APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from an order entered on February 23, 2018, terminating the mother’s parental rights. The mother filed her notice of appeal on April 5, 2018, together with a motion to accept an untimely notice of appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the mother’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from an order entered on February 5, 2018, dismissing the appellant’s Petition for Writ for Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum. The appellant filed his notice of appeal on April 2, 2018, together with a motion to accept a late notice of appeal. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional in civil cases and cannot be waived, we deny the appellant’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from a claim of retaliatory discharge. Randy Roberts (“Roberts”) was fired by Tennier Industries, Inc. (“Tennier”) for several stated reasons, including that he kept an unmarked bottle of pills at his desk and was insubordinate. Roberts contends that he was, in fact, fired for having complained about a manager who harassed him. Roberts sued Tennier in the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”). Tennier filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it fired Roberts for valid, non-pretextual reasons. Roberts filed a motion to continue in which he requested more time for discovery in order to probe Tennier’s practices in situations similar to his. The Trial Court denied Roberts’ motion to continue and granted Tennier’s motion for summary judgment. Roberts appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the information for which Roberts sought additional time for discovery could have assisted his case and that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to continue. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Vern Braswell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide the defense with statements of witnesses, items recovered from the Petitioner’s home, and the contents of a sealed envelope that was discovered during the pendency of post-conviction proceedings. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Steven Tyler Nabi, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for trial, failing to properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial, and failing to pursue the issues of the State’s lack of DNA evidence and defense of a third party. Petitioner entered guilty pleas following the State’s presentation of its evidence at trial. Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered because he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the plea acceptance hearing, the trial court failed to properly advise him under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner did not understand that his sentence would be served at 85 percent. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Dale Merritt, was convicted by a Knox County jury of one count of delivery of less than fifteen grams of a Schedule I controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a park and one count of delivery of less than fifteen grams of a Schedule I controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a child care agency. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to seventeen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, David Smith, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve four years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or probation. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the rights of J.R.L. (mother) with respect to her two children, B.M.L. and Z.A.L (the children). DCS alleged four grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (4) persistence of conditions. DCS did not seek in the trial court to support the ground of failure to support. The court found clear and convincing evidence of (1) mother’s failure to provide a suitable home; (2) mother’s failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Chastity Coleman, entered into a plea agreement with the State with an agreed-upon sentence. During the plea colloquy, the trial court invited and met with the Defendant outside the presence of the prosecutor and trial counsel after which the court decided to reduce the Defendant’s period of incarceration. The State appeals. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgments under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. We further conclude that the trial court committed three errors that each independently require reversal: (1) the trial court acted improperly by engaging in ex parte communication with the Defendant; (2) the trial court erred in failing to rule on the State’s motion to recuse while continuing to hear matters involving this case; and (3) the trial court lacked the authority to unilaterally modify the plea agreement. Because the trial judge has predetermined the sentence to be imposed, we remove the trial judge from further consideration of this case. We vacate the judgments and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff employer filed suit against its employee, claiming that he was liable for balances on his commission and sales accounts and for breach of loyalty pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the employee and ordered the employer to direct the redemption of his stock held in the parent company. We reverse, in part, and hold that the parent company is not obligated to redeem the stock and that the employer is entitled to $15,000 in damages for unearned compensation as a result of the employee’s breach of loyalty. The court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We remand for the collection of attorney fees and costs.   

The Defendant, Andrew Young Kim, pled guilty to six counts of burglary, seven counts of theft of property in varying amounts, and one count of vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to continuous confinement for a non-violent property offense and erred in setting the length of his sentences, in denying all forms of alternative sentencing, and in imposing partially consecutive sentences. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the denial of any alternative sentence, and the partial consecutive sentence alignment, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for the Defendant’s Class E felony conviction for theft of property (Count 14), an enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(11). Upon our de novo review of Count 14, we order that the Defendant’s two-year sentence on that count be served on supervised probation with the imposition of $1000 fine. Moreover, for reasons stated herein, Counts 7 through 10 are remanded for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff employer filed suit against its employee, claiming that he was liable for balances on his commission and sales accounts and for breach of loyalty pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the employee and ordered the employer to direct the redemption of his stock held in the parent company. We reverse, in part, and hold that the parent company is not obligated to redeem the stock and that the employer is entitled to $15,000 in damages for unearned compensation as a result of the employee’s breach of loyalty. The court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We remand for the collection of attorney fees and costs.   

The Petitioner, Sheddrick Harris, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2), - 403. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner raises the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the Petitioner that he had a constitutional right to a trial before a different judge than the one who signed the search warrant for the Petitioner’s automobile; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek recusal of the trial judge because the trial judge had an ex parte communication with a head deputy that led to enhanced courtroom security procedures, evincing the trial judge’s bias against the Petitioner, and because the trial judge was the same judge who issued the search warrant; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the warrantless search of the Petitioner’s vehicle, failing to challenge the search warrant by requesting a Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) hearing, and failing to challenge the Petitioner’s illegal detention effectuated without probable cause and without an arrest warrant and solely for the purpose of gathering additional evidence against the Petitioner; and (4) that trial counsel failed to adequately impeach an attorney witness who was facing disciplinary action by the Board of Professional Responsibility at the time of the Petitioner’s trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marcus S. Akins, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of incarceration for the remainder of his three-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcellus Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence concerning his involvement in an attempted robbery of one business and his suspicious activities near another business. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action initiated by Father, the chancery court adjudicated the divorce and entered a parenting plan proposed by Father, naming him as primary residential parent and establishing a residential parenting schedule for the parties’ child; Mother had previously initiated a custody proceeding in Scotland. Mother moved to dismiss the Tennessee proceeding, contending that the Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the divorce because the parties we not domiciled in Tennessee and did not have jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act to adjudicate the child custody matters. Upon Mother’s appeal, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the divorce but, due to the pendency of the proceeding in Scotland, did not have jurisdiction over the custody matters. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of divorce to Father, vacate the parenting plan and child support provisions of the final decree, and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  

The Defendant, Michael Edward Roberts, was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; seven counts of rape, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-304, -13-503, -14-403. The State ultimately dismissed five of the rape charges. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant of aggravated assault and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-301(a)(3), -14-406. The trial court acquitted the Defendant of the aggravated kidnapping charge. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting fresh complaint evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Williams, was convicted by a jury of one count of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, one count of DUI, and one count of reckless driving. The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction with the DUI conviction and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in the county workhouse. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which challenged “the legality of the traffic stop” resulting in the Defendant’s arrest. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A bookkeeper for two companies was terminated after his employers learned that he had a conviction for money laundering and mail fraud arising out of his previous employment. The employee filed suit, alleging that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and his disability, in violation of the Tennessee Disability Act. The employers moved for summary judgment, asserting that the employee was terminated for poor performance and for not disclosing the prior conviction, that these grounds constituted legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds for termination, and that the employee could not demonstrate that these grounds were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employers, and the employee appeals. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the asserted reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are pretextual, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

In this garnishment case, a judgment creditor garnished funds from the joint bank account of a non-debtor depositor and a debtor. The trial court allowed the garnished funds to be tendered to the judgment creditor because the account agreement showed that the joint account was held with rights of survivorship. Tennessee Code Annotated section 45-2- 703(a), however, allows the non-debtor depositor to prove his rights in the funds held in the joint account. Because the non-debtor depositor provided sufficient evidence to prove his rights to the funds in the joint account, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

After Appellant’s son violated an order of protection entered against him, Appellant sought relief from the trial court. Although the trial court ruled on some of the issues raised by Appellant, not all of her claims were adjudicated. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

This appeal involves a request for access to examine records under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505, in which the plaintiff sought the release of civil forfeiture documents from the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for release of the sought-after documents in a non-redacted format. Upon our previous review, we found the issue to be moot owing to the legislative enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 722, § 5. Upon the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of the legislative enactment of 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 113, § 1, which amended the Tennessee Public Records Act. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Defendants, Marcus K. Williams and Corey Zimberlist Rutland, Jr., were indicted for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. Defendant Williams was also indicted for aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Defendants Williams and Rutland were convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and Defendant Williams was convicted of aggravated burglary. At a sentencing hearing, Defendants Williams and Rutland received identical sentences of eleven years for aggravated robbery and five years for aggravated assault. Defendant Williams received a five year sentence for aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated robbery charge. Defendant Rutland argues that the trial court improperly excluded the content of a phone call between Defendant Rutland and Defendant Williams, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under a theory of criminal responsibility, and that his sentence is disproportionate and excessive. Finding that the only error by the trial court was harmless, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Leroy Collins, pled guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of Class C felony reckless endangerment, all committed during one criminal episode. The offenses involved Defendant shooting three people and shooting into a house occupied by two other people. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, the sentence for each conviction of reckless aggravated assault is the minimum sentence of two years, and the sentence for the reckless endangerment conviction is the minimum sentence of three years. The State further agreed that the sentences would be served concurrently with each other, for an effective sentence of three years for four felony convictions committed with a handgun involving three victims being shot. However, the State opposed Defendant’s request for judicial diversion or probation for the effective three-year sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied both requests for alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve the entire sentence by incarceration. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s ruling. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Wendell Guinn, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that his constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct during the jury voir dire and the State’s closing arguments; (2) that the trial court committed several errors in the jury instructions; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.