APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Nearly nine years ago, Defendant, Walter Andrew Ware, committed aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect and aggravated child endangerment on his two-month-old infant daughter. He was sentenced to a sixteen year sentence, to be served at 100%. Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gevon C. Patton, appeals the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for criminally negligent homicide and especially aggravated kidnapping and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and requests that his case be transferred to another trial court judge upon remand for a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Chris Basham, appeals his convictions for improper display of registration plates, tampering with or fabricating evidence, simple possession of methamphetamine, simple possession of hydrocodone, and simple possession of alprazolam, for which he received an effective three-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when not suppressing the evidence collected during the search of his car, and the prosecution failed to prove chain of custody. Following our consideration of the arguments of the parties, record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce/parental relocation matter in which the father of two minor children opposed the mother’s intended relocation to Ohio. The father also sought a modification of the parties’ parenting plan regardless of whether the mother was permitted to relocate. The mother filed a cross-petition to modify the parenting plan and child support. After determining that the parties spent substantially equal intervals of time with the child, the court conducted a best-interest analysis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest to relocate with the mother. The court concluded that it was not in the children’s best interest to relocate and modified child support to reflect the parties’ current incomes. Although the trial court made an explicit finding that the mother had indeed relocated without the children, the trial court never ruled on the parties’ competing claims to modify the original parenting plan or entered a new parenting plan. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the judgment appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  

Antonio Crenshaw (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction of robbery, for which he was sentenced to fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Kenneth Chandler, the Defendant, of aggravated robbery. He received a sentence of eleven years in the Department of Correction. After filing a notice of appeal with this court, the Defendant filed a motion requesting that the court stay his direct appeal so that he might seek coram nobis relief. This court granted the Defendant’s motion to stay his direct appeal, and the Defendant filed a petition for writ of error nobis relief in the trial court. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court found that statements from the Defendant’s fellow inmates were newly discovered evidence but that the evidence was not admissible as substantive evidence at trial and denied relief. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly act as the thirteenth juror; and (3) the coram nobis court erred in denying his error coram nobis petition. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The defendant, Susan Marie Taylor, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering her to serve her original four-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of her probation and the imposed sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Kenneth Fleming, appeals as of right from his convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred: (1) by giving an improper jury instruction and allowing the case to be presented to the jury when there was insufficient proof to establish venue and jurisdiction; (2) by failing to give a jury instruction on lost or destroyed evidence; (3) by allowing the State to enter a silver handgun and blue toboggan into evidence; (4) by not providing a curative instruction when a witness testified as to other crimes similar to the crime in this case; (5) by allowing the State to make improper comments during closing arguments and by giving an improper curative instruction to the jury; and (6) by sentencing the Defendant partially consecutively. Following our review, the judgments are affirmed.

Petitioner, James Chronicles Cobb, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This case was brought by the landlord of a building that was leased to a limited liability company for purposes of operating a restaurant; the restaurant failed, and the company defaulted on its obligations under the lease and took bankruptcy. The landlord filed suit to recover damages from four persons who had signed agreements guaranteeing performance of the lease to the extent of the guarantors’ interest in the lessee. The case proceeded to trial against one guarantor and, after a bench trial, the court dismissed the action, finding that the guaranty lacked consideration and that the guaranty was invalid and unenforceable because only the guarantor signed it. On appeal, the landlord contends that the trial court erred in both respects. Upon a de novo review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a judgment against the guarantor in the amount of $60,037.97 and for a determination of interest on the judgment.

This is a conservatorship action in which the wife sought appointment as her husband’s conservator. Following a hearing, the court found that the husband was fully disabled and in need of a conservator to manage his personal and financial affairs. The court appointed the wife to serve in that capacity and awarded her spousal support. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Upon the petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both the mother and father of two children. Clear and convincing evidence supports each ground relied upon by the trial court and the trial court’s conclusion that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm.

We granted this appeal to clarify the interplay among appellate review preservation requirements, the plain error doctrine, and the retroactive application of new rules. We conclude that a new rule applies retroactively to cases pending on direct review when the new rule is announced but does so subject to other jurisprudential concepts, such as appellate review preservation requirements and the plain error doctrine. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016), declaring the criminal gang offense statute, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-121(b) (2014), unconstitutional applies to the defendant’s appeal because it was pending on direct review when Bonds was decided. Nevertheless, we evaluate the defendant’s entitlement to relief by applying the plain error doctrine because the defendant failed to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the trial court. We conclude that the defendant has established the criteria necessary to obtain relief pursuant to the plain error doctrine. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision denying the defendant relief and vacate the defendant’s convictions under the criminal gang offense statute. We remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing on the defendant’s remaining convictions in accordance with the sentencing classification ranges established by the specific statutes creating the offenses, without any classification or sentence enhancement pursuant to the criminal gang offense statute.

Christopher Minor was sentenced to serve additional time in prison for violations of the criminal gang offense statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121(b) (2014). While his case was on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 157 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), declared that a portion of the criminal gang offense statute was unconstitutional. Today, the Court vacates Mr. Minor’s convictions for violating the criminal gang offense statute. It is only fair that Mr. Minor should not have to serve additional time in prison for violating a statute that an appellate court declared unconstitutional while his appeal was pending. 

The Defendant, Kenneth O. Williams, entered a guilty plea to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Defendant filed a motion to correct his sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that the trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence him as a Range II, multiple offender or to enhance his sentence above the minimum in the sentencing range. The trial court denied the motion for failure to state a colorable claim, and the Defendant appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant has not articulated a colorable claim that his sentence is illegal, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andre Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to an effective term of thirty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentences and ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce case dealing with numerous issues of interpretation of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan. The plaintiff wife appealed one portion of the on-going case. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

We assumed jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d)(1) and Rule 48 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and ordered expedited briefing and oral argument. The issue we must determine is whether the vacancy in the Office of Mayor of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County may be filled at the August 2, 2018 election, or whether it must be filled at a special election pursuant to section 15.03 of the Metropolitan Charter. We conclude that section 15.03 of the Metropolitan Charter requires that a special election be set, that the Davidson County Election Commission therefore acted in contravention of the Charter in setting the election on August 2, 2018, and that the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wallace’s claims for relief and dismissing this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The Commission is hereby ordered to set a special election in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-14-102(a). This opinion is not subject to rehearing under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, and the Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to immediately issue the mandate.  

This appeal involves a dispute between two limited liability companies (and an individual with an interest in both companies) over four lots in a residential subdivision. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff-company $116,151.87 in proceeds from the sale of lots that were originally owned by the plaintiff. However, the trial court ruled that the defendant-company was entitled to recover $512,795.07 for the amount it expended constructing homes on those lots. The plaintiff-company has appealed, challenging numerous rulings made by the trial court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

In this post-divorce dispute, Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time and obtained an ex parte restraining order based upon Father’s physical altercation with his wife during parenting time with the parties’ children. After a hearing in December 2015, the trial court suspended Father’s parenting time until he took steps to address his anger management issues. At a review hearing in August 2016, the trial court determined that the suspension of Father’s parenting time was no longer in the best interest of the children and adopted the recommendations of Father’s psychologist concerning the reintegration of Father into the lives of the children. The trial court subsequently awarded Mother her attorney fees and discretionary costs incurred throughout the case. On appeal, Father asserts that he should have been awarded his attorney fees for the period of time after the December 2015 hearing and that the trial court erred in awarding Mother her discretionary costs for the same period. Both parties seek their attorney fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees in full. With respect to discretionary costs, we affirm the trial court’s award with the exception of the costs of preparation and travel, which are not authorized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. Each party shall pay his or her own attorney fees and costs on appeal.
 

This appeal involves a dispute over ownership of three easements and allegations of fraud stemming from the failure of Appellee to honor its alleged oral promise to purchase the disputed easements and an adjacent parcel of land owned by Appellants. The trial court, on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, ruled that Appellants had no interest in the easements and that Appellants’ claim arising from the alleged oral promise to purchase the easements and the adjacent parcel of land was barred by the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case wherein the trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights based upon the sole statutory ground of abandonment by incarceration. The court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother timely appealed. We affirm.

Defendant, Danyelle McCullough, was charged with one count of theft over $1,000 and one count of forgery over $1,000 in an indictment returned by the Shelby County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of four years for each count to be served in confinement. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shane T. Usrey, the Defendant, pled guilty to theft of property over the value of $500 in case numbers CR6120, CR6493, and CR7510. In 2017, the Defendant was arrested for violating the terms of his probation by committing domestic assault and aggravated assault. After a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s probation in all three cases and imposed the original sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court should not have placed any probative value on the victim’s testimony because she was intoxicated at the time of the offenses; and (2) the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to have found that the Defendant violated his probation. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract action in which both parties assert affirmative claims. Plaintiff, a Memphis TV station, sued one of its advertisers for breach of an advertising agreement to recover approximately $511,000 for past advertising services. Defendant Advertiser filed a counterclaim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, for constructive fraud, and for breach of contract. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings with respect to the breach of contract claim in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $510,000. Subsequently, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Second Amended Counter-Complaint in its entirety, finding that Defendant failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted. Defendant appealed. We have concluded that Defendant’s Answer constituted a denial that Defendant owed approximately $511,000 in unpaid advertising fees; therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should have been denied. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Defendant’s claims for constructive fraud; however, we have determined that the factual allegations in the Second Amended Counter-Complaint are sufficient to state claims for breach of contract, and claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings.