite statement of the basis for its grant of summary judgment in favor of the seller. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Malik Jones-Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for entry of a corrected judgment form with respect to one of the Petitioner’s convictions.

The Defendant, Julie Christine Ottmer, pled nolo contendere to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an agreed upon sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her nolo contendere plea. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was no manifest injustice to support withdrawal of the plea. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion because she “misunderstood the terms of her plea.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, an estate and its co-executors, appeal from the trial court’s order disqualifying their counsel due to a purported conflict of interest. Because the appellants have appealed from a non-final order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

This is a property damage case. Appellants assert that their property is being damaged by the defective gutter systems of adjacent buildings, which are owned by Appellees. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss Appellants’ complaint, finding that Appellants’ claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for property damage. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-105. Appellants contend that their complaint sounds in nuisance, specifically temporary nuisance, and not in negligence. Accordingly, Appellants argue that the statute of limitations renews with each rain. While we agree with the trial court that Appellants’ claim is one for negligence and not for nuisance, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. Applying the discovery rule and giving Appellants all reasonable inferences based on the averments in their complaint, we conclude that Appellants have pled facts sufficient to survive the motions to dismiss.  

Appellee brought a claim against Appellant insurance agency for “unlawfully and fraudulently” withdrawing funds from Appellee’s bank account and accepting premium payments on two insurance policies after Appellee allegedly cancelled his policies. Although not asserted as a claim in its general sessions summons, the circuit court, on appeal, awarded Appellee a judgment for unjust enrichment in the amount of $397.00. Because the preponderance of the evidence does not support the judgment, we reverse and remand.  

The Defendant, Christopher Joel Hartwell, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement in case number C22683 to conspiracy to commit money laundering, a Class C felony, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a non-dangerous felony, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 53-11-401 (2008) (amended 2010), 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number C22684 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C22685 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). Finally, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C23659 to two counts of the delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone, a Class C felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). After the appropriate merger of the offenses, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five-year sentence of which three years were to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) allowing confidential informants to testify at the sentencing hearing, and (3) not requiring the State to produce discovery materials related to the confidential informants. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mack Mandrell Loyde, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender for the aggravated burglary and employing a firearm convictions, and imposed fifteen-year sentences for each. For the aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a repeat violent offender to life without parole. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also challenges the trial court’s sentencing as to his status as a repeat violent offender and resulting life sentence without the possibility of parole. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s application of the repeat violent offender statute to the defendant’s aggravated robbery conviction and the trial court’s determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence for the three convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the matter of sentencing as to Counts 1 and 3.

The petitioner, James Robert Oliphant, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1983 Washington County Criminal Court conviction of assault with intent to commit second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission to hear an action brought by a former medical student, Eddison Williams (claimant), against the Quillen College of Medicine at East Tennessee State University. Claimant alleged that the State, acting through medical school officials, “negligently breached its contractual duties regarding following policies before dismissing [him] on disciplinary grounds.” He argued his action stated a claim for “negligent care, custody and control of persons,” a category of claims the Commission has jurisdiction to hear under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a)(1)(E) (Supp.2017). The Commission concluded it had no subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

After Appellant’s son violated an order of protection entered against him, Appellant sought relief from the trial court. Although the trial court ruled on some of the issues raised by Appellant, not all of her claims were adjudicated. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

Thomas Kowalski, Michael Kowalski, John J. Kowalski, and Margaret Kowalski (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the February 2, 2017 judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the holographic Last Will and Testament of Francis J. Kowalski (“the Will”) contained a residuary clause such that Francis J. Kowalski (“Deceased”) did not die partially intestate and that the Will granted a conditional life estate in real property located at 2820 Azalea Place (“Azalea Place”) in Nashville to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC. We find and hold that the Will does not contain a residuary clause and that Deceased died partially intestate. We further find and hold that the Will granted a fee determinable estate in Azalea Place to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC. Given all this, we reverse the Trial Court’s judgment as to whether the Will contained a residuary clause and modify the judgment to reflect that the Will granted a fee determinable estate in Azalea Place to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC.

The petitioner, Roy Len Rogers, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2010 Rhea County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and reckless endangerment, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Anthony Penny, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The plea agreement provided for the defendant to be sentenced by the trial court with an agreement his sentences would be served concurrently. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for each count to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider the purposes and principles of sentencing, by applying enhancement factor four, and by failing to properly consider certain mitigating factors under the “catch-all” provision of the statute. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The former director of a culinary program filed a complaint alleging defamation by implication or innuendo and false light invasion of privacy against an individual he claimed was the source of statements made in a newspaper article. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the statements were not actionable as a matter of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the former director appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the trial court.

I concur in the affirmance of the post-conviction court’s judgment, but write separately to state my conclusion that trial counsels rendered deficient performance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s inappropriate questioning during voir dire. The inappropriate questioning is set forth in the majority opinion and does not need to be repeated here. Obviously, it is impossible to determine some things from the record reflected only in the transcript. For instance, the appellate court is unable to ascertain the volume, inflection, and body language of the prosecutor during this rather unorthodox voir dire. Was the prosecutor waiving arms in order to instruct the entire venire to answer aloud at the same time? When the prosecutor informed the venire that the first two answers (by individual members of the venire) were wrong, what was the emphasis on the word “wrong?” What was utilized to successfully have the entire venire adopt the State’s theory in an apparent rhythmic cadence during voir dire? Appellate judges cannot know the answers to these questions from a cold record. However, the answers are not necessary to conclude that the pertinent line of questioning was outside the bounds of proper voir dire. Pertinent to the legal issues involved in this post-conviction appeal is the fact that the prosecutor’s questions had absolutely nothing to do with whether the potential jurors could perform their duty without regard to bias or prejudice. The questioning was a blatant closing argument with the added ability to interact by conversations with the potential jurors.

The Petitioner, Jamie N. Grimes, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school and resulting twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State violated the mandatory joinder rule. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.